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ABSTRACT

In 1776, King Charles III of Spain issued his Pragmatic Sanction on marriage,
extending its provisions to Spanish America in 1778. Young persons were to ask
parental permission to marry, and faced punishments if they did not. Any parental
objections had to be “just and rational,” and an applicant had recourse to the courts if a
parent’s objections were not reasonable. In the colony of St. Augustine, Florida, parental
dissent did not meet with a sympathetic hearing. This thesis examines how the Pragmatic
Sanction, with subsequent decrees and orders, was observed or ignored in St. Augustine.
Marriage, as a life milestone, bears implications for the wider society, and the study of
marriage in St. Augustine illuminates personal lives in the colony, shedding light on how
courtship and marriage were conducted in Spanish Florida. An examination of marriage
license petitions filed between 1784 and 1803 brought out social, economic, and racial
concerns in St. Augustine. A literature survey revealed relevant points in the history and
development of the Pragmatic Sanction, permitting an examination of whether or not the
decree was successful in achieving its goals of reducing unequal marriages – a term
undefined in the documents – and of strengthening the authority of the patriarchy at both
the family and Crown levels. This research shows that equality, quality (character), and
honor were the primary considerations in St. Augustine, ahead of religious and racial
purity. This paper’s conclusions regarding implementation of the pragmática in St.
Augustine challenge current scholarship concerning its application in the rest of Spanish
America. In St. Augustine, at least, the Pragmatic Sanction failed to achieve its goals.
iv

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

On 23 March 1776, King Charles III of Spain proclaimed his real pragmática de
casamientos, the Royal Pragmatic, or Pragmatic Sanction, on marriage. It was part of the
overall cast of Bourbon reforms in which the monarchy sought to strengthen itself vis-avis the Catholic Church. While recognizing the Church’s important role in marriage, the
Pragmatic Sanction expressed the King’s desire that Spain should “avoid engagement and
marriage contracts entered into by minors without the counsel of their parents,
grandparents, or guardians, which result in grave offenses to God our Lord, discords in
families, and scandals and other grave disruptions, moral and political.”1 The provisions
of the Pragmatic Sanction applied only to Spain. In 1778, Charles III extended its
provisions to Spain’s overseas empire. Over the next several years, royal decrees and
orders were issued to emphasize, modify, and strengthen the provisions of the 1776
pragmática.2

1

Richard Konetzke, Colección de Documentos para la Historia de la Formación Social de
Hispanoamérica, 1494-1810, Vol. III, Book 1 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas,
1962), 406. The wording is: “Por cuanto con el fin de evitar los contratos de esponsales y matrimonios
que se ejecutaban por los menores e hijos de familias sin consejo de sus padres, abuelos, deudos o tutores,
de que resultaban graves ofensas a Dios, nuestro Señor , discordias en las familias, escándalos y otras
gravísimas inconvenientes, en lo moral y político . . .” Translation mine. Unless otherwise noted, all
translations in this thesis are mine.
2
There were other decrees issued both before and after the 1776 pragmática and its 1778 extension
pertaining to military marriages and marriages of government officials. These decrees will not be
examined except for those directly and specifically referring to the pragmática, or relating directly to
Section 15 of the 1776 decree, in which military members were held to the same requirements as civilians
in regard to requesting permission from their parents or other qualified persons. Questions regarding the
broader range of laws and regulations pertaining to marriage will have to be the subject of further
investigation.
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The key provision in the 1776 pragmática was that persons under the age of
twenty-five years were required to receive parental permission before entering into a
marriage contract. The document also required that individuals contemplating marriage
be of equal social standing and be limpia de sangre (literally, clean of blood), that is to
say, white Spanish Catholics with no Moorish or Jewish blood.
We will examine how these provisions, and the provisions of the decrees, royal
orders, and other documents issued subsequent to the Pragmatic Sanction were applied in
St. Augustine, Florida, during the second period of Spanish possession, specifically the
years 1784 to 1803.3 These petitions are found in the East Florida Papers, a series of
documents created by the governmental and military administration of St. Augustine
from 1784 to 1821. If there were further petitions from 1804 into 1821, their location is
not known. They could be in the archives in either Cuba or Spain, or for that matter,
considering the vagaries of Florida’s sometimes infamous weather, they could be at the
bottom of the sea. Another possible explanation for the lack of these documents after
1803 may lie in sweeping changes to the provision covering parental consent and the age
at which such consent was necessary. These changes, instituted by Charles IV in a royal
decree of 10 April 1803, will be discussed in Chapter Eight.4
Why should these documents and the application of the pragmática be of concern?
Marriage is one of the three milestones of life along with birth and death. St. Augustine
3

The Second Spanish Period ended in 1821, when the United States took possession of Florida. However,
the key documents studied in this paper, the marriage license petitions entered by townspeople who wished
to marry, cover only the years 1784 to 1803.
4
The royal declarations issued after 1778 also present a problem of availability, notably ones of 26 August
and 19 November 1788, to which other royal decrees referred. A search of the Spanish archives website
did not yield the fugitive decrees, nor are they listed in the online index to the East Florida Papers
maintained by the University of Florida. They were not listed in Roscoe R. Hill’s Descriptive Catalogue of
the Documents Relating to the History of the United States in the Papeles Procedentes de Cuba Deposited
in the Archivo General de Indias at Seville, nor are they found in Richard Konetzke’s Colección de
Documentos para la Historia de la Formación Social de Hispanoamérica.
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society during the period under study was in these basic facts of life no different from any
other society: people were born, they married, and they died. The documentation of
these events forms the basis of family studies, whether from a social, historical, or
genealogical standpoint.
Using the tools of genealogy and history, we can ask important questions about
the history of marriage in Second Spanish Period St. Augustine: Are there separations by
race or class? How do these separations affect the formation and conduct of society?
Following this introduction, Chapter Two presents a historiography of the
institution of marriage in Spanish society, on the Iberian Peninsula and in the New
World. Little has been written on that subject relating to the city of St. Augustine. The
historiography will examine what has been written about St. Augustine’s marriages, as
well as the broader view of marriage in Latin America and in Spain. The broadest
coverage of the topic of marriage and society in Spanish America focuses on Mexico, an
area investigated in depth. This historiography will also examine the conclusions of
various scholars concerning the status of women, and concerning the pragmática.
Chapter Three is a description of the methodology used in this paper, and a
comprehensive source note on the Pragmatic Sanction and its successor documents which
modified, amplified, and reinforced it, and the marriage license petitions and a few other
selected documents from the East Florida Papers regarding St. Augustine.
Chapter Four provides a discussion of the language in the sources. On the
surface, word definitions change over time. More deeply, these shifts in definition signal
shifts in thought. One phenomenon discovered in these sources is that some words used
in St. Augustine’s documents were used in ways that had not been used in Spain for
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decades. The Crown thought of its empire as one body, while, in reality, Spain and its
colonies became different societies indeed. Language can reveal these fundamental
differences in mentalities. As historians have learned, language is also gendered, and
this chapter will explore some of the gendered words and their contemporaneous
meanings, which reveal differences in the status of women and men, as well as providing
clues to male-female relationships.5
Chapter Five continues the examination of language, particularly one key
concept: honor. Several different words were used to express this idea. An honorable
person may have been described as honrado, decente, or as a persona blanca. One could
be described as possessing honradez. Tracking both the dictionary definitions of these
words at that time and their local usage in St. Augustine reveals clues to the social
attitudes of its people. We may ask how important honor was to the residents of St.
Augustine, and along which dimensions: racial, sexual, religious, or moral.
Chapter Six examines the history of the status of women in Spanish society on
both sides of the Atlantic. The question of marriage in any age heavily involves the
status of women. The subject of marriage is a study of power as much as of gender.
Marriage in St. Augustine and in Spanish America reflected a balance of power often
skewed against women. The power disadvantage experienced by women was often
codified in law. Women in Spanish society were bound by rules and expectations
5

Authorities for the definitions and etymologies of words are found on the Nuevo Tesoro Lexicográfico de
la Lengua Española (New Lexicographic Treasure of the Spanish Language, hereinafter NTLLE), online at
http://ntlle.rae.es/ntlle/SrvltGUILoginNtlle. This resource holds the digitized and searchable contents of
dictionaries from 1495 to the present day, as collected and presented by the Spanish Royal Academy. In
most instances, I used the dictionary closest in time to the period of the document in which a particular
word appears, to come as close as possible to the contemporaneous meaning. As indicated above, however,
the most contemporaneous meaning in Spain may not necessarily have been the same meaning intended by
the creators of documents in St. Augustine. One word, at least, in use in St. Augustine in the time period
in question did not enter the dictionary until the twentieth century. Context often must play a part in
determining the intended meaning, a task not always easy.

4

imposed by men. This chapter examines the various social levels occupied by women,
whether elite, middle class, lower class, or the lowest. Elite women were placed on a
pedestal, accompanied and observed everywhere – even in their homes. Lower-status
women had more freedom of movement, and more risk of being accosted by men. We
will look at the work done by women, and at the status of widows. Scholars found that in
Mexico, widows had little chance of remarriage. However, in St. Augustine the pool of
eligible potential mates was so small that widows of nearly any age did not remain alone
for long.
Chapter Seven is a history of marriage laws, civil and ecclesiastical, under the
Spanish regimes, beginning with the Siete Partidas (seven divisions) of Alfono X, “El
Sabio” (the Wise, or the Learned).6 There is brief mention of the Laws of Toro, the chief
purpose of which was to codify the laws of inheritance and disinheritance.7 The Council
of Trent, which met during the middle sixteenth century and set the Church’s policies on
marriage, among other aspects of Catholic doctrine, will also be examined. These laws –
Toro, the Siete Partidas, and the canon law of the Church established at Trent – all find
echoes in the real pragmática de casamientos.
Chapter Eight examines the history of the real pragmática de casamientos, its
1778 modification, and successive documents, and the changes over time wrought by
these later decrees. The pragmática spawned numerous lawsuits, requiring the king to
6

The Siete Partidas (seven divisions) were completed between 1256 and 1265. In 1272, the Cortés of
Burgos reacted against the new code, fearing that it was being implemented to replace the fueros, laws
specific to certain localities, and the customs of the nobility. Alfonso X affirmed the fueros and customs,
along with the Partidas. Alfonso XI later, circa 1348, affirmed the Partidas as having the force of law.
See Joseph F. O’Callaghan, “Alfonso X and the Partidas,” in Robert I. Burns, S. J., ed., and Samuel
Parsons Scott, trans., Las Siete Partidas, Volume I: The Medieval Church: the World of Clerics and
Laymen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), xxxix-xl.
7
The Laws of Toro were another codification, completed in 1505. They dealt mainly with inheritance, but
a few of the laws, to be examined in Chapter Seven, dealt with marriage and with the power of the male
over the female.
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issue subsequent decrees clarifying, explaining, or enforcing the provisions of the
original decree. The flood of litigation was stopped by the decree of 10 April 1803.
Chapter Nine examines how the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction on
marriage, and succeeding documents, were applied in St. Augustine. Did St. Augustine’s
residents follow established patterns from other areas of Spanish America? Case studies
will illustrate how the decree was carried out in St. Augustine. How does the application
of the Pragmatic Sanction in St. Augustine compare with the results obtained by scholars
studying the broader scope of Latin American marriages? For one thing, in Mexico, the
Pragmatic Sanction was seen as prohibiting interracial marriage. There is no specific
language in the Pragmatic Sanction against interracial marriage. In St. Augustine, though
there were few interracial marriages, there was no indication in the documents that the
Pragmatic Sanction was interpreted as prohibiting them.
The central question is: How closely did the authorities in St. Augustine observe
the provisions of the pragmática and of the succeeding decrees and royal orders intended
to strengthen it during the Second Spanish Period? Subordinate or related questions to be
examined are: What was the historical background of the pragmática? How did the
pragmática change the administration of marriage and the conditions thereof? How did
succeeding decrees and royal orders modify, augment, or change the provisions of the
pragmática? What were the elements of the pragmática and its successor decrees, and
how were they applied in St. Augustine? Were exceptions made in specific cases in St.
Augustine, and what were they? Which elements of the pragmática, if any, received
more emphasis in St. Augustine? Which, if any, appeared to be routinely ignored? Upon
what criteria was the concept of inequality in marriage based, as applied in St. Augustine
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– was it socio-economic class, race, or a combination of the two? How important was
social status or class in late colonial St. Augustine? How did the concept of honor apply,
particularly in marriage, in St. Augustine? Was the pragmática successful in achieving
its stated goals, or was it a failure?

7

CHAPTER TWO:
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MARRIAGE IN SPAIN AND HER COLONIES

“Historical conclusions are not infallible, but when they are well
evidenced and carefully argued they deserve to be taken as telling
us something true about the world. We can question the truth claims
of an historical narrative without going so far as to relegate it to
merely one fiction among others. There are always multiple narratives
of any historical moment, but that does not mean that as interpretations
they cannot tell us something true.”
-- Matthew Restall8

St. Augustine
Little has been written about marriage in St. Augustine. Patricia Griffin briefly
addresses the subject in Mullet on the Beach: the Minorcans of Florida, 1768-1788,
discussing particular marriages only insofar as they united specific families. She also
points out that in 1784, 1785, and 1786, marriages were performed only in the month of
December.9 Daniel Schafer discusses the marriage of Zephaniah Kingsley to Ana
Madgigine Jai, a marriage that had little to do with the real pragmática de casamientos
since Ana was an African woman, and blacks were excluded from coverage under the
8

Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), xvii.
Patricia C. Griffin, Mullet on the Beach: the Minorcans of Florida, 1768-1788 (Jacksonville: University
of North Florida Press, 1991), 171. Fathers Hassett and O’Reilly were faced with completely rebuilding
the Catholic parish church in St. Augustine from the ground up. The building that housed the church was
uninhabitable. Though they conducted baptisms and burials year-round, the necessity of building and
equipping a church, and the attempts to reclaim church furnishings shipped to Cuba in 1763, compelled
them to limit marriages. The priests conducted a correspondence with the bisopric in Cuba in an attempt to
reclaim church furnishings and fixtures. See letter requesting the return of church goods, Letters from the
Captain-General, Reel 1, Bundle 1B, 1788-1789, East Florida Papers, folio 79R. Some of the goods were
finally shipped to St. Augustine in 1795, but were hijacked by an unspecified “enemy” and carried to
Charleston, South Carolina. See letter from Juan Francisco de Olide Ytrriola to Governor Juan
Nepomuceno de Quesada, With Bishop and Curate, Reel 38, Bundle 100I8, East Florida Papers (folios not
numbered).
9

8

pragmática. However, of value is Schafer’s statement that “Racial prejudice existed in
Spanish East Florida, but it lacked the exclusionary rigidity found in nearby Georgia and
South Carolina.”10 Also, the existence of this marriage, and the practice of concubinage
by other elite men, demonstrates that race was not as much an issue in terms of marriage
as scholars have reported it to have been in Mexico.
In Zéspedes in East Florida, 1784-1790, Helen Hornbeck Tanner describes an
embarrassing event when the younger daughter of Governor Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes
y Velasco entered into a clandestine marriage.11 The marriage was against the wishes of
Governor Zéspedes, and created a crisis of honor in his family.12 The story of this
marriage illuminates the problem of clandestine marriage in St. Augustine, as well as the
available punishments. Clandestine marriage remained a problem in St. Augustine and
its vicinity, despite repeated decrees against it.
The social structure in St. Augustine in the Second Spanish Period allowed at
least a measure of upward social mobility. Griffin describes some individual survivors of
the fiasco of Andrew Turnbull’s plantation. They came into St. Augustine as refugees,
with nothing more than the shirts on their backs, and several of them ended up doing well
indeed. By the late 1780s or early 1790s, a number of them, including the Corsican
Pedro Cosifacio, the Italian Domenico Martinelli, Bernardo Seguí of Minorca, and the
Minorcan matriarchs Inéz Victori (married name Cavedo) and Isabel Perpal, had become

10

Daniel L. Schafer, Anna Madgigine Jai Kingsley: African Princess, Florida Slave, Plantation
Slaveowner (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 37-38.
11
A clandestine marriage is one for which the banns were not published. For the rationale behind
prohibitions against clandestine marriages, see Chapter Seven, page 104.
12
Helen Hornbeck Tanner, Zéspedes in East Florida, 1784-1790 (Jacksonville: University of North Florida
Press, 1989), 73-78.
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relatively wealthy and earned the honorifics don and doña.13 Three members of the
planter elite, the internationalist Zephaniah Kingsley, the Swiss Francis Philip Fatio
(Francisco Felipe Fatio), and the St. Augustine-bred Francisco Xavier Sánchez, represent
the successes and vicissitudes of their class.14
The most in-depth study of St. Augustine’s white social structure is Susan Lois
Pickman’s doctoral thesis, Life on the Spanish-American Colonial Frontier: a study in
the Social and Economic History of Mid-Eighteenth Century St. Augustine, Florida.
Though Pickman’s study concentrates on late First Spanish Period St. Augustine, roughly
the years 1740 to 1763, it provides clues to the social structure of the town in the Second
Spanish Period. Pickman describes a creole elite, the floridanos, who held power and
wealth at the end of the First Spanish Period. They held their power through tight kinship
bonds, land possession, and the influence these advantages conveyed.15 She identifies
several influential floridano families at the end of the First Spanish Period who, though
not as powerful, were still influential in the Second Spanish Period, many of them having
remained in St. Augustine through the twenty years of British rule, 1763-1783. These
13

Domenico Martinelli was referred to in the Spanish documents as Domingo Martinoly or Martinely.
However, he signed his name in the Italian fashion as Domenico Martinelli. Likewise, Pedro Cosifacio has
been referred to as Pedro Cosifaci, but he signed his name as Cosifacio, He adoped this spelling over his
native name of Cosifacci. Francisco Felipe Fatio, as he was known to the Spanish, signed his name as F. P.
Fatio, for Francis Philip Fatio, the name I use for him herein. Spellings of people’s names are as they
signed them on documents. The problem is more difficult with the illiterate, some of whose names appear
in several forms. In that, I have simply had to choose.
14
A floridano was a person born in Florida of Spanish parents. In Florida, it replaced the word criollo, one
born in Spanish America of Spanish parents. See Chapter Four. Kingsley is featured in two books by
Daniel Schafer: Anna Madgigine Jai Kingsley: African Princess, Florida Slave, Plantation Slaveowner,
and Zephaniah Kingsley, Jr., and the Atlantic World: Slave Trader, Plantation Owner, Emancipator. Fatio
and Sánchez each appear in essays in the anthology Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida, edited
by Jane G. Landers. Susan R. Parker studied Fatio’s plantation operation “Success through Diversification:
Francis Philip Fatio’s New Switzerland Plantation.” The Sánchez enterprise is the subject of “Francisco
Xavier Sánchez, Floridano Planter and Merchant,” by Jane G. Landers. In these books and articles, the
idea of class is evident. Tanner, in her biography of Zéspedes, portrays the elite stratum of the Royal
governor and other prominent officials and high-ranking military officers.
15
Susan Lois Pickman, Life on the Spanish-American Colonial Frontier: a Study in the Social and
Economic History of Mid-Eighteenth-Century St. Augustine, Florida (Ph.D. dissertation, State University
of New York, Stony Brook, 1981), 155. She does not definitely state the period covered in her dissertation.
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include the Solana, Hita, Avero, and Arrivas families.16 This landed elite, in the Second
Spanish Period, was not included in the government, which was a military as well as a
civil government and consisted almost entirely of peninsulares – men from Spain – with
a few Cubans, including the last Spanish period governor, José Coppinger.
Pickman points out that as this floridano landed elite grew wealthier, they closed
ranks. No longer could a peninsular male marry into a floridano family. The floridano
elite grew more endogamous, marrying among themselves.17 This trend was reversed in
the Second Spanish Period, with floridano offspring intermarrying not only with
peninsular Spaniards, but also with offspring of the Anglo elite of East Florida, an
example of this being the marriage of Francisco Xavier Sánchez and María del Carmen
Hill, daughter of Theresa and Theophilus Hill. Also at the end of the First Spanish Period
there was a growing merchant middle class of entrepreneurs, traders, and businessmen
who allied their interests with those of the floridanos and forged political ties with them.
These middle-class men were ambitious and determined to break into the upper class.
Just as Bourbon marriage reforms were greeted with resistance in other areas of Spanish
America as threatening to close the upper class to the ambitions of the middle class, so
they were in St. Augustine.18
Patricia Griffin explores the life of “Mary Evans, a Woman of Substance,”
presenting an examination of one member of St. Augustine’s elite and the problems she
had in maintaining her status despite the self-destructive activities of her wastrel third
husband.19 Kathleen Deagan examines “Mestizaje in Colonial St. Augustine,” finding

16

Ibid., 188.
Ibid., 168.
18
Ibid., 179.
19
Patricia C. Griffin, “Mary Evans, a Woman of Substance,” El Escribano Vol. 14, 57-76.
17
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that there was significantly less race-mixing there than in other areas of Spanish America.
The low rate of Spanish-Indian marriage in St. Augustine resulted in a nearly complete
lack of a mestizo population in East Florida, unlike the rest of Spanish America.20
Deagan’s work concentrates on the First Spanish Period (1565-1763), but sets the stage
for one important way in which St. Augustine differed from the rest of colonial Spanish
America in marriage practices and in social composition.21

Mexico
Mexico is the subject of the most thorough studies of marriage in Spanish
America in the colonial period. Robert McCaa wrote two articles on his studies of the
town of Parral, Mexico. In “Calidad, Clase, and Marriage in Colonial Mexico: the Case
of Parral, 1788-90,” he examined the use of the words calidad (quality) and clase (class)
in Mexico at the end of the eighteenth century. In his estimation, the historical meanings
he examined have been lost under layers of modern interpretation. In Mexico at the time
of which he wrote, calidad and clase were ingredients in the formula for determining the
equality of parties to a marriage, as required by the pragmática. He compared census
data from before the marriages celebrated in 1788-1790 to the marriage records, looking
for any “drift” in stated race. His question was whether the stated race of the groom, or
more likely, the bride underwent any change. He found such change, in that after
marriage, no matter what their stated race had been in the previous census, the racial
20
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affiliation of the marriage partners converged in the marriage records.22 Mention of race
in the marriage license petitions filed in St. Augustine tended to be limited to a statement
that a prospective bride or groom was “clean of all vile race of mulatto, Negro, Moor or
Jew.”23 In the five cases of interracial marriage (peninsular Spaniard and mulatto
woman), the race of the bride was mentioned only once. Race is mentioned only once in
the marriage records of St. Augustine’s parish church. That mention concerned the
marriage of two Indians.24 The fact that race was so seldom mentioned in the marriage
records may indicate a more relaxed attitude toward race than that found in Mexico.
In another article based on his work in Parral, McCaa examined factors
influencing choice of marriage partners. The factors of calidad and clase were important
determinants in such choices.25 In another article, McCaa discussed changes in marriage
law from the Council of Trent to the Bourbon reforms, ending with the royal decree of 10
April 1803, which mandated the most drastic changes from the original 1776 pragmática,
changes which worked to the disadvantage of women.26
Woodrow Borah and Sherburne Cook, in “Marriage and Legitimacy in Mexican
Culture: Mexico and California,” take the history of Spanish marriage law back to the
Romans.27 They discuss legal marriage and informal consensual unions in relation to
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social class. Silvia Arrom examined marriage patterns in early nineteenth-century
Mexico. By then, not much had changed in terms of the concepts of class and quality,
which Arrom brings into her discussion, with findings similar to McCaa.28 Sonia LipsettRivera examined women’s status and how women’s rights and recourses diminished over
a period of years. Her inquiry concerned the canons of the Council of Trent, and the idea
promoted by theologians that force and violence were serious impediments to marriage.29
Patricia Seed described an ongoing effort by the state to curb the power of the
Church over marriage.30 It was not a change in parental behavior in objecting to their
offsprings’ marriages that influenced the trend. Rather, the focus of social control
changed, moving away from the Church to the state, a reflection of a general social move
toward patriarchal control in the home as well as on the throne. Honor was the primary
social virtue to the Spanish, linked to the female’s sexual purity and the sacredness of a
promise given.31 Seed also emphasized the importance of language, of understanding the
words used in documents as they were understood at the time they were used. The
definition of “inequality” she uncovered shows a shift in meaning during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, from social inequality to inequality of wealth. She attributed
this to the rise of capitalism and the growth of the merchant class. In St. Augustine,
parental concern over the economics of marriage focused more on the ability of the
prospective groom to support a family.32
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María Elena Martínez examined the peninsular origins of the term limpieza de
sangre, describing it in religious terms. It was the standard for purity and orthodoxy,
excluding from the inner circle of the pure Catholic faithful anyone with a hint of Jewish
or Moorish ancestry. The Spanish became “obsessed with genealogy” to prove a
Christian lineage.33 Limpieza de sangre was the ideology of Spain, and the component
parts of that ideology were descent and religious faith. Conditions in the New World
altered the ideology, influenced by the large numbers of slaves imported from Africa, a
growing population of mixed-race people, waves of poor Spaniards who hoped to better
themselves and improve their social status, and an economy based on race slavery. She
complained that most studies of limpieza have been limited to the late colonial period.
Her aim was to examine the early importation of the concept of limpieza and to explore
how it developed in Spanish America, in light of religion, race, gender, and sexuality.
Martínez also discussed the meanings of words in their temporal context. In
particular, she examineed the etymology of the word raza (race), which in the sixteenth
century had a meaning more akin to “lineage” than to what many people have viewed as
a biological condition. In the seventeenth century, the word came to be more pejorative,
and to include Jews, Moors, and Protestants. By the beginning of the eighteenth century,
limpieza de sangre became attached to physical appearance, mainly skin color. By the
late eighteenth century, the transformation of the meaning of “purity of blood” from the
religious to the racial, aimed at individuals of African descent, was complete. Martínez
described a legal and social construct which prescribed a distinction between private and
public life, which resulted in a divergence between the theory of limpieza de sangre and
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its actual practice in colonial Spanish America. Finally, Martínez saw the pragmática as
part of the Crown’s overall campaign to severely restrict the Catholic Church’s authority
and autonomy.
Another view of the obsession with genealogy among Mexican elites is found in
Ilona Katzew’s study, Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico.
Katzew quotes other scholars in pointing out that the elaborate nomenclature involved in
casta painting was not used in daily life, and that the paintings represented the elite’s
obsession with their lineages in order to prove limpieza de sangre more than anything
else. The genealogical preoccupation is also evident in Katzew’s discussion of calidad,
of which limpieza de sangre constituted only one element. Katzew demonstrates how
race is socially constructed and why: physical appearance could be deceiving, but
knowing a person’s forebears and being able to classify that person would put – and keep
– him in his place. In Katzew’s view, the extension of the pragmática to the colonies in
1778 represented a drastic curtailment of freedom of choice in marriage.34
In her book Violación, estupro y sexualidad: Nueva Galicia, 1790-1821, Carmen
Castañeda García studied the sexual dimension of women’s status relating to rape. She
analyzed public records of rape and abduction cases to obtain the statements of the
victims. She also studied the discourses on sexuality and sex crimes found in texts on
canon law; civil legislation; the canons of the Council of Trent; and the guidebooks for
priests, known as confessionals. Her goal was to examine the conflicts between men and
women regarding sexual conduct which brought them under the jurisdiction of the
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ecclesiastical and civil courts. She also explored the mechanisms of the colonial legal
system which resulted in women’s subordination and victimization.35

Other Studies of Marriage in Spanish America
In her introduction to a book of essays she edited, Lavrín examined the history of
the palabra de casamiento, the word or promise of marriage. Then she commented on
the subject of free will in marriage choice, invoking the Council of Trent. It was not just
marriage that was at issue, in her view, but also the family honor, expressed most
emphatically in both sexual and socio-economic terms. Civil law emphasized and
enforced inheritance and property rights, an emphasis aimed at strengthening the basic
social unit: the family. Family honor as a social construct was designed to assure the
legitimacy of the heirs of the family, to sustain its socio-economic position. Emphasis on
female virginity at marriage was intended to assure a trusted line of inheritance. To
Lavrín, the intent of the pragmática was to maintain the social elite.36 In the opening
essay in the collection, she described an increase in social control by the Church in the
seventeenth century. She discussed the restrictions on sexuality and on marriage, and the
two degrees of impediments to marriage and the elements of each.37
Ann Twinam wrote about illegitimacy and its effect on status and opportunities
for women. She described and defined who was “elite” in colonial Mexico, and the
prerogatives they held, including being able to purchase legitimacy and have the stain of
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illegitimacy removed from their lineage – even purchasing legitimacy for ancestors long
dead.38 Like McCaa, Seed, and Martínez, Twinam delved into the contemporaneous
meanings of words as they were used to describe levels of illegitimacy, and the stigmata
associated with each. Twinam examined honor, concluding that it was the rationale for
the hierarchy in colonial Spanish America. The idea of honor was closely linked to the
ideology of limpieza de sangre. In Twinam’s view, honor had racial, religious,
genealogical, and sexual dimensions which served to control women, especially their
sexuality. Elites created the ideology of limpieza de sangre, and with it an elaborate
fiction of a sharp division between private and public life. Private reality could be
manipulated to protect public reputation among members of the elite.39
Susan Migden Socolow’s contribution to Lavrín’s anthology changed the scene
from Mexico to Argentina. Socolow examined marriage as a legitimizing institution
geared toward the preservation of family patrimony, usually taking place between social
equals. Spanish society’s reaction to the marriage of two socially unequal people had a
bearing on its attitude toward upward mobility, in Socolow’s view. She studied parental
and familial opposition to marriages in the area of the Río de la Plata, examining how
regulations and laws on marriage were applied. Suitability of marriage partners fell
under the sole discretion of the Church until the 1778 extension of the 1776 pragmática
changed the game, giving dominion over marriage choice to parents and the civil courts.
Socolow found that “equality” in Argentina was defined by race, social status, moral
reputation, and economic status, but that race, that is to say, the degree of black ancestry,
38
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was the major determinant. Like Twinam, Socolow found that the concept of honor
worked primarily to control female sexuality as a means of ensuring the legitimacy of
family lines. Socolow also found racial “drift,” but in a different sense from McCaa’s
findings. McCaa found that a man’s racial identification could change if he married
unequally, but that more often it was the woman’s identification that changed. Socolow
found that a woman’s racial identification in public records depended on that of her
husband. In Socolow’s sample, a Spanish woman married to a mulatto man became, to
the census taker, the notary, and the public, a mulatto. Socolow concluded that the
pragmática was not successful in preventing socially or racially unequal marriages.40 In
the marriage license petitions filed in St. Augustine, examined in Chapter Six and
Chapter Nine, the Pragmatic Sanction failed to prevent at least four such marriages.41
In his chapter, “Women, La Mala Vida, and the Politics of Marriage.” Richard
Boyer examined patriarchalism historically and culturally. In the view of the Church, the
father was the undisputed head of the family. This view was supported in the advice and
instructions given to clergy. The power of the father – the patria potestad – was
tempered by the requirement that he was responsible for the welfare of those under his
control. This was the idea of the padrón, that the man in power – whether he be the head
of a family, the head of the Church, or the head of state – was required to protect and
treat with dignity those over whom he had control. Reality could be quite different.
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Boyer showed that the treatment of a wife by her husband was not always benign.
A man had the right to beat his wife for her correction or edification. The beatings were
to be carried out with restraint, as it was viewed at that time, or else the reciprocity
necessary to a marriage would be threatened. Women who suffered excessive cruelty at
the hands of their husbands, whether the abuse was physical or psychological, were said
to be subjected to la mala vida (the evil life). Boyer brought up one essential point:
Marriage was best understood from the woman’s viewpoint, as she had less power, little
recourse in the event of abuse, and in the eyes of the Church, a stronger moral claim to
just and loving treatment by her husband, whether she actually received it or not.
However, marital politics being more about power than they are about gender, it was not
unheard of for a woman to administer la mala vida to her husband, as happened on at
least one documented occasion in St. Augustine.42

Gender
In addition to the above writings, gender figures in other articles by Asunción
Lavrín and Ann Twinam, joined in this topic by Mary Elizabeth Perry, Ramón A.
Gutiérrez, and Edith Couturier (with Lavrín), and in books by Twinam and by Socolow.
Gutiérrez discusses marriage along dimensions of class, power, and gender. In marriage,
men had more power over women than women ever attained over men. The definition of
honor was also gendered. The characteristics of an honorable man differed sharply from
those of an honorable woman. Honor for men described their conduct on the battlefield,
in business or profession, and as one man to another within the structure of the
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patriarchy. Honor for women was exclusively sexually defined. Gutiérrez appears to
agree with Twinam that the elites defined honor, to separate themselves from
commoners.43
Mary Elizabeth Perry studied gender ideology in Seville and found that, early on,
that ideology was driven by religion more than by any other factor. The ideology of
limpieza de sangre depended directly on female chastity, which underpinned the
legitimacy of a family line. Honor and power were gendered, with men having absolute
power in the home. Men carried the banner for the family in the wider world; women
stayed home. Even widows, though permitted to own and dispose of property and to run
a business, had to depend on male help in some circumstances.44
Lavrín points out that women were not always as severely sheltered as some
scholars have suggested, nor was honor so rigid a concept. Gender, of course, did play a
role both in the delineation of a woman’s place in society and in the idea of honor.45
Lavrín and Couturier collaborated on “Las Mujeres Tienen la Palabra” (women have the
word). According to their analysis, women in Mexico had little influence politically or
economically, as they focused primarily on their families. Even those who ran small
businesses or shops did so to support themselves and their children, rather than as an
independent career choice. Women suffered the disadvantage of a lack of networks,
Lavrín and Couturier argue, which hampered their efforts at group action and gave them
43
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no political representation. One tool women had that gave them legal force before both
ecclesiastical and civil courts was the palabra de casamiento, the promise of marriage.46
Ann Twinam discusses forces that shaped elite gender attitudes. She presents a
case study in “private pregnancy,” in which an infant was brought to a priest as an
orphan, the result of a clandestine affair involving elite individuals, at least one of whom
was probably married to someone else. Twinam delves into the assumptions about
women behind this case.47 This idea of “private pregnancy,” and the manipulation of
birth records, acted to protect members of the elite.
One case in St. Augustine may be an example of such a pregnancy. A child
named Inéz Ana Antonia, whose surname was not recorded, was born 17 November 1786
and baptized on the same day.48 Godparents were Lorenzo Capó, the sacristan, and doña
Inéz (Victori) Cavedo, who became the matriarch of an influential Minorcan family.
Patricia Griffin suggests that doña Inéz may have served as a midwife.49 That suggests
that she may have known who the mother of the child was, and possibly who the father
was, as well. Of the cases of illegitimacy recorded in the baptism records of St.
Augustine between 1784 and 1799, this is the only one in which the father did not come
forward and acknowledge the baby. If this was a “private pregnancy,” the child would
have been brought immediately and secretly to Father Miguel O’Reilly, who officiated at
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the baptism. It may be that the parents’ identities were concealed to prevent
embarrassment to an elite family or families.
In The Women of Colonial Latin America, Socolow investigated marriage in
greater depth, discussing how both Church and state viewed the institution. The most
common pattern, according to Socolow, was for women to marry someone of the same
race, occupational group, social stratum, and parish as their fathers. She characterized
marriage as a process that began with the exchange of the palabra de casamiento. It was
a process that offered both peril and opportunity, more to women than to men. Women
often found advantages in marriage: protection, financial support, and honor. There were
disadvantages at times, including la mala vida, a controlling or abusive husband, or the
risks of childbirth. Socolow joins Martínez and Twinam in studying “private
pregnancies” and their occasional sad consequences. Like Boyer, she discussed a
husband’s power over his wife, and la mala vida.

The Council of Trent
Four scholars treated the subject of the canons declared by the Council of Trent
pertaining to marriage, promulgated during the twenty-fourth session, 11 November
1563. Susan Socolow examined matrimonial files (expedientes matrimoniales) filed in
Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1786. Socolow views these documents not in light of the real
pragmática de casamientos but in terms of the Council of Trent. These were files that a
clergyman would open to determine if the marital pair was suited for marriage on the
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basis of being single and other factors.50 William Roberts examines the marriage canons
of Trent as to what errors they were intended to correct, and the reforms Trent instituted
in order to correct those errors.51
Allyson Poska discusses the Council of Trent, briefly describing conditions before
Trent, then after. Broadly, the purpose of the Council was to “redefine the role of the
parish and the sacraments,” including the sacrament of marriage. According to Poska,
Spain had been moving toward religious homogeneity both as an impetus for and a result
of the reconquista. Spanish victory resulted in the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews
in 1492. By the canons on marriage, the Church took charge of regulating social and
sexual relations, and took control of the marriage process. The Church banned premarital
and extramarital sex, with the burden of responsibility and punishment for these offences
being laid more heavily on women than on men. Thus gender again entered into the
question of marriage-related behavior.52

The Real Pragmática de Casamientos
As to the real pragmática de casamientos of 1776 and its extension to the colonies
in 1778, Christian Buschges presents a case study, when “Don Manuel Valdivieso y
Carrión Protests the Marriage of his Daughter to Don Teodoro Jaramillo, a Person of
Lower Standing,” also in Boyer and Spurling’s Colonial Lives. Until the proclamation of
50
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the pragmática, and its extension, the Church had regulated marriage, supporting freedom
of choice of marriage partner and independence from parental control. That changed in
1776 in Spain and 1778 in the colonies. Buschges maintains that the pragmática and its
extension were intended to prevent socially unequal marriages. After the promulgation
of the decrees from the Crown, there followed a spate of lawsuits contesting and testing
the new law. This suit, brought in Quito in 1784, charged that the daughter in question
had been seduced by Jaramillo, who was allegedly of lower social status. The marriage
would dishonor the Valdivieso family. Questions treated in the suit centered on
Jaramillo’s quality, his racial purity (he was white), that he was “honorable” (decente),
and that his means of earning a living were not “ignoble, mean, nor plebeian.”53
Steinar A. Saether differs with other scholars on the background and meaning of
the pragmática of 1776 and the 1778 decree, claiming that the others have misunderstood
their history and purpose. In Saether’s view, the decrees were not a reaction to sociopolitical events in the Americas nor were they attempts to limit Church power. They did
not constitute a ban on interracial marriage. They were not conservative or old-fashioned
in the face of progressive reforms. Rather, Saether argues that the Bourbon reforms
worked to strengthen the power and influence of the Crown, to make the state more
efficient, and to modernize it. But did not the Crown’s effort to strengthen its own power
and influence in any particular area thereby reduce those of the Church? The Bourbon
reforms were modeled on those already carried out in other European countries, says
Saether, though he does not identify which countries. The Bourbon view of government
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was absolutist, based on patriarchy, hierarchy, and the absolute authority of the King.
This model was acceptable in Spain, but encountered resistance in Spanish America. The
Crown was not ready for this conflict in mentalities.54
Rodrigo Andreucci Aguilera described a history of the pragmática, and found
historical underpinnings for the Pragmatic Sanction in the prohibition in 1563 of
clandestine marriage by Philip II. The King called for punishment for the couple
contracting a clandestine marriage and for those having a hand in the union, whether
witnesses or accomplices. Their goods could be confiscated, they could be exiled. If any
person exiled for this reason returned to Spain, his life would be forfeit. The marital
couple could also be disinherited by their parents. Aguilera makes no connection
between King Philip’s proclamation and the canon of the Council of Trent issued in that
same year against clandestine marriage. He also fails to point out a connection between
this proclamation and the provisions against clandestine marriage in the Laws of Toro.55
María Luz Alonso argued a different origin for the Pragmatic Sanction.56 She
cites contemporary sources which maintained that the true origin and motivating factor
for the issuance of the pragmática was Crown Prince Luis de Borbón’s possible marriage
to a woman of inferior status. One problem with this argument is that there was concern
over unequal marriages more than twenty years before the promulgation of the decree of
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1776. In 1752, Spanish cleric José de Tenebra expressed the opinion that unequal
marriages should be prevented.57
In this framework, and using original documents and secondary sources, this
paper will reconstruct how the pragmática and subsequent rulings were applied – or
ignored – in St. Augustine.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

“Studies of any body of documentation can be used to support almost
any hypothesis about past behavior, since our knowledge of past
conduct is always incomplete and partial.”
-- Patricia Seed58

Methodology
Three types of sources support the arguments presented herein. The secondary
sources contain the results of research by scholars into questions of marriage in the
Spanish Empire during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The
pragmática of 1776, the decree of 1778, and successor decrees are the original documents
regarding the law of marriage at the time. The matrimonial licenses filed in St. Augustine
from 1784 through 1803 are the original documentation of marriage promises and
petitions for permission to marry in the Spanish Florida city.
Examination of the various laws reveals their provisions and tracks the changes
wrought in the subsequent decrees. This serves to establish the pattern of the
requirements of these laws. The studies described in the abovementioned secondary
sources, compared with the laws themselves, provide a picture of the underpinnings of
the changes in these laws, that is to say, how the law responded to social and political
conditions.
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The marriage license petitions were chosen for their role as the initial document
filed in many cases of intended marriage. They were prompted by the first article of the
1776 pragmática, which required that those intending to be married obtain the counsel or
consent of their parents in order to marry. These petitions also stemmed from Articles
Eight and Nine, which mandated that parents must consent to a marriage unless they had
“just and rational” reasons for denying permission, and that young people had recourse to
the courts to contest their parents’ opposition. Also applicable here are Articles Four and
Five of the 1778 decree, that individuals whose parents or other qualified persons lived
too far away for timely response to a request for consent would instead petition local
authorities for permission. The provisions of the pragmática will be discussed further in
Chapter Eight.
These petitions were analyzed along several dimensions. Were the petitions in
conformance with the provisions of the pragmática as extended to the colonies by the
decree of 1778? How was language used to express the ideas of the equality of marriage
partners, the quality of persons, purity of blood (limpieza de sangre), race, status, and
honor as these were applied in St. Augustine? How frequent were parental objections to
marriages? Upon what criteria were these objections based? Were these objections to
particular marriages successful? What do these documents reveal about the status of
women in St. Augustine at that time?

The Original Documents
The documentary sources used in this research come mostly from the East Florida
Papers, a collection of official documents, letters, reports, and similar papers seized by

29

the United States in 1821 at St. Augustine. There are 146 marriage license petitions,
spanning the years 1784 to 1803.59 The majority of these documents are formulaic and
without a great deal of information, consisting of the petition by the prospective groom or
bride, or both, who request a license to be allowed to marry, supported by the testimony
of witnesses, and the ruling of the tribunal made up of the governor, the city and military
auditor, and the notary. The usual basis for these petitions was the absence of parents,
grandparents, guardians, or others who were qualified, under the real pragmática de
casamientos, to give permission for the marriage. This license, once granted, then
allowed the parties to continue on to the local parish church for the expediente
matrimonial, the file opened by the local parochial curate, who was also the ecclesiastical
judge. The curate would question the groom and the bride to assess their fitness for
marriage, that is to say, to be sure they were single, that they were not related within the
fourth degree of kinship, that they had not promised marriage to another, and that they
had not taken religious vows of chastity or entered a religious order.
Other documents in the East Florida Papers used as sources include letters
between the governors in St. Augustine and the Captains-General in Havana, between the
governors and other Royal and ecclesiastical officials, and between the governors and
other officials in East Florida, on a variety of topics. A few letters discuss clandestine
marriages, which had long been prohibited by the church, a view restated at the Council
of Trent in the mid-sixteenth century. The state’s prohibition of clandestine marriage
appeared in the codification of the Siete Partidas in the thirteenth century. The East
Florida Papers also contain the text of several of the proclamations made subsequent to
the issuance of 1778 decree which applied the pragmática to the colonies.
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Some demographic data, including information about women business owners in
St. Augustine, come from the Municipal Accounts on Reel 148 of the East Florida
Papers. These consist of records of quarterly taxes assessed on business premises. These
documents record the date, the name of the person paying the tax, and the neighborhood
in which the business was located.
Baptismal records figure in an illustrative case concerning marriage, illegitimacy,
and the status of women in St. Augustine. In these records, we see many hijos naturales
(natural children), whose parents were not married, to each other or to anyone else.
Occasionally, there are marginal notes in the baptismal records indicating that a natural
child was legitimized by the subsequent marriage of his or her parents. There were
eighteen natural children listed in the baptismal records from 1784 to 1799. Information
on these cases was taken from transcriptions of the baptismal records in the archives of
the Diocese of St. Augustine.60
Early in 2015, the marriage, burial, and baptismal records themselves, in digitized
form, became available on the website of Vanderbilt University. Transcription and
translation of the records from 1784 to the fall of 1788 is made more difficult by the fact
that they are in Latin. In 1788, on a visita, or inspection tour, of the St. Augustine parish,
Bishop Cirilo de Barcelona, Auxiliary Bishop of Cuba, decreed that henceforth the
marriage, baptismal, and burial records would be kept in Spanish. He also prescribed
formats for each, which appear in those records.61
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Primary Documents in Derivative Sources
For the text of the real pragmática de casamientos of 1776, the decree of 1778
which extended the provisions of the pragmática to Spanish America, and many of the
subsequent decrees, Richard Konetzke provided the most complete transcriptions.62 The
original of the real pragmática de casamientos likely no longer exists. Patricia Seed, in
her notes to her book To Love, Honor, and Obey in Colonial Mexico, cites Konetzke as
her source for the text of the pragmática. A much earlier publication contains the text of
the pragmática, closer to the time of its promulgation.63 Comparison of Konetzke’s
transcription of the pragmática of 1776 and that of Santos Sánchez shows the Konetzke
version to be more complete. Konetzke included one paragraph at the beginning and one
at the end, both of which Sánchez omitted in his transcription. The wording in Sánchez is
in the third person (“Siendo propio de la Real autoridad”), where Konetzke uses the first
person (“Siendo propio de mi Real autoridad”). Also, in the quoted fragments here, the
Sánchez version begins with “Siendo propio,” etc., as the first paragraph, whereas in the
Konetzke transcription, this is the second paragraph, and it begins “Don Carlos, por la
gracia de Dios Rey de Castilla, etc., sabed que siendo propio,” and so forth.64
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There exists a digitized copy of a document which purports to be the pragmática,
or a copy of it.65 The document appears to be a copy that was entered into a day book or
other record on some local level. It is in a bound volume, and is not in a court hand, the
precise, elegant, and error-free handwriting used in documents that originated in the royal
court. The wording is slightly different from the Sánchez and Konetzke transcriptions,
and it appears incomplete. In comparison to the Sánchez and Konetzke versions, it is
missing the last five or six paragraphs, respectively. The blogger gives no information
for this truncated version, nor does he give a source. An indication that this document is
or at one time was in private hands is revealed in a stamp on the recto of the first folio
with the name Arturo Padilla Fuentes, abogado (attorney), dated 10 January 1953.
Konetzke’s transcriptions are more complete and more reliable .
For the text and explication of the Siete Partidas, the Samuel Parsons Scott
translation edited by Robert I. Burns, SJ, was selected. The Siete Partidas is the code of
laws compiled by King Alfonso X, “El Sabio” in the thirteenth century. The Laws of
Toro, codified in 1505, appear in Compendio de los Comentarios Extendidos por el
Maestro Antonio Gómez a las Ochenta y Tres Leyes de Toro, compiled by Pedro Nolasco
de Llano (1795). These laws dealt almost exclusively with inheritance, but one of the
laws restates the Crown’s position against clandestine marriage. Another of the Laws of
Toro states that a man had the right to kill his wife and her paramour if he caught them in
the act of having illicit sex.
The relevant canons of the Council of Trent, a middle sixteenth-century Catholic
Church body whose long deliberations produced a revision and codification of canon law,
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are drawn from the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent with a Supplement
Containing the Condemnation of the Early Reformers, and Other Matters Relating to the
Council, translated by Theodore Alois Buckley, published in 1851, and from J.
Wentworth’s The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Oecumenical Council of Trent
published in 1848.66
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CHAPTER FOUR:
LANGUAGE IN THE SOURCES:
INTERPRETING THE MENTALITIES
“There is no other way to define what we mean when we refer to
a given language than to say the language of Rome in the year x;
the language of Annecy in the year y. In other words, to take a
single restricted locality and a single point in time.”
-- Ferdinand de Saussure67

In interpreting the original documents we must depend on the words of those who
created them. Language conveys ideas, but also represents the thought behind the ideas.
Chapter 2 showed that there developed a discontinuity of mentalities between Spain and
its colonies in the Americas. It becomes obvious that Charles III came to have the same
problem George III of England had with his colonies which lay to the north of St.
Augustine. Each monarch thought of his empire as being of one mind, while the AngloAmericans and the Spanish colonists were developing their own culture, with separate
and distinct ways of thinking and of viewing their world.
Patricia Seed refers to a set of broadly-shared cultural mores and beliefs
represented by a word or a phrase.68 When a word or phrase was used in the colonies
with marked difference from the usage in the metropolis, we can infer a difference in
thought as well. Between Spain and St. Augustine, the discontinuity in mentalities finds
representation in the language each used in its documents. Creators of documents in St.
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Augustine used words in ways not used in Spain for decades, and St. Augustine used at
least one word Spain did not – floridano (see page 67).
To Patricia Seed, the study of the language used by families in their objections to
their children’s marriages and by church officials in their responses established dominant
sets of meanings. Language reflects “the history of change in socially constituted
meanings as understood and expressed in a given historical period.”69 The idea of the
particular historical period is important when considering language, for meanings change
over time. Boyer offers an explanation for the use of what in Spain would be archaic
meanings by officials in St. Augustine: “. . . at the level of family and private life, beliefs
and behavior showed little change during the three hundred years of Spanish rule in the
Indies.”70 The slow pace of change in social behavior was reflected in the use of
language by officials to describe and attempt to control that behavior.

Calidad and Clase: the Social Basis of “Equality”
In Chapter Two, the words calidad (quality) and clase (class) were discussed as
representing concepts important to the idea of marriage equality. The evolution of
meaning in these two words is instructive. Calidad appeared in a 1495 Spanish
dictionary, the earliest included on the NTLLE. In dictionaries ranging from that year to
1609, in English, French, Latin, and Italian, the definition was simply “quality.”71
Recognizing that dictionaries reflect language as it develops, and tend to lag behind its
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everyday use, by 1611, calidad had come to be applied to persons, being defined as “a
person of quality, a man of authority and of parts.”72 However, a simpler interpretation
appeared between 1617 and 1729, with the definition again being merely “quality.”73 In
the 1620 and 1679 dictionaries, there was an added definition for the phrase “person of
quality,” defining such a one as “a person of quality, authority, and command” (1620),
and as “a man of principle, authority, and dignity” (1679).74
In the 1729 definition in the Royal Academy’s dictionary, the first definition
discussed the taxonomic qualities of species.75 The second discussed the quality of trade
goods, as in a product’s freshness or construction or other aspects to be judged as fit for
sale.76 It was in the third definition that referred to the qualities of a noble human being:
the nobility and distinction of one’s blood (lineage), “and thus of the knight or hidalgo of
old was said, he is a man of quality.”77 This definition, with the statement about the
knights and hidalgos of old, placed the definition back in time. Thus it demonstrated a
relationship to history and lineage, and the relevance of the word calidad to, and perhaps
in, the past. A fourth definition further spoke of the distinction in a person or thing,
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increasing it in esteem, seeing it (or him) from inside as well as outside. That is to say,
the moral and philosophical as well as physical qualities of a person or thing.78 In the
fifth definition, calidad referred to the gravity or importance of a thing.79
Finally, the sixth definition described the condition and requirements of a contract
or other writing, as being fit in its contents.80 This could have referred to marriage
contracts. The fitness of a marriage contract would be of concern to civil authorities,
who were called upon to pass on that fitness, as well as to ecclesiastical authorities,
whose processes, the expediente matrimonial and the marriage ceremony, would depend
on the fitness of the civil contract. Under the practice of the Pragmatic Sanction in St.
Augustine, these processes would not occur if the civil contract did not receive the
approval of the governor. A typical order by a governor would read:
“The information produced by Antonio Alberty and Antonia Tudorina is
sufficient, and at his superior validation and signature, His Lordship interposes his
authority and his judicial decree as he is able, and has standing in law. And in
consequence thereof, he has ordered that they be given certification of this order
so that they may appear before the [ecclesiastical] judge of competent jurisdiction
to perform the remaining actions which may be necessary for the marriage which
the parties seek to contract.”81
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Thus in the years between 1617 and 1729, there had developed fine distinctions in
the concept of “quality,” from a simple indication that something was good – had quality
– to differentiation along the lines of taxonomy, commercial products, business
negotiations and contracts, and of course to the quality that elevated one person over
another. Reflected in the concept of quality as representing a “distinction of blood,” was
the idea of a properly “clean” genealogy, the growth of the concept of limpieza de sangre.
In the 1780 and 1783 dictionaries of the Spanish Royal Academy (diccionarios de
la Real Academia Española, hereinafter DRAE), aside from taxonomic and commercial
definitions, calidad was defined as “nobility and distinction of blood” in the second
definition and as “the importance or gravity of some thing” in the fourth.82 In that, there
was not much change from 1729. In the 1786 dictionary written by a Jesuit, called the
Terreros y Pando, calidad was defined as “the character of a person.” The 1791 DRAE
used the definition found in 1780 and 1783 as “nobility and distinction of blood.” In the
1803 DRAE, the definition remained the same.83
Ilona Katzew enumerates the elements of calidad, as the word was applied to the
character and quality of persons in Mexico: economic status, social position, cultural
factors, racial (that is to say, physical) features, reputation, occupation, wealth, limpieza
de sangre, honor, integrity, and origin.84 Many of these, at one time or another, are
reflected in the marriage license petitions filed in St. Augustine.
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In an odd twist on the economic factor, José Coruña, father of Antonio Coruña,
objected to his son’s proposed marriage to Angela Rosi. José’s objection was that the
couple “has no means, nor even a bed in which to sleep, and has nothing on which to live
besides ten pesos of salary . . .”85 In this case, the objection of a parent was based on his
own child’s lack of means. A parent’s objection to the poverty of her child’s intended
spouse was the issue in the opposition of doña Luisa Pérez, a widow, to the marriage of
her daughter, doña Felicitas Almanza, to don Juan Blas de Entralgo. Doña Luisa’s
objection “consisted of no other thing than that the intended groom is poor, without office
or employment, nor any other means to support himself than that which he earns by his
pen . . .”86 He had an honorable lineage, apparently, but subsisted poorly as a writer or
scribe, or possibly a notary. If he was a notary, his name does not appear as the
government notary, so he may have operated privately, or as a representative of another
entity such as the church.
Probably St. Augustine’s most famous instance of a parent’s opposition on the
basis of economic inequality did not make it into the marriage license petitions. Irish
soldier John O’Donovan had asked Governor Zéspedes for permission to marry his
daughter, Dominga. Zéspedes refused to give his consent. The couple disobeyed,
arranging a clandestine marriage. Zéspedes wrote to don José, Count of Gálvez, saying
he had told O’Donovan that “he needed sufficient means to support my daughter with the
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honor corresponding to her birth.”87 These three cases support Patricia Seed’s assertion
that economic disparity centered on the prospective groom having the financial means to
support a family properly rather than on a general wealth-versus- poverty dichotomy.88
Social status concerns were reflected in the many petitions in which an intended
bride or intended groom was described as being from an honorable family, of good
qualities and circumstances, and socially equal to his or her intended. An example of this
is the testimony of witnesses Miguel Hernandez and Lorenzo Capó that Juan Pons and
Juana Andreu were “both of equal quality.”89 Antonio Mestre described don Dimas
Cortés and doña Agueda Seguí as “persons of the first circumstances of that land, for
their birth, esteem, and good conduct.”90 Race and reputation figured in the case of Juan
Antonio García and Caterina Brown, both of whom had African ancestry. Witness
Antonio Hernandez testified that he knew García in Campeche, Mexico, and that García’s
parents were “known publicly as people of color and of low esteem.” He also knew
Caterina in St. Augustine, and says she was “a mulatto woman, for having been the
daughter of a Negro woman and a white Englishman.”91
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Concern with a man’s occupation appeared in only one of the marriage petitions,
that of don Nicolás Sánchez to marry doña Magdalena Joaneda. Testifying on behalf of
both the intended groom and the bride, witness Tomás de Aguilar stated that “all are
honorable persons, of good reputation, and neither employed in a disgraceful
occupation.”92 It is interesting that an individual characterized by the honorific “don”
would encounter any question as to the social acceptability of his line of work.93
The question of origin arose once, in the application of Louis Trunston, a French
sailor seeking to become a citizen (vecino) of St. Augustine. His petition diverged from
the usual motive of lack of parents or any other person qualified to grant permission to
marry, though reference was also made to this condition. Trunston sought to have his
good conduct as a stranger (one whose place of origin was not St. Augustine or other
Spanish territory) verified so that he could marry Juana Gornes, a citizen of the town.
Town citizens José Turdas and Pedro Trope testified to Trunston’s good conduct and
seven-year term of residence in St. Augustine.94 Thus most of the high notes of Katzew’s
list of elements of calidad found expression at least once in the matrimonial license
petitions of St. Augustine.
Calidad in these petitions was often used in the plural, calidades, as in “the many
good qualities” of a petitioner or his or her intended. Sometimes the qualities were
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enumerated: honesty, being of a good family, recognition in the town (de pública voz y
fama – of public voice and fame) as honorable. These were indicators not just of social
class but of individual comportment and upright character, no matter if the individual was
of the elite or a commoner. Honor was important at all levels.
In these petitions, calidad was the second-most frequent concern of the tribunal,
the petitioners, and the witnesses in their responses (See Chart 1). Typical responses to
questions of calidad were: “being both parties of equal quality, as is public
knowledge;”95 “in view of there being no inequality in the qualities of both parties . . .;”96
“being certain of the good qualities and circumstances of the intended bride.”97 In his
petition, Mariano Lasaga praises the “qualities of honor and purity of blood” of his
intended, Ynés Generino.98 Two witnesses in the petition of José Arnau to marry
Magdalena Manucy recognized that “both are equal in quality and purity of blood
(limpieza de sangre).”99 Calidad, in St. Augustine during the period in question, seems to
refer mainly to social qualities, including the factor of religious purity which made one
socially acceptable in Spanish society, wherever it occurred.
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Clase and calidad became the basis upon which equality of marriage partners was
determined. Both words became part of the ideology of limpieza de sangre. Clase was a
more recent addition to the Spanish vocabulary, first seen in the 1611 dictionary
characterized as Covarrubias, where it referred to classes of naval vessels. The word also
applied to the divisions of an institution of higher learning, to classify students.100 In
another dictionary from 1611, the Rosal, clase was defined simply as lonja, defined
primarily as the language of business negotiations. It also referred to places where
soldiers lodged, and to rooms where many came together, as in classrooms.101 In the
1679 Henríquez dictionary, it was defined in Latin as ordo (order, as in taxonomy).102
The 1729 Academia Autoridades, volume 2 spelled clase as classe. This
dictionary presented detailed definitions. In the first, classe was defined as “Order
chosen in any material in which there are different individuals: as, the class of the
Angelic Spirits, the class of the Apostles, of the Saints, of the Martyrs. The word is taken
from the Latin classis.”103 The second definition signified “also a distinct order of
persons that results in the division in the neighborhoods of any city, town, or population,
for the government and knowledge of the individuals and citizens which comprise it.104
The third definition signified “also the grade or quality that corresponds to the sphere of
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any individuals: as, the class of Nobles, Hijosdalgo, Doctors, Masters, the learned,
politicians, etc.”105 The fourth definition spoke of the classification of students.
In the 1780 edition of the Royal Academy’s dictionary, clase was defined as “the
order or number of persons of the same grade, quality, or office, as in the class of
grandees, of titled nobility, etc.”106 This may not necessarily have indicated social class
as much as it referred to an estate. In any event, this definition described a status
elevated above the commoners. The nobility was cited as an example. In St. Augustine,
there were no nobles, grandees, or hidalgos. The elite in St. Augustine was based more
on social position, such as government officials, priests, wealthy merchants, and wealthy
ranchers and planters. The definition of clase was the same in 1783’s DRAE, but in the
1786 Terreros y Pando, it was defined as a “distinction of persons or things, in order to
place them or examine them according to their value and nature.” This definition more
strongly emphasized social class, with the idea that among individuals, some had more
value than others.107 In the 1791 and 1803 editions of the DRAE, the definition was the
same as that of 1780 and 1783.108 Whether appearing to emphasize social class or titled
estate, these definitions reflected a hierarchal and structured society.
What conclusion may we draw from the fact that the word calidad appears in
sixty-nine of the 146 marriage petitions of St. Augustine, but the word clase appears only
once? It may be that a strict division of social class was not all that important in Second
Spanish Period St. Augustine. It may be that the word calidad was seen as containing the
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concept of clase in reference to the “quality” or “qualities” of an individual. Another
factor may lie in the social composition of St. Augustine. There was no aristocracy.
There were no grandees, no marquises, no counts, no hidalgos. There were elites. The
military and official elite based its status on political and military power, the power of the
government. The planter elite was wealthy and better educated. Not all the wealthy
Chart 1
Words used in marriage license petitions of St. Augustine, Florida

Sanguinidad Limpieza Igualdad
de Sangre

Honor*

Calidad,
Mala raza
Calidades

Clase

*The word honor encompasses here the words honrado/honrada, honradez, and
blanco/blanca. This chart represents the frequency of these words found in the 146
marriage license petitions filed between 1784 and 1803.
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planters were of Spanish descent like Francisco Xavier Sánchez. Many were British,
such as Zephaniah Kingsley, or other European, such as the Swiss Francis Philip Fatio.
Just under the military and planter elites were the merchant and professional elites, many
of them self-made. They were Spanish (including Cubans), Minorcans, English, Irish,
and Americans. Such diversity, including a growing proportion of Americans infused
with principles of individual liberty, and the vicissitudes of living on a frontier, may have
loosened the sense of class and privilege. St. Augustine was a small frontier garrison
town. It is likely that everyone knew everyone else, and the town’s residents recognized
their mutual dependence. The wise person takes care not to offend someone upon whom
he must depend for employment, food, or protection.
This one use of the word clase may indeed have been simply a way to express the
idea of equality of status, a concept also conveyed by the idea of equality of calidades, as
found in two witness statements in the marriage license petition of José Fernández
Pinerua to marry María Antonia Watson. Witness Diego Riollo stated that the two were
“white (or honest: blanca) persons and of the same status (estado).” Witness Rafael Neto
expressed the same sentiment by saying that José and his intended were “white (honest)
and of the same class (clase).”109

Raza, Casta, Castizo: the Racial Basis of Social Inequality
The meanings and uses of the words raza, casta, and castizo represented a
complex world. To begin simply, the first appearance of raza in a dictionary included
today in the NTLLE was in the Palet, a Spanish-French dictionary issued in 1604. The
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definition was simply “race.”110 María Elena Martínez maintains that this is also to be
taken as “lineage,” and that one could be of good or bad lineage.111 The first time the
word was defined other than as “race” is in the 1611 Covarrubias edition: “Race in
lineages is taken as vile, as in having any race of Moor or Jew.”112 The word did not
appear as other than “race” again until the 1737 Academia Autoridades: “Caste or quality
of origin or lineage. Speaking of men, it is taken regularly as vile.”113 The 1783 and
1791 DRAE contained the same definition as this 1737 edition.114 Rather than an
expression of race as it is viewed in the twenty-first century, this definition of race was a
denunciation of any mixture as a deviation from purity. Thus, despite Martínez, to
consider this denunciation of mixture was to consider something distasteful and beneath
the dignity of a proper Spaniard. Race was not necessarily linked to color, but it was
indicative of the “other,” the outsider, the nonconforming.
Raza became “linked to sin and heresy,” and to Jews, Muslims, and Protestants,
who were “stained or defective” due to their heresies.115 The word had more of a
religious connotation than does “race” in the twenty-first century. There were two
features of raza related to limpieza de sangre. Old Christians wanted to exclude
segments of society from high office and influence, to retain their own hold on these
benefits. The Inquisition’s efforts to expose “hidden” Jews, those newly converted to
Catholicism but suspected of continuing to practice Judaism, also figured into the
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ideology of raza and limpieza de sangre.116 Raza as a word to describe a denigrated
segment of society was used in the sixteenth century more by the church than the state. It
was used not to distinguish nobility from commoners, but to characterize lineages with
Jewish or Moorish connections The word became pejorative, to refer to Jews, Moors,
and to a lesser extent, to Protestants.117 Color was not yet a consideration, at least not in
Spain. The ideology behind this application of the word raza held that “[c]ertain
communities were believed to derive from different biblical ancestors, and thus some
were thought to have more privileged lineages than others.”118 In other words, all were
equal in the sight of God, but some, as Old Catholics, were more equal than others.119
The definition and usage of raza may sound as if it approached the twenty-first
century reference to color when Fray Juan de Pineda compared humanity to horsebreeding. Horses were all the same “race” (that is to say, all horses were horses), but
some were of a better lineage. So, too, human beings “had particular origins and hence
specific characteristics. And just as one tried to produce better horses by not breeding
those of good lineage with lesser ones, so with humans.”120 The origins referred to here
were, again, those of Moor or Jew or even Protestant, and proper Catholic Spaniards
would not want to mix with these, but would prefer to keep their lineage “pure.” The
same dichotomies of purity and impurity, beauty and ugliness, and rationality versus
sensuality that we see expressed in racism in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first
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centuries also informed the struggle between newly converted Christians and those old
Christians who viewed the newly-converted with suspicion and distaste.121
The most frequent usage of the word raza in the marriage petitions of St.
Augustine appears in the phrase mala raza, or vile race. The phrase may or may not be
extended, as in “limpia de toda mala raza de moro, Judío, mulato . . .” (clean (pure) of all
vile race of Moor, Jew, mulatto). In some instances, the word negro is used, rather than
mulato. Thus the word raza, in St. Augustine, encompassed both religion and race. Race
and religion were also lumped together in an alternative expression of this sentiment, as
in the statement of witness Domenico Martinelli to the petition of José Turdas to marry
María Gabarda. “. . . that the intended bride María Gabarda is a person known as honest,
pure of all vile race of Moors, mulattos, Jews, and of other vile sect.”122 (secta: error or
false religion).123 Mala raza did not receive frequent mention as an impediment to
marriage in St. Augustine, as shown on Chart 1. How an individual was socially
perceived carried more weight than physical appearance.124 It was also true that black
and white rarely intermarried in St. Augustine.
The words casta and castizo, which in Spain referred to good lineage, came to
have different meanings in Spanish America. Though these words were not used in the
marriage license petitions of St. Augustine, their absence can be as instructive as their
presence. As with raza, the word casta first appeared in 1495 simply as a reference to
lineage, but with the specification of good lineage.125 In dictionaries issued in 1505 and
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1516, the same definition appeared.126 The two words converged in 1570, wherein casta
was defined as raza.127 Such simplicity and merging of meaning continued in dictionaries
issued between 1591 and 1609.128 In 1611, the definition of casta was at last expanded,
and included another word that was to become important in considerations of calidad: “It
understands noble lineage and castizo, that which is of good line and descendance; . . .
castizos we call that which is of good lineage and casta.”129 Modern lexicographers
might cringe at the circumlocution in that definition, but the emphasis is on a positive
connotation. Casta gained another connotation in 1729, that of legitimacy: “Generation
and lineage which comes from known parents.”130
It was not until 1780 that any pejorative meaning was attached to the word casta
in Spain, when the 1780 dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy defined it as
“Generation or lineage. Said also of those devoid of reason (los irracionales).”131 The
same definition appeared in the 1783 edition.132 Those devoid of reason, of course, were
those who deviated from the mainstream, who did not conform to the proper and pure
Spanish Catholic model. In 1729 appeared a phrase in Spanish usage, hacer casta, “to
procreate, and have children.” There was also mention of a joking reference in speaking
of persons of reason (los racionales).133 By 1780, the phrase had become pejorative, the
opposite of its 1729 meaning: “to produce those devoid of reason (irracionales).” The
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same meaning appeared in the 1783 edition of the DRAE.134 Still, in Spain, there was no
reference to color in the definition of casta.
Castizo was another word that began as referring simply to good lineage.135 It
evolved, being defined as “of noble blood” in 1609 and “of a good race or breed” in
1706.136 The influence of Spanish America appeared in the second definition of castizo
in the 1706 dictionary: “Son of a mestizo and a mestiza,” which does not conform to the
usage in casta paintings of this period.137 A castizo resulted from a mestizo or mestiza
and a Spaniard, a definition reflected in the captions used by the casta painters in their
art.138 This second definition did not appear in any other Spanish dictionary through
1783. In 1729, castizo is defined as being of known origin and lineage, which resembled
the definition of casta in the same dictionary, as being of known parents.139 The
emphasis on known origin or parentage indicated a concern with legitimacy, another
consideration in determining the quality and the suitability of a person as a marriage
partner. A man wanted to be sure his children were his, so the family legacy would be
passed on to an intact and known line. In the marriage license petitions of St. Augustine,
there were frequent references to the petitioner or the intended as being the legitimate son
or daughter of his or her parents. The definition of castizo found in 1780 and 1783
reflected concern with legitimacy, “that which is of good origin and lineage.”140 Good
lineage was legitimate lineage.
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María Elena Martínez states that in Spain, castizo indicated someone of good
family and lineage, and morisco meant someone of Moorish heritage.141 In Mexico, a
castizo was the product of a mestizo or mestiza and a Spaniard. A morisco in Mexico
was the product of a mulata or mulato and a Spaniard – a different definition indeed and
one which links the elements of mala raza: religion and race.142 Martínez also says that
in Mexico castizo had no redeeming qualities.143 But in what seems to be a contradiction,
Martínez also calls it “no linguistic accident” that castizo became the label for the
mixture of Spanish and Indian blood (a mestizo being the product of a Spaniard and an
Indian). It indicated acknowledgement “of the aristocratic bloodlines of some such
mixtures, products of Spanish conquistadors and Indian nobility.144 Indeed, Indian
nobility was seen as the equivalent of being Spanish in Section 3 of the 1788 decree
extending the real pragmática de casamientos to the colonies.145 If there was racism
reflected in the pragmática and the 1788 decree, according to Martínez, it was selective,
referring exclusively to those of African descent, who were pointedly excluded by law.
The absence of casta and castizo in St. Augustine’s documents supports Deagan’s
assertion that intermarriage between Spanish and Indians was rare. There was no need
for words to describe a situation that did not exist. There were also few marriages
between whites and mulattos or negroes. In the composition of the marriages of its white
citizens, St. Augustine more closely resembled Spain than it did the rest of Spanish
America.
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Sanguinidad: an Archaic Term
The word sanguinidad appeared first in the 1604 Palet dictionary, with the
meaning of “parentage.” The meaning was the same in the 1607 Oudin, and in the 1609
Vittori, along with another definition as consanguinidade (Italian: consanguinity). That
same definition appears in the 1617 Minshieu edition. The definition appears as
“consanguinity” in the 1705 Sobrino and 1721 Bluteau editions.146 After that, the word
was not found in Spanish dictionaries. Thus in the marriage license petitions of St.
Augustine, citizens and officials used a word that had not appeared in Spain’s dictionaries
for at least sixty-three years. The word used in the 1780s and 1790s in Spain was
consanguinidad, defined in the 1791 DRAE as the “union by natural parentage of various
persons who descend from the same root or trunk.”147 In those documents, its use
denoted specified degrees of blood kinship, as in the Church’s prohibition of marriage
within the fourth degree of consanguinity.
In the marriage license petitions of St. Augustine, the word sanguinidad was used
in the sense of quality of lineage. In the petition that don Fernando de la Maza
Arredondo filed for permission to marry doña Antonia Perdomo, Arredondo stated “that
having investigated the possible familial relationships between them, they are verified in
every part to be free of all obstacle.”148 That would include the obstacle of close blood
relationship. The same statement appeared in the petitions of Rafael González de
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Saavedra to marry María González and of Manuel Fernández Bendicho to marry Rafaela
Rodríguez.149 The presence of this phrasing might indicate that there was some question
about these proposed marriages.
The word did not appear again until a petition filed by don Vicente Mexía for
permission to marry doña Juana Blanco in 1796, and then never appeared again in St.
Augustine’s marriage license petitions. In this 1796 petition, witness Rafael Saavedra de
Espinosa stated that, “he [Espinosa] is aware by public voice and fame of the equality of
both in order of their quality of lineage (sanguinidad).”150

Igualdad: Racial or Socio-Economic?
Igualdad (equality) or its root word igual appeared in more of the marriage
license documents of St. Augustine than any other words studied in this chapter, as
shown in Chart1. Statements such as these appeared throughout the documents: “ . . . he
is also aware of the equality in quality (calidad) of the bride and of him who presents [the
witness].”151 In his testimony in favor of Louis John Schofield, witness James Carroll
testified that “Margarita Heinsman, his intended bride, is the equal of Louis John
Schofield, and between the two there is no legal impediment . . .”152 As this research
showed equality to be the key concern in St. Augustine, Susan M. Socolow found the
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same condition in Argentina. In Buenos Aires, judges considered economics over race,
legitimacy, and breeding.153
Of Sebastian Olivera and Catalina Usina, witness Pedro Fornell stated “that the
intended bride is equal in blood to him who presents him [as a witness], not considered
by this party the least obstacle to the marriage.” Witness Luis Soche said of the same
couple, “ . . . that both intended bride and groom are single and equal in quality . . .”154
The phrase “equal in blood” most likely referred to limpieza de sangre, that both were
good Catholics free of all “vile sect” or “vile race” of Moorish or Jewish ancestry. The
chief concern in St. Augustine appeared to have been social equality. The requirement
for “equality” in marriage stated in the real pragmática de casamientos offered no
definition of “equality.” Either Charles III thought his meaning was obvious, or it was
left up to the localities to determine what constituted “equality.” The low frequency of
the term “mala raza” in these documents also indicated that, while race did figure into
marriages in St. Augustine, it was not as important as equality, quality, and honor.
Rather, socio-economic equality was the primary concern in St. Augustine (see Chart 1).

Blanco (Blanca): an Ambiguous Word
One factor making it difficult to determine if race was a consideration in the
marriages of St. Augustine is the use of blanco (blanca) in the documents. While blanco
or blanca means the color white, it has an alternative meaning having to do with honor.
In the sense of “hombre blanco, muger blanca, it is the same as an honorable person and
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of public esteem.”155 Blanco or blanca, the masculine form and feminine form,
respectively, thus could also have meant “honorable.” The documents themselves did not
always make clear which meaning was intended.
Statements such as these might lead one to think that blanca was intended to refer
to race: “. . . the intended bride María Gavarda is a person known to be white, clean of
all vile race of Moors, mulatos, Jews and of other vile sect . . .”156 “He [the witness]
knows that the intended bride, Juana Seguí, is a white person, free of all vile race . . .”157
“ . . . that he knows from public knowledge that [María] is a white person, of distinction,
with the good circumstances which match those of” her intended groom.158 These
statements could just as easily read “he (or she) is an honorable person,” thus having no
reference to race at all, but rather referring to their religious purity and good social
conduct. In Table 1, blanco and blanca are included in the category of honor, which is
discussed in the next chapter.
There may have been a hint of the meaning of blanca in St. Augustine in witness
statements to the petition of Antonio Huertas to marry Caterina Aguilar. Antonio stated
that his parents “are honorable (blanca) persons of esteem in the said realm [of Granada,
in Spain], and free of all vile race . . .” Witness Antonio Gil echoed the sentiment in
saying that Antonio Huertas’s family, whom he knew in Granada, were “old Christians,
and persons well-known to be honorable in esteem . . .”159 The use of the word “esteem”
(estimación) suggests social approbation rather than race. The definition in 1783 of
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estimación was “Esteem and respect that someone or something has by reason of his or
its qualities, singular circumstances, and qualifications.”160 Perhaps a stronger indication
of the meaning of blanco or blanca in the marriage documents of St. Augustine lies in the
statement of witness don Miguel Costa to the petition of Joseph Burrell and Elizabeth
Hill. Costa said that Elizabeth’s parents were “both of good blood, honorable and
without . . . mix of Negroes or mulattos.” 161
However, the ambiguity of this term exists in such statements as don Pedro
García’s testimony that María de Regla Coruña “comes from a good family, honored and
white [or honorable].162 Likewise, Antonio Poncell is described by witness Luis
Hernández with the same exact phrase.163 Thus it is difficult to determine whether honor
or race is being considered in these statements. Would the phrasing be so redundant,
using “honored” and “honorable” in the same sentence? There is no reason that it would
not be. The sentiment that a family was both honored in its town or city, and was
honorable in the behavior of its members, is not inconceivable. However, it is also
possible that the phrasing contains reference to race, as well.

Doncella o Soltera: The Value of Virginity
The value generally placed in Spanish society on a woman’s virginity was high.
The Church provided the cult of Mary as a means of ensuring the value of a woman’s
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virginity. The word doncella – “a woman who has not known a man” – referred to
virginal women.164 A woman who lost her virginity outside of marriage was soltera.
This sense of the word soltera is found in the 1706 Stevens Spanish-English dictionary:
“A single woman. Generally taken in no good sense.”165 This may have reflected
English bias rather than Spanish cultural mores. However, Sonia Lipsett-Rivera quotes
Ana María Atondo Rodríguez that a soltera was “a woman who was not a virgin, and
who had, or was susceptible to having, illicit relations.”166
How important was this concept in St. Augustine? If we judge by the frequency
with which the word doncella appeared in the marriage license petitions, the concept was
apparently not important at all. The word appeared just once in the 146 petitions. The
context in which the word was employed is vital to understanding why it was used.
Francisco Pérez, a white peninsular Spaniard, petitioned to marry Beatriz Sánchez, the
quadroon illegitimate daughter of wealthy rancher Francisco Xavier Sánchez. Readily
conceding that Beatriz did have black heritage and was illegitimate, Pérez argued for her
honor and upright life, and stated that it was a man’s duty, once a promise of marriage
had been given to a maiden (doncella), to fulfill that promise and preserve her honor.167
In this case, honor certainly trumped race.
The local perception in St. Augustine of this concept of virginity at marriage may
also be inferred from the use of the word soltera in these petitions, a use supported by its
definition in the 1783 DRAE: “The person who is without having taken an estate” (in this
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case, the estate of matrimony).168 There was no separate definition for soltera as a
pejorative term in the 1783 DRAE. If there truly were a pejorative denotation of soltera,
it was not in use in St. Augustine. Out of the 146 petitions studied, only ten described the
status of the intended bride as soltera. Of these, two involved a bride and groom who
were both English, and most likely intended the English meaning of the word “single,”
meaning simply “unmarried.”
Four have wording that indicated the word “single” referred to the fulfillment of
the ecclesiastical requirement that both parties to a marriage be unmarried. The Catholic
Church at the time required that candidates for marriage demonstrate that they were
single and therefore eligible to marry. In a probanza de limpieza de sangre (proof of
purity of blood) filed in St. Augustine by Juana Salom, widow of Sebastian Etienne, there
appeared this statement by a parish priest in a quoted marriage document: “10 September
1778, after conducting the formalities of proof of the estate of being single . . .”169
In three of the abovementioned ten petitions, the prospective groom described his
intended bride as soltera, a situation in which one would not expect pejorative meaning.
These petitioners were saying that their intended brides were single, and therefore
eligible for marriage. The tenth petition did not provide a context for the word, yet
neither the prospective groom nor the witnesses had anything adverse to say about the
intended bride.
In several St. Augustine marriages, the bride was obviously not a doncella, since
the couple had already borne at least one child before marriage. Marginal notations in the

168

NTLLE, 1783 DRAE, 865, column 1.
Juana Salom, Probanza de limpieza de sangre, Files on various subjects, 1798-1802, Reel 113, Bundle
267, No. 39, East Florida Papers. Note that this is not the same person as the black slave of whom Jane
Landers wrote.
169

60

baptism records of “natural” children – born out of wedlock to known parents who
acknowledged the child – state that the child was subsequently legitimized by the
marriage of the parents. An example is found in the baptism record of Juana María
Concepción Payeres, born 23 June 1785 and baptized by Father Miguel O’Reilly on 25
June 1785, the illegitimate daughter of Juan Bautista Payeres and Isabel Ridabete.170
Juan filed his marriage license petition on 31 August of the same year.171 He and Isabel
were married 19 September 1785.172 A marginal note at this entry states that the infant
"was legitimated by subsequent marriage of the parents. O'Reilly."173 There is no
indication in the baptism records or the marriage petitions of any stigma attached to the
illegitimate births in these cases.
This is not to say that virginity was not important. A fine distinction
differentiated premarital sex after the exchange of the promise of marriage from that
which took place without such a promise. The former was tolerated, and commonplace.
The latter was a source of shame and dishonor for the woman.174 The importance of the
promise of marriage is reflected in the marriage license petitions. Specific mention of
the promise of marriage (palabra de casamiento) occurs in nineteen of the 146 petitions.
There were two other statements, however, which referred indirectly to the exchange of
170
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such a promise. Forty of the 146 petitions have statements that the man and woman had
“agreed to contract matrimony,” which implies a promise given and accepted. Beginning
in 1794, the most common expression, and the most frequent by far with seventy-eight
occurences, was that the couple had agreed to or contracted betrothal (esponsales).
Again, this implies an exchange of a promise. Thus, out of the 146 marriage license
petitions filed between 1784 and 1803, 137 of them made either direct or indirect
mention of a promise to marry.

Limpieza de Sangre: Race and Religion
Purity of blood (limpieza de sangre) was at first a religious ideology, fashioned to
exclude those who had at first been welcomed into the Christian fold – those Moors and
Jews who had converted to Christianity in order to fit into Spanish society and participate
in the benefits thereof. The concept was devised by old Christian elites to deny recent
converts access to institutions and offices by which those elites benefited and held their
power.175 In Spanish America it evolved into a system based on proportions of Spanish,
Indian, and African ancestry – the sistema de castas (caste system).176
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, laws requiring pure Catholic ancestry
were passed in Castile and in Aragon. The Inquisition had a mandate to discover and
expose “secret” Jews and Muslims, those who had converted to Christianity but who
were suspected of continuing to practice their heretical religions.177 These early laws
provided that after two or three generations, the stain of such heresy could be lifted and
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the descendants of such converts would be considered true Christians.178 Laws became
stricter and the stain became permanent as the category of purity of blood narrowed.179
In sixteenth-century Seville, genetic purity was emphasized as a means of preserving
family integrity. Those who aspired to hold office or to enjoy privileges offered by
society needed to prove they were pure of blood. The proof depended on female chastity.
Pure women were not just honorable and chaste, they had been kept so by the practice of
enclosure to assure their chastity.180 Limpieza de sangre was not just about religion. It
was a means for controlling the sexuality and guarding the purity of women.181
Another side of limpieza de sangre was “a particularly virulent negative
prejudice,” in Ann Twinam’s words.182 The concept of limpieza was developed to
exclude anyone who was not pure Spanish. Yet another aspect was its mutability, as with
other status indicators in Spanish society. The stain of impure blood could be lifted by
royal decree, an example of which Ann Twinam cites.183 As well, illegitimacy, in certain
cases, could be erased by the purchase of a gracias al sacar, a declaration that an
individual born out of wedlock be considered legitimate, therefore eligible to hold office
and enjoy certain privileges. In the Americas, whiteness was also for sale to mulattos,
altering their status and that of their descendants.184 Prejudice in Spanish America had
limits. Obviously one limit was the amount of money an individual had available to
spend to obtain these indulgences. But another limit was the degree of impurity,
becoming less an impediment to social acceptability as it became more attenuated. “If
178
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the percentage of mixed blood over time descended to less than one-eighth, the individual
was technically white and met the requirements of limpieza de sangre.”185
The concern with purity of lineage in Spanish America consisted in a concern
with “Spanishness,” as Martínez calls it. It was a way to keep the Spaniards, the
peninsulares and their descendants, at the top of the hierarchy.186 The belief in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was that values, religious beliefs, and behaviors were
instilled in children through the “blood.” Martínez identifies this idea as a metaphor for
indoctrination.187 There was a saying: De casta se viene al galgo el ser rabilargo (“the
long-tailed species comes down to the greyhound through good breeding”). This saying
metaphorically expressed the thought that children tended to perpetuate the customs of
their parents.188 In the seventeenth century, there was no clear line between what are
popularly referred to as ‘nature’ and ‘nurture.’ “Rather, people tended to attribute the
transmission of beliefs and behavior to both cultural and biological inheritance, and to
conflate the two.”189 To the people of that century, nature equaled nurture.
By 1702, black “blood” became associated with impurity. Black skin was
evidence of an impure ancestry. Thus, limpieza de sangre attached to physical
appearance, changing its meaning from being old Christian to being linked to white skin,
a link that strengthened in the eighteenth century. On 8 January 1774, the Supreme
Council of the Inquisition gave the Mexican Inquisition permission to add a question to
their standard questionnaire for determining a subject’s purity of blood. The new
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question regarded mulattos and other persons of mixed blood who were considered
inferior. “After more than a century and a half of having a de facto purity policy against
people of African ancestry, the Holy Office formally included blacks and mulattos as
impure categories.”190
Purity of blood was a concern in St. Augustine, but was mentioned far less
frequently in the marriage license petitions than equality (igualdad), quality or qualities
(calidad, calidades), and honor, as shown by Chart 1. But just what did limpieza mean in
these documents? Was its intention religious or racial? In the petition of Vicente
Laderol and Margarita Seguí, witness Santo Geraso described Vicente as “a person
reputed as honorable, clean of all vile race of mulattos, Jews, Negroes, and other vile
sect, and that both are held as Christian Catholics . . .”191 In the matter of Pedro de Cala
and Ana Sigle, witness Joaquin Benitez stated that Pedro’s parents were “held and
reputed as good Christian Catholics, free of all vile race of Moors, Jews, and other vile
sect , nor of those recently converted to our holy faith.”192 With the reference to mulattos
and blacks in Geraso’s statement, race was a consideration in these documents. But
limpieza also clearly referred to religion as well, and in greater proportion. In St.
Augustine, limpieza de sangre meant both being “old Christian” and, to a lesser degree,
being white of skin. Concepts of race and religion, in St. Augustine as elsewhere in
Spanish America, were aimed at preserving “Spanishness.”
190
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A Florida Coinage: Floridano
Finally, there was a word used in St. Augustine that was not used in Spain or
elsewhere in Spanish America. In Mexico and other parts of Spanish America, the term
criollo (creole) was applied to persons of Spanish parentage or ancestry born in the New
World. In Mexico, the word criollo became a derogatory term, associated with
illegitimacy and what modern racists call miscegenation.193 In Florida, the word criollo
was not used. The term for persons born in Florida of Spanish ancestry was floridano. It
is the term used in the censuses, and was applied to such persons of distinction as don
Francisco Xavier Sánchez and don Manuel Solana.194 Did St. Augustine’s officials and
citizens figure a way out of the derogatory connotation of criollo by inventing their own
term? It is interesting to note that the first dictionary entry for floridano appeared in
1914. The DRAE for that year defines floridano first as a native of Florida, and second
as pertaining to the State [of Florida] in North America.195
With these linguistic differences in mind, the next chapter turns to one concept
which had a long history and tradition in Spanish society worldwide: honor.

193

Martínez, Genealogical Fictions, 244.
Censuses 1784-1814, Census of 1793, Bundle 323A, Book 2, Folio 2-102R, Library of Congress.
195
NTLLE, 1914 DRAE, 481, column 3.
194

67

CHAPTER FIVE:
HONOR – THE KEY TO THE SPANISH CHARACTER

“My blood will not join with that of the Humanes family while I live!
His father was a farmer.”
– Federico García Lorca, La Casa de Bernarda Alba196
In Garcí Lorca’s play, steel-willed matriarch Bernarda Alba will not bend what
she considers her family’s honor, even if it means driving one of her daughters to suicide.
Adela, her youngest, has been having sex with her oldest sister’s fiance. When Bernarda
scares him off, Adela hangs herself. Bernarda orders her other daughters to cut Adela’s
body down and to dress her as if she were a maiden (doncella). She insists that Adela’s
public reputation be that of a virgin, to protect the family’s honor. Nor will she have that
honor sullied by allowing another daughter to marry the son of a farmer, one of the
“ignoble, mean, and plebeian” occupations denigrated by elite Spaniards. Yet the cruelty
that occurs under the roof of Bernarda Alba’s house is of such magnitude that García
Lorca forces us to consider what honor is, and to ask ourselves how far people will go to
maintain the fiction of its presence.

Dimensions of Honor
To the Spanish, honor was the overriding virtue, holding greater importance than
other virtues such as chastity, love, or fidelity, and was involved intimately in each of
196
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these, and more. Patricia Seed describes it as probably “the most distinctive of all
Spanish cultural traits.”197 Honor was a matter both of personal self-esteem and the
esteem of the community. Therefore, it had a private as well as public face, though
public opinion was the ultimate arbiter of a man’s or a woman’s honor. Reputation was a
treasure to be defended. As Cervantes had it, “An ounce of good reputation is worth
more than a pound of pearls.”198
Honor had two dimensions, status and virtue. In terms of status, honor was “first
and foremost a measure of social standing.” It was measured on a vertical continuum
from those at the top, who had much honor, down to those with none. The dimension of
virtue was measured along a horizontal continuum, as a rank ordering among social
equals.199 The elites defined honor, making it the rationale for the colonial hierarchy.200
Honor was of central concern to the elites, and to those who aspired to elite status.201 Its
purpose was to separate the elite and nobility from the common people. However, honor
was also an important consideration to the commoners, both as a matter of self-esteem
and a means of gaining social advancement.202

Honor, Gender, and Sex
In Spanish America, honor set the Spanish apart from the mixed-race populations.
Protection of a woman’s honor meant protection of a Spanish woman’s honor.203
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However, the honor of mixed-race women was protected in St. Augustine in at least one
case, the aforementioned petition of the Spaniard Francisco Pérez to marry the quadroon
Beatriz Sánchez, in which he cites her honor and his obligation to protect it by carrying
out his promise of marriage (palabra de casamiento).204 On the other hand, it was this
idea that honor pertained only to the Spanish that permitted Spanish men to engage in
illicit sex with poor, non-Spanish women or to keep them as concubines or mistresses.
As we will see in the next chapter, it also shielded men who raped certain women.
A gendered double standard applied in the concept of honor. Women were more
often and more severely punished for breaches of honor, especially those involving
sex.205 For men, honor meant behaving in a manly way, exercising authority over family
and subordinates, providing for his family, and valuing honesty and loyalty. Whether a
man was of the elite or of the common folk, the fact of being Spanish allowed him to
conceive of himself as possessing honor. Any Spanish man considered himself “a
member of a superior group,” thereby glossing over, to himself, the existence of socialclass distinctions.206 In other words, the poorest Spanish man felt superior to the castizo
or the black man, much as the poorest Southern white man considered himself superior to
the Negro just because of the color of his skin, imbued with certain egregious
misassumptions.207 Honor for men also included a willingness to fight. The coward
quickly lost honor. “The man without honor is worse than dead,” wrote Cervantes of the
importance of honor.208
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Honor for women was expressed in sexual terms. The honorable woman was
chaste before marriage and faithful afterward. She was feminine and modest, mindful of
her reputation, and circumspect around men. The behavior, especially the sexual
conduct, of the women in a family reflected upon the male head of household.209
Governor Zéspedes recognized this last aspect of honor. He described the clandestine
marriage of his daughter Dominga to Lieutenant John O’Donovan in his sorrowful letter
to the Count of Gálvez: “. . . my first obligation was to look after the honor of my
daughter . . .”210 He proceeded to incarcerate O’Donovan in the Castillo de San Marcos
and placed Dominga under what amounted to house arrest, lawful punishment for their
clandestine marriage. Zéspedes expressed his humiliation to Gálvez, writing of “the
different feelings that battle within my breast, as father of the disobedient ones, and as
governor for His Majesty . . .”211
Zéspedes was not the only one whose honor was offended. Don Mariano de la
Rocque was dismayed that his wife, doña Angela Huet, aided and abetted Lieutenant
O’Donovan and Dominga Zéspedes in the clandestine marriage. Away from St.
Augustine in connection with his duties as the garrison’s engineer, he wrote an elegant
apology to Zéspedes: “I have become sensible to what has occurred with my lady doña
Dominga [de Zéspedes] and that my home has been the location, and I do not doubt that
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Your Lordship will do justice . . . May it serve Your Lordship that I offer myself at the
feet of my lady doña Concepción [the governor’s wife] and the rest of your family.”212
The chief goal of family honor was to “guarantee the legitimacy of the children,
essential to sustaining the socioeconomic position of the family.”213 Honor needed to be
guarded closely, so that no public scandal should mar it. If a family member lost honor,
the matter was not allowed to come to public attention, “since public embarrassment was
worse than death” to the Spanish.214 If the loss of honor involved a woman’s sexuality,
“Colonial society’s principal response to the loss of sexual honor (virtue) was to cover up
or to remedy the loss of virtue as quickly and as quietly as possible.”215 As it was for
Bernarda Alba, the primary concern was with the preservation of the image of honor,
however rotten the reality behind that image may have been.

Honor in St. Augustine
Concern with honor in St. Augustine, as revealed in the marriage license petitions,
was high. In addition to the forty-three mentions of the word blanco or blanca as
meaning “honorable,” the words honor, honrado (also spelled honrrado, honorable) and
honradez (honor, or the state of being honorable) also appear an aggregate total of twelve
times, for a total of fifty-five mentions of the idea of honor as applied to candidates for
marriage.
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Examples of that concern were expressed not only in the marriage license
petitions but also in documents such as a letter dated 10 November 1807 from Father
Miguel O’Reilly to Governor Enrique White, in which the priest related the demand by
town citizen don Sebastián Berazaluce that don José Genaro Chaple be compelled to keep
his promise of marriage to Berazaluce’s daughter Manuela. Should Chaple not honor his
word, Berazaluce had told O’Reilly, the recalcitrant groom should be arrested and
imprisoned in the Castillo de San Marcos. He was incarcerated in the Castillo for a brief
time. Though not explicitly stated in O’Reilly’s communication to White, Berazaluce
was obviously concerned with the honor of his daughter and of his family.216 The couple
finally married on 3 December 1809.217 The marriage may have been one of necessity, as
Gabina Josefa Genaro Chaple was born to them on 19 February 1810.218
In addition to petitioning on grounds of having no relatives in St. Augustine of
whom to ask permission to marry, don Joaquin Sánchez Ceballos asked that witnesses be
called to testify “that my parents, as myself, are of honorable birth.”219 The word used is
decente, which is defined as “honest” and also as “dignified” in the 1783 DRAE.220 In
his petition to marry doña Rafaela Rodríguez Piuma, don Manuel Fernández Bendicho
refers to “the well-known honor of both” of them.221 In the petition of don Dimas Cortés
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to marry doña Agueda Seguí, witness Antonio Mestre/Maestre did not use the word
honor, but lists elements of honor: Agueda’s parents “are people of the first
circumstances of that land [Mahon, Minorca], for their birth and esteem, and good
conduct . . .”222
Honor concerned not only the elites of St. Augustine, the high governmental and
military officials and the wealthy landed planters. In the marriage documents, honor and
related words are mentioned by both elites and non-elites. Of the mentions of the words
honor, honrado/honrada, honradez, and blanco/blanca, out of a total of fifty-five
mentions, only fifteen were said by or about elite persons, those distinguished by the
honorifics don and doña. The other forty were mentioned by or about common people.
Honor was vital to all levels of St. Augustine society.
The lack of honor was also of concern. In a case filed 10 November 1801, don
Juan Leonardy protested the intended marriage of his widowed mother, doña Agueda
Coll, to Juan Bernardo Sánchez. His late father, don Rocque Leonardy, “in his life was
known as an honorable man,” wrote don Juan. He stated that his mother’s intended
groom was a stranger who, in 1794, had been brought to St. Augustine from Cuba as a
prisoner, to serve a term of exile for “having robbed a married woman.”223 After
completing his exile and being repatriated to Cuba, Sánchez returned to St. Augustine,
where “it is also well known that he is a vagabond whose only occupation is to roam the
countryside . . . with prohibited weapons,” with one of which he wounded a respected
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citizen, don Sebastián Espinosa. Don Juan Leonardy obviously saw Juan Bernardo
Sánchez as a man without honor.224
In the marriage license petition of Juan Antonio García to marry María Caterina
Brown, two witnesses commented on the couple’s low degree. Juan was reputed to be a
mix of Indian and black, and María was a mulata, the female offspring of a black woman
and a white Englishman, and therefore illegitimate. Witnesses Antonio Hernández and
José María stated that Juan’s parents were “people of color, and of low esteem.”225 Thus
both Juan and María might have had their honor questioned.226 Color did not always
imply lack of honor, however. Spaniard José Manuel Fernández petitioned for
permission to marry Ana Sánchez, another of the quadroon natural daughters of don
Francisco Xavier Sánchez and María Beatriz Piedra, don Francisco’s mulata consort.
There is no mention whatsoever of race, and nothing to imply that either José or Ana was
perceived as being without honor.227 Nor was there any such mention or perception when
Francisco Sánchez of Granada petitioned to marry Catalina Sánchez, also a quadroon
daughter of Francisco Xavier Sánchez.
These three marriages between peninsular Spaniards and Sánchez’s quadroon
daughters occurred four to ten years after the issuance of a consulta which prevented
marriage between a white Spanish woman and a free mulatto.228 If this opinion was
published in St. Augustine, it does not appear to have had much effect in preventing
mixed marriages. However, considering the gendered definition of honor in Spanish
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society, it is possible that it was acceptable for a Spanish man to marry a mixed-race
woman, but not acceptable for a Spanish woman to marry a man with black ancestry.
Honor figures in the next topic for consideration: the place of women in Spanish
society during the colonial period. The gendered nature of honor will be explored, along
with the extent of women’s opportunities, and lack thereof, in many aspects of Spanish
law and custom.
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CHAPTER SIX:
WOMEN’S PLACE IN SPANISH SOCIETY
TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

“Well-behaved women seldom make history.”
-- Laurel Thatcher Ulrich229

A study of marriage in St. Augustine must include mention of studies that have
been done on the status of women in Spain and in Spanish America. As Richard Boyer
wrote, “[T]he politics of marriage can best be understood from the standpoint of
women.”230 Alfonso X, “the Wise,” stated in his Siete Partidas, that “matrimony” is the
term for marriage, from the Latin root matris (mother). Alfonso said that the use of the
term recognizes the hardships endured by women during pregnancy and childbirth, and in
raising children with little to no help from their husbands.231
Lavrín and Couturier describe the narrow world within which most women
operated, which had caused their stories to be left out of traditional history. They do not
say that women never took roles on the historical stage in Spain or in Spanish America.
Rather, they see women as having been relegated unjustly to a subordinate role by
traditional historians. New methodologies of social history, historical demography, and
229
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other approaches to the mentalities of people in general and women in particular have
given historians tools with which to bring out women’s stories. 232 How language can be
gendered and can reveal mentalities has been demonstrated in Chapter Four. More
research into the great quantity of original documents, such as the East Florida Papers,
has yielded information about women in such documents as marriage license petitions.
However, even when women were represented in documents, we find that such evidence
is presented from the viewpoint of men, or at least filtered through it.233
Boyer also wrote that marriage is best understood through women because they
possessed less power, both in marriage and in the wider society, and because they had
scant claim to outside help if abused. Did women have such limited recourse in St.
Augustine in the Second Spanish Period? Jane Landers concluded that justice was
available, even to slaves. The case of Juana Salom, discussed below, shows that Spanish
justice, harsh though it may have been at times, was available to all strata of society.

The Patriarchy
Women’s subordination in Spanish society was reinforced by structures of
Spanish patriarchy in which people existed within spheres of expectations that limited
their actions.234 Women lived inside a fundamental inequality based on gender and age.
Men were superior to women, fathers were superior to their children.235 This was the
essential structure of the family. Not only did men have more power physically and
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culturally, but also legally. Men could force women into seclusion, controlling their
movements and interactions.236 Even in the 1840s (after St. Augustine had passed to the
United States), women in Latin America moved in “a world dominated by masculinist
logic and masculine constructions of self, nation, and culture.”237 The doctrine of the
patriarchy was formidable and not easily dismantled. Women in Spanish society were
afforded few opportunities for self-expression and even fewer for political participation.
Yet they also had, in Boyer’s words, “strong moral grounds to claim just and loving
treatment.”238 The politics of any situation involves contention of superior and inferior
forces. The superior force must, in principle, legitimate itself in terms other than those of
raw power.239 Custom and law intervened, reining in the superior force’s propensity for
the exercise of raw power. In Spain and in its colonies, the law and the concept of the
padrón exercised this intervening function.
Marital politics in Spanish society was patriarchal, as well. Patriarchalism was
based on “natural authority,” that is to say, it was natural for men to have authority and
unnatural for women to possess it. The patriarchal king was viewed as the father of his
child-like subjects. Authority may have at times been benevolent, but it always ran from
the top down.240 From the early church to the early modern era, the husband was the
master of the house and of all who dwelt within it. Those under the master’s roof
submitted to his rule. This is the essence of patriarchalism.241
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In the thirteenth century, the time of Alfonso X (1221-1284), the status of women
was governed by the “received biology” of Aristotle and Galen, whose writings
underscored the theory of “natural authority.” Women were considered physically
inferior, possessing an inferior reproductive function and therefore were morally and
intellectually subservient to men. Though Alfonso did not explicitly subscribe to the
ancient wisdom, according to Robert I. Burns, SJ, the king stated that women who
appeared in the public sphere “lost their modesty.”242
The patriarchy and hierarchy of the Church, as independent of the monarchy, saw
itself as superior to the king. The king was required to obey canon law, and was
monitored by Church officials. The people also – theoretically – had the right of
rebellion if the king behaved capriciously. This “Christian patriarchalism” applied to the
family as well as the state.243 But the patriarchy was not solid or fixed in those days, or
later. Medieval Spain developed “a more informal and more fluid pattern of patriarchal
relationships” influenced by the exigencies of war and the reconquista.244

Sexual Behavior, Gender, and Marriage
Patriarchy infused gender relationships. For many decisions, such as marriage or
business matters, a woman was required to ask permission of a man – her father, her
brother, another male family member, or a close male friend. The man was then required
to give that permission. But could he not also withhold it? In litigation brought about
under the real pragmática de casamientos, in St. Augustine as well as in the rest of the
Spanish empire, fathers and others did withhold their permission. Even in the face of
242
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such opposition, however, “women with a strong resolve could have their way.”245 In
order to get their way, they moved in a sometimes perilous world, in which they were
expected and required to preserve their sexual virtue, be obedient, and, if a member of an
elite family, never to go outside of the home without being accompanied and observed.246
It was assumed that women needed the protection of confinement at home and
close observation when out of the home because their will (self-control) and honor were
weak.247 Enclosure, as the practice was called, served the purpose of protecting women
from their own weakness and protecting society from their “disorder.”248 Enclosure
applied almost exclusively to elite women. Keeping them under constant observation in
the home and on the streets did not always prevent unwanted pregnancy; some elite
women managed to have illicit sex under these conditions. Lower-status women did not
find themselves enclosed by their families. They needed their freedom of movement in
order to work and earn a living, or to carry out their duties as servants or slaves. Thus
they were more vulnerable to male approaches.249 Though more vulnerable, they did not
necessarily act inappropriately. To keep a good name, they needed to abide by the
requirements of good breeding, and behave with circumspection around men.250
Another gendered social norm was the “cult of virginity,” with the Virgin Mary as
the exemplar. Though using a religious figure as its role model, the cult was secular in
origin. It recognized that mortal women are not saints, but emphasized sexual abstinence.
Wait until marriage to have sex, the cult’s tenets told women, or, if a woman were not to
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marry, she should refrain entirely from sex. Thus, society’s norm left no middle ground
for respectable women: an honorable woman was chaste, or she was not. Married women
who had extramarital sex and single girls who got pregnant outside of a promise to marry
were immoral and without honor if such misbehavior became public.251 The concept of
“private pregnancy” covered many such indiscretions.
One group of women remained in their “proper” feminine sphere and recognized
that they were subject to a male hierarchy, yet had a notable degree of autonomy: nuns.
Their autonomy was possible precisely because they were part of the Church, a position
that allowed the nuns to surpass the limits imposed on lay women.252 Thus there were
women in various roles: those who remained quietly at home or in the convent carrying
out society’s expectations, and those in homes and in convents who were outspokenly
questioning tradition.253

The Church’s Teachings and Expectations
The Church’s expectations regarding female sexual behavior were more rigid than
those for men, as set forth in confessionals. These guidebooks were normative, not based
in reality but in what the Church wanted to establish as the modes of behavior to which
all were to aspire. The instructions in these guidebooks attempted to approximate the
sorts of problems clergymen were likely to encounter by considering a wide range of
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situations and behaviors.254 Confessionals also provided instructions on family
dynamics, placing the father at the head. But as master of the house, the husband and
father had not only prerogatives but also responsibilities. He was the master, but he was
also the padrón, responsible for the welfare of everyone under his roof.255
The first of these ecclesiastical expectations was that sex was to be engaged in
only within marriage and the second was that its sole purpose was procreation. The
Church condemned sex for pleasure, and those sex acts that did not produce children.
Sex was a mutual obligation of both husband and wife, the “conjugal debt.” Finally, the
Church considered it a sin for one to refuse to have sex with one’s spouse. Women did
have the right to initiate sex, but they were also supposed to be modest about it. There
were days when sex was prohibited, even between man and wife.256 There were other
restrictions on sex, a fact that demonstrates the control the Church had – or attempted to
have – over marriage. Of course, these prohibitions and prescriptions affected men as
well as women. The theory, then, was that females were to have sex only in marriage.
However, other factors existing in the real world had their effects. The sexual code, in
reality, varied with social class. Elite women were closely supervised by their families
outside the home. Elite women were even observed and protected inside the home, “for
one never knew who could enter and what could happen.”257
A sexual double standard applied to intimate relations. Women were expected to
remain pure. Men were permitted, and in some ways even expected, to be more
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indiscriminate in their intimate relations.258 One group of women was not necessarily
expected to be pure: poor women, with whom men of higher classes had illicit sexual
relations. Concubinage was a generally-accepted social norm, says Socolow, though she
gives no documentation or statistics to support this statement.259 These non-marital
relationships could be short-term or long-term. In St. Augustine, there were several such
relationships which were long-term. That of Francisco Xavier Sánchez and Beatriz
Piedra has already been cited. Their relationship lasted some twenty-three years and
produced five children. George J. F. Clarke, son of a well-to-do Anglo family of St.
Augustine, had a long-term relationship with a mulata woman, Flora Leslie. George’s
brother, Charles, also had a mulata consort.260
Not only did the confessionals prescribe family dynamics and sexual behavior,
they also dealt with the politics of marriage, and in this the authors of these guidebooks
differed. They agreed on the concept of marriage as a contract. They disagreed on the
relative power of the parties to the contract. Some confessionals described a fundamental
inequality between men and women, with the man as the superior party. Others saw
marriage as a contract between equals, bound to each other by mutual loyalty and love.
Equal or unequal, marriage was based on a degree of reciprocity of justice, reason, and
love. It was upon this reciprocity that the balance of power in a marriage depended; this
was the fundamental political principle of marriage.261
The Catholic Church did not recognize divorce, but provided a way out of a bad
marriage in the separation of cuerpo y bienes (body and goods). The disagreeing couple
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remained married, but lived separately. The woman’s dowry and half of the property
acquired during the marriage (the gananciales) were awarded to the woman. Neither
spouse could remarry while the other lived. This situation was rare, and was almost
always initiated at the wife’s request. During the proceedings in which an ecclesiastical
court decided on the possible separation of cuerpo y bienes, the wife was placed in
depósito and closely monitored, while her husband remained completely at liberty. If the
accusations made by a woman concerning the difficulties of the marriage were disproven,
the woman would lose everything, including her dowry, resulting in a life of
impoverishment. She might also find herself charged by her husband with adultery, and
could become a social pariah, even if her accustions against her husband were proved to
be true.262

Marital Politics, Illegitimacy, and Race
How these politics played out can be found in the original documents. In the
details of private lives exposed to public scrutiny in the suits arising from broken
marriage promises, Asunción Lavrín describes how men attempted to exculpate
themselves, and succeeded, by casting doubt on a woman’s purity. It was easy for a man
to state that the woman he had jilted was a mujer inquieta, a woman of loose morals and
several known lovers.263 Here again, the patriarchy was arrayed against women, and any
reciprocity in this relationship was destroyed.
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Yet there was a high rate of illegitimacy in Spanish America, as a result of
consensual unions. Twenty to forty per cent of all births were illegitimate. The rate was
higher in urban areas than in the countryside.264 The father of an illegitimate child
experienced no damage to his reputation; the mother could. Her status might be
downgraded from doncella to soltera. This was a distinction “imposed by men who
wished to ensure that their children were genetically theirs.”265 As explained in Chapter
Four, this concept did not carry a great deal of weight in St. Augustine, and did not
prevent marriages of couples who already had borne children, nor did any stigma seem to
attach to these couples.
St. Augustine’s residents did not seem too concerned with race when the matter
concerned a member of the elite, even though some scholars maintain that the purpose of
the real pragmática de casamientos was to prevent interracial marriages. The case of
Francisco Pérez’s petition to marry the quadroon Beatriz Sánchez, filed 28 January 1795,
provides an example. Pérez, a white peninsular Spaniard, said that Beatriz was lightskinned and fair of face. “Her facial appearance is not so mixed that anyone will
suspect” her origins, said Pérez. No one in St. Augustine needed to suspect. As the
daughter of Francisco Xavier Sánchez, the wealthy floridano planter, Beatriz was well
known. Pérez admitted that Beatriz was of mixed race, but cited her honorable behavior,
honesty, and propriety. He argued that such an elite father as don Francisco Xavier
Sánchez passed to even the least-born of his children the privileges of his lofty estate.266
The petition was routinely processed, and approval granted. Less than five months later,
on 10 May 1795, the white Spaniard José Manuel Fernández, citizen of St. Augustine,
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petitioned to marry Ana Sánchez, another quadroon daughter of Francisco Xavier
Sánchez. José’s petition made no mention at all of Ana’s racial background. He
petitioned on the grounds of his parents being absent, and there being no other qualified
relatives to grant permission. In the file is F. X. Sánchez’s consent to the marriage.
Probably nothing else was needed for the proposed match to be approved by acting
governor Bartolomé Morales.267

Marital Reciprocity and the Dutiful Wife
A dutiful Spanish woman devoted herself to taking care of her husband, managing
the household, bearing children and providing them with what little education they may
acquire. She also helped guard the family wealth (if any), position, and reputation. But
when the husband was off at war or away on business, his wife made decisions and ran
the family in his absence.268 Spanish women, schooled for domestic functions as wives
and mothers, operated within legal and physical limits which they overcame either by
dint of personality or out of extraordinary circumstances.269 The general assumption was
that a woman would marry, and dutifully and quietly take care of husband and home.
The essence of marriage for a Spanish woman was that “In return for the support,
protection, and guidance her husband was legally required to provide, a wife owed him
nearly total obedience.” The emphasis was on the husband’s “dominance and his
obligations.”270 To the extent that a man did not carry out his marital obligations, the
logic of the requirement for his wife’s obedience was undercut, thus Silvia Arrom’s
267
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statement that a wife owed her husband “nearly total obedience.” Various writings
concerning the patriarchal idea of husbandly authority supported the right of a man to
beat his wife. A man could, as the colloquialism has it, knock some sense into his wife if
she did not live up to her domestic responsibilities. A beating, though, could not be too
severe, however that may have been defined by society or by law.271

Abuse and Mistreatment: La Mala Vida and Rape
Naturally, married life involved disagreements to be settled, preferably “by means
other than force.”272 Some squabbles escalated into serious matters, which threatened the
necessary reciprocity of a marriage. Such a serious threat to a marriage was termed la
mala vida (the evil life).273 La mala vida could include a husband’s failure to support his
wife and children, beatings and mistreatment, abandonment, and bigamy. When abused,
women either acted to escape the situation, or remained in a marriage compact that had
been violated. The confessionals, instruction books for clergy, supported the man’s right
to beat his wife to punish or correct her. If a man’s punishment of his wife got out of
hand because he had been drinking or he was jealous or a sadist, the wife had no source
of help from any legal or official entity.274
The only protection a woman had available was if the authorities placed her in
depósito, where she would be lodged in the home of a reputable citizen, and protected
from her husband. However, depósito was a temporary respite. Generally, the wife
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would be returned to her husband.275 To be fair, la mala vida was not unilateral. A
strong, domineering woman with a weak husband could subject him to la mala vida.
Jane Landers tells a peculiar tale of la mala vida in St. Augustine, though she does
not dwell on that aspect of the story. Minorcan Juan Salom had a slave named Juana.
Salom ordered her and her two children to sleep on the floor next to the bed he shared
with his wife. When his wife was asleep, Salom would rape Juana. Against the
requirements of church and law, Juan arranged to sell Juana, but not her children, to a
new owner from Havana. He lied about the circumstances, and Juana, fearful for her
children’s fate if they remained in Salom’s house without what measure of protection she
could afford them, drowned them in Salom’s well.
Once the story came out, and Salom’s wife was forced to face the truth, she beat
him, as Landers says, in “an inversion of the ‘natural order’ of Spanish gender
conventions.” Salom had been subjecting his wife to la mala vida by repeatedly raping
his slave right next to their bed. A neighbor’s slave described the loud noises resulting
from the incidents, indicating that Señora Salom must have known what was going on.
As the crisis came to a head, Señora Salom gave her husband a dose of la mala vida. For
killing her children, Juana could have been executed, but the hearing brought out exigent
circumstances leading Cuba’s court of appeals to commute that sentence. Juana was
brutally whipped and forced to wear an iron collar for six years.276
The most serious mistreatment a wife could receive was to be raped by her
husband. The intersection of rape and marriage “pervaded society and crossed both
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ethnic and class lines.”277 In Medieval Spanish law, according to Lipsett-Rivera, only a
doncella could be considered by law to be a victim of rape. Rape affected the honor both
of the victim and her family. A victim’s marriage chances were reduced, and she was
likely to suffer her husband’s disrespect if she did marry.278 This was the societal norm,
even though, in reality, all ages, statuses, and conditions of women could find themselves
victims of rape.279 As a married woman was no longer virginal, and as her husband had
power over her, there could be no such crime as spousal rape. The Siete Partidas
expanded the categories of women considered victims of rape under the law, beyond
what Lipsett-Rivera states, above. Under Partida VII, Title XX, victims who could claim
rape or forcible abduction would be a widow of good reputation, a virgin, a married
woman (raped by a man other than her husband), or a nun.280 Women who were not
virgins and who were not regarded as possessing honor, were less likely to report rape,
and more likely to have their complaints dismissed if they did report it.281
Lipsett-Rivera examined 108 cases of rape reported in Mexico in the late colonial
and early national periods. In these cases, the victim, her family, the perpetrator, lawyers,
and public officials expected the cases to be resolved either by the marriage of the rapist
to his victim or by the perpetrator providing a dowry to permit the victim some measure
of marriageability. Of these 108 cases, five resulted in the marriage of the victim to her
rapist; thirteen of the rapists and ten of the victims were unable to marry, as either one or
both were married; fifteen of the rapes were incestuous; and in three of the cases, the
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rapist was a priest.282 In some instances, such as the rape of a female under twelve years
old, the mandatory sentence was death. Of the 108 cases reviewed by Lipsett-Rivera,
only twenty-five resulted in conviction and sentence, but none of these cases brought
sentences of capital punishment.283
Referring to Carmen Castañeda García’s Violación, estupro y sexualidad, LipsettRivera states that the Laws of Toro provided that a prostitute could not be raped.
Presumably, she means that a prostitute could not claim rape. She also states, again
referring to Castañeda García, that, under Toro, a husband “could not force his wife into
intercourse.”284 Does she mean that it was unlawful for a man to force his wife to have
sex with him, or was it the case that a married woman, owing her husband the “conjugal
debt,” could not claim to have been raped if her husband forcibly had relations with her?
In the Laws of Toro, there is no direct statement concerning either prostitutes or wives in
regard to rape or their legal standing to claim rape. However, it was not to the Laws of
Toro themselves that Castañeda García was referring. Rather, it was to a compilation of
the commentaries upon those laws by legal scholar Maestro Antonio Gómez..
Gómez’s commentaries on the Laws of Toro, compiled and published in 1795 by
Pedro Nolasco de Llano, provide background and elaboration on the Laws of Toro,
referring to other laws relating to the same matter, or to precedent. Law 82 concerns the
right of a husband to kill his wife and her paramour should he catch them in the act of
illicit sex. Maestro Gómez’s commentaries expand upon the definitions and penalties for
incest, rape, and other sex crimes. Commentary number seventeen under Law 82 states
that the laws governing rape and its punishments did not apply when the victim was a
282
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prostitute.285 As to the idea that a woman could not claim spousal rape, which is what
Lipsett-Rivera seems to be saying, commentary fourteen to the same Law 82 denies the
existence of spousal rape as a category, stating that there was no penalty for a man who
had violent sex with his wife, to subordinate her to him and subject her to his will.286
Nor was this a new concept at the time of the codification of Toro. Medieval
canon law provided that forcible sex between a husband and a wife was permissible.
Canon law also stated that a prostitute could not complain of rape.287 This right of a
husband to rape his wife if he felt it necessary to assert his dominance relates back to the
discussion of the right of a husband to beat his wife in order to correct or punish her, and
to the mention of the Church’s holding that to refuse sex with one’s spouse would be a
sin. However, the Church opposed the idea of rape victims having to marry their rapists.
Said eighteenth-century theologian Vicente Ferrer, the use of “force, violence, coercion,
or terror” was an impediment of the most serious sort to any marriage.288
Punishments for rape varied throughout history, including the death penalty;
forfeiture of all goods to the victim, or to the convent if the victim were a nun; public
whipping; and exile.289 The tide turned against women in a frightening way when the
decree of 30 October 1796 provided that “Those accused of rape should not be bothered
with imprisonment or arrest, but continued on bail.” Those who could not afford to post
bail were confined to the limits of their city or town, which served as their prison.290
However, no steps were taken to protect the women of these cities and towns from the
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man raping again. This loose treatment of rape suspects was reiterated in another decree
dated 19 July 1802.291 Thus, women were placed in a vulnerable position, with again no
recourse or protection from the possibility and fear of violent attack.
Even before these decrees, the punishment for rape could endanger the female
population of a city. In 1794, as mentioned in Chapter Five, Juan Bernardo Sánchez was
exiled to St. Augustine for having “robbed a married woman” in Cuba. The third
definition of robar (to rob) in the 1783 DRAE is “to abduct a woman violently or through
deceit, and remove her from her home.”292 Punishment for simple robbery was
reimbursement of the victim to three times the value of the goods stolen.293 Punishment
for habitual robbers – highwaymen and pirates – was death.294 Exile was a punishment
for rape. The marital status and sex of the victim would be irrelevant to a charge of
robbery, but it would be quite relevant to a charge of rape. So it is possible that the crime
of which Juan Bernardo Sánchez was convicted and exiled was rape. Exile may have
removed him from the population of Cuba, and from his victim, but it may well have
placed the female population of St. Augustine in peril.

Women in Commerce: Agency within Limits
Women did suffer repression. They also had opportunities to act. Richard Boyer
found that women in Spanish America enjoyed agency in their own lives.295 In St.
Augustine, women filed petitions for permission to marry, and they filed suit to counter
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parental objections to their proposed marriages.296 In St. Augustine, a total of nineteen
women filed marriage petitions. Women were permitted to conduct business on some
levels. Still, they relied on assistance and advice from sons, friends, male relatives, and
even servants to represent them. The extent to which a woman could participate in her
own business affairs was governed by class and gender expectations. Elite women who
worked were expected to do so only in their own homes.297
In St. Augustine, two Minorcan women, survivors of Andrew Turnbull’s illadministered plantation, rose to elite status through business or business connections.
Doña Inéz Victori, married name Cavedo, became the matriarch of a powerful merchant
clan. Two of her daughters married self-made men of means, don Pedro Cosifacio and
don Domenico Martinelli. Doña Inéz’s son married doña Juana Seguí, daughter of
another wealthy Minorcan, don Bernardo Seguí. Doña Inéz’s third daughter married the
tailor Sebastián Ortega. Inéz Cavedo’s son and sons-in-law formed a mercantile clan
which prospered in St. Augustine.298 The other wealthy Minorcan matriarch was the
merchant doña Isabel Perpal, one of the twelve wealthiest people in St. Augustine.299
Women owning shops included María Oliver, Catalina Ortega, doña María Domínguez,
Caterina Pons y Andreu, and the elusive la viuda de chocolate (the chocolate widow).300
Female occupations throughout Spanish America tended to be limited to sewing,
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weaving, food sales, nursing and midwifery, goat-herding, dairy production, fruit and
vegetable growing, baking, and shopkeeping. 301
Other restrictions dated back at least to the Laws of Toro. Law 55 stated that a
woman could not enter into any contract or break any contract to which she was a party
without her husband’s permission, nor could she appear in court or defend herself in
court without her husband’s consent.302 Law 56 modified Law 55 to an extent, saying
that a husband could grant a general license to his wife to enter into contracts and conduct
business as she may not otherwise do without his permission. If the husband granted
such general license, and it is assumed that it had to be in writing, any business his wife
conducted was valid.
Law 57 provided that if a husband refused to grant such permission, a judge could
issue it.303 Law 58 provided that a husband could approve in arrears what business his
wife had conducted without his permission.304 Further, Law 59 provided that when a
woman’s husband was absent and not anticipated to return soon, the court could
intervene. The court could recognize a woman’s need to conduct business as legitimate,
necessary, or advantageous to the woman and could grant a license to the woman such as
her husband may have granted, were he present. The license granted by the court had the
same validity as if granted by the husband.305
Women also frequently acted as executors or administrators of their husbands’
estates and as guardians of their children. As executors, they could sell or otherwise
dispose of their husband’s property, pay any debts owed by the estate, and carry out the
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husband’s last wishes. Such was the case in St. Augustine with the widow of the wealthy
floridano rancher Francisco Xavier Sánchez, who died intestate. His widow, María del
Carmen Hill, distributed his property among all his children – those whom he had by her
and those whom he had by his mulata consort, Beatriz Piedra, before he married María.306
As guardians of their children, widows managed their children’s inheritance until their
majority.307 However, a widow who remarried lost her status as her children’s guardian
and conservator of their estates.308 That duty was assumed by her new husband, echoing
the provisions of the Laws of Toro.

Education and Health
Generally in Spanish America, schooling was gendered. Schools were
established, usually by the parochial curate, where boys would be taught reading, writing,
arithmetic, and doctrine. 309 In St. Augustine, Father Thomas Hassett established a free
school in 1787, mainly for the male children of St. Augustine’s Minorcan families. Boys
were taught reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography.310 Girls were taught at home, or
in the home of a local woman, with a curriculum of basic reading, catechism, sewing,
weaving, and embroidery, with a goodly dose of what Boyer calls “subordinate
domesticity.”311 Girls also learned cooking and music. Though most women, including
elites, were illiterate, a few elite women received a serious education, beyond the basic
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literacy most females were accorded. In St. Augustine, as elsewhere in the Spanish
Empire, women tended to be illiterate. A few women could sign their names.312
In Spanish America, a select group of elite young females was educated in very
small groups, usually only two or three girls, by convent nuns. These girls would have
been educated at a convent, living there while they were under instruction; or there may
have been a small convent school, or the girls may have been educated in their homes by
local nuns. The prevailing male opinion was that teaching girls to read benefited them in
that they could then read and meditate upon scripture.313 Indeed, access to reading
materials for women was generally restricted to devotional literature.314 Writing, on the
other hand, was not considered beneficial for women, and in fact, some men thought
teaching women to write was dangerous.315 Nuns had the highest rate of literacy of any
class of women in Spanish societies.316
In the late eighteenth century, probably in the larger cities of Spain and Spanish
America, there was a change in the general view of women’s education. More formal
education was provided for elite women, with the idea that women did, after all, have
intellectual abilities. The notion was that a good education would make elite women
better mothers and wives, and thereby improve society. Education would help women
overcome their “flaws;” it would reduce their over-sensitivity and weakness of character,
would curb their ungoverned emotions, and cure their fiscal extravagance and penchant
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for ostentation.317 There seemed to be no agreement, however, as to what would
constitute a good education for women.
Along with reforms in education came reforms in health in an increasing concern
over the social order. Women’s health in Spanish America certainly was in line for some
improvement. Infant and maternal mortality were high from infection and from
ignorance of ways to deal with difficult births. In Spanish America, the average age at
death for women of childbearing age was thirty.318

High infant mortality does not seem

to have been the case in St. Augustine, however. In 1784, there were twenty-three births
and only one infant death. There were nine infant deaths in 1785 and nine in 1786, to
forty-eight and sixty-seven births, respectively. Even in 1789, when there may have been
an epidemic with nineteen infant deaths, measured against sixty-three births, an infant
mortality rate of 0.301, the highest of the years 1784-1790.319 The relatively low infant
mortality rate may in part be attributable to superior Spanish aseptic practice: doctors and
other practitioners washed their hands before treating patients, and between patients.320
Lack of doctors in other areas of Spanish America where infant mortality was high might
also help to explain that phenomenon. St. Augustine had doctors because it was a
military garrison. The doctors at the Royal military hospital also served the town, and
there was one Anglo-American doctor, Dr. Joseph Way, and two Irish physicians Thomas
Travers and John Darcy, who also practiced in St. Augustine.
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Marriage Patterns in a Garrison Town
In Spanish America generally, widowed men chose to remarry in order to provide
a mother for their children and a wife to manage the household, leaving them free to
conduct worldly business. Elite men tended to choose women ten to fifteen years their
junior. Non-elite men also tended to choose younger women. Women were more often
widowed than men; men faced more peril to life than women. By the 17th century in
most of Spanish America, only widows with money and status, or those who were
conspicuously attractive sexually, managed to remarry. Different circumstances applied
in areas such as Montevideo, a military town where there was a shortage of women.321
Like Montevideo, St. Augustine was a garrison town where there were fewer
marriageable women in relation to the number of men. Widows in St. Augustine of
nearly any age had little difficulty remarrying. It did not always happen that men in St.
Augustine chose younger women, though many did. Don Francisco Xavier Sánchez was
at least forty-one years old when he married seventeen-year-old María del Carmen
Hill.322 Royal pharmacist don Ramón de Fuentes was around forty-two years old when
he promised to marry doña María de la Concepción Perry, whose age was thirteen years
and nine months.323 At the other end of the spectrum, John Hudson was twenty-eight
when he married doña María Evans, becoming her third husband. She was in her late
fifties upon that occasion. Marriages with such age disparity were not unusual. Of 109
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married couples listed in Father Thomas Hassett’s 1786 census of St. Augustine, which to
be sure did not enumerate everyone in the city, Patricia Griffin found that twenty-five of
the wives were over forty years old, and eleven of them were married to men at least
seven years younger than they were.324

Widowhood
Widowhood for women did not necessarily mean independence. Some were
burdened by litigation over their husbands’ estates, greedy in-laws, contentious children,
and bad financial advice from men who either were not financially astute but trying to be
helpful, or those who sought to swindle a widow out of her substance.325 However
independent a widow could be, she never was accorded the patria potestad. The widow’s
special, though limited, position stemmed from her legal right to inherit, and from her
dowry, additional property due to her, her right to half of the assets gathered during the
marriage, and her position as guardian of her children. Notwithstanding the widow’s
access to power and her responsibilities, a question remains as to how prepared a Spanish
American woman could be as a result of any training she may have received, her level of
confidence, and the resources available to her to manage an estate or run a business.326
Women in Spanish America, including in St. Augustine, were bound by law and
by society’s expectations. How did marriage law describe the relationship between men
and women? That is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
A HISTORY OF SPANISH MARRIAGE LAW
BEFORE THE PRAGMÁTICA OF 1776

“[Marriage is] one of the noblest and most honorable of the seven
sacraments . . . and for this reason it should be honored and observed, as
being the first of them . . . [It] is the support of the world, and causes men
to live a regular life and one free from sin, and without which the other six
sacraments can neither be maintained nor observed. For this reason, we
have placed it in the middle of the seven Partidas of this book, just as the
heart is placed in the middle of the body . . .”
-- Alfonso X, “El Sabio” (the Wise)327

Marriage Before the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X
By the time Alfonso X (1221-84) published his Siete Partidas, marriage in Spain
and in the rest of Europe had been undergoing fundamental changes. Though the
Catholic Church had assumed control over the process of marriage, medieval canon law
was still unsettled on the subject.328 Marriage encompassed two defining elements. It
was either a voluntary exchange of vows in the moment, that is to say, the actual day of
marriage (matrimonio); or it was betrothal (esponsales), a voluntary and solemn promise
to marry at some time in the future. Under these two elements, the contract was sealed
by the physical consummation of the relationship, which rendered it permanent and
indissoluble, at least in theory.329
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The declaration to marry stated at the betrothal created the marriage, with or
without sex. As indicated by the number of “natural children” later annotated in the
baptism records of second Spanish period St. Augustine to be legitimated by their
parents’ marriage, sex after betrothal but before marriage was not uncommon. Again,
this situation may have been exacerbated during 1784-1786 by the decision of Fathers
Hassett and O’Reilly to conduct marriages only in December during those years. The
legal age for marriage was fourteen for males and twelve for females.330 The youngest
female bride in the matrimonial licenses of St. Augustine between 1784 and 1803 was
María de la Concepción Perry, at thirteen years, nine months.
Practice under the medieval baronial system saw marriage as a breakable contract.
The new view coming into vogue near the end of the medieval period, encouraged by the
Church, was that marriage could not be dissolved. Also in prior practice, parents and
other elders had much control over a young person’s choice of marriage partner.
Marriage involved more than just the joining of two people; it had vital implications for
matters of property, dispersal of resources, relationships between the families being
joined by the marriage, and each family’s status. In certain instances, mostly in royal
marriages, it could also have grave implications for the security of the state. The new
movement tended toward free will in the choice of a marriage partner. The changes
being wrought in marriage practices became nothing less than a social revolution.331
There were advantages for both sexes in marriage. For men, it provided an
available sexual partner, the possibility of heirs to carry on the family name and honor,
social respectability and acceptance, and opportunities for networking within a family
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web. For women, the advantages included the preservation of honor and status,
discipline and supervision (though this at times could also be a disadvantage), economic
support, and security from the possibility of falling into promiscuity or prostitution.332
Free choice of marriage partners became the essence of marriage. Consent of the
intended couple was also a vital element to a marriage. Alfonso spoke in the Fourth
Partida of “the justice which should be maintained and observed in marriage which joins
persons together, by mutual consent.”333 Even though the concept of free choice
invalidated arranged marriages and other pressures parents brought to bear on their
children, custom saw them continued. Many people resented efforts to enforce free
choice, considering marriage a family matter to be decided without outside interference
from Church or state.334
Earlier marriage practices had not necessarily involved a priest. A couple could
merely announce their marriage, making marriage indistinguishable from concubinage or
a consensual union, expressing the baronial idea that marriage was not permanent. Under
the new concept, the process of marriage in Spain began with the consent of the couple
and the family. The next step was the betrothal, sealed with the exchange of the palabra
de casamiento. The betrothal was also the occasion for the dowry, and bound the couple
to each other. The banns would be read in the church, giving anyone who knew of
impediments to the marriage the opportunity to come forward and state them. The
culminating event was the church rite of matrimony, presided over by a priest, with the
public exchange of specific vows.335
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Clandestine marriage became a significant problem. A clandestine marriage was
one in which the banns were not published. The practice was prohibited by the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215; however, such marriages were still valid. While valid, they
carried a legal penalty. Parties to a clandestine marriage could be required to do severe
penance. They would also be required to participate in a public solemnization of their
union.336 There were civil reasons against clandestine marriages. Such a marriage
brought dishonor on the bride and her family. In medieval times, the family whose honor
had been damaged would seek revenge through violence. Some men who clandestinely
married did so in order to access the bride’s money, spent it on themselves, then deserted
the newly impoverished woman. Sometimes, women thus abandoned and impoverished
had no recourse but to turn to prostitution to support themselves.337
The betrothal, or promise to marry, could be initiated by one or both parties.
Ideally, it was rendered in writing, in front of witnesses. It could be rescinded, but there
were penalties for its breach.338 This practice remained unchanged at least to the end of
the eighteenth century. A man who broke a promise of betrothal could end up in prison,
as José Genaro Chaple found out when he jilted Manuela Berazaluce. Whether the
palabra de casamiento was uttered by one or both of the parties, both parties had to
consent to it free of any duress or undue influence.339
Consanguinity – family relationship – was considered an impediment to marriage
if it fell within the fourth degree.340 Prohibited degrees of family relationship in regard to
marriage included great-grandparents, grandparents, parents, brothers and sisters, first
336
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and second cousins, and aunts and uncles. Also prohibited were marriages between
godparent and godchild and between adoptive parent and adopted child.341 However,
there also resulted an increasing number of dispensations allowing persons within the
fourth degree to marry. In St. Augustine, don Juan José del Toro petitioned to marry
doña Rafaela Escalona. In his petition, don Juan stated plainly that doña Rafaela “was
joined to me in parentage in the second degree of affinity.”342 The couple married 28
April 1790.343 In a letter to Governor Quesada in 1792, Father Thomas Hassett related a
communication he received from Cuba to the effect that del Toro owed fifty pesos to the
Diocese of Cuba for services in 1790 having to do with the marriage. This was likely the
issuance of a dispensation for don Juan and doña Rafaela to marry.344
The ascendance of free choice, and the option of a clandestine marriage if one
were willing to face the consequences, widened the scope of marriage from endogamy to
exogamy.345 A great number of marriages in St. Augustine during the years under study
were exogamous, cutting across ethnic lines. Spaniards, whether peninsular or floridano,
married Minorcan, Irish, British, French, and American partners. The insularity of the
floridanos that existed at the end of the First Spanish Period, as noted by Susan Pickman,
broke open in the Second Period.
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Las Siete Partidas
The code of Alfonso X entered into law many of these practices, some of which
had been covered by canon law but not by civil legislation. Betrothal was defined in the
fourth Partida as “a promise persons make when they desire to marry.”346 A betrothal
was not valid unless both parties consented to it. The parties had to be content with the
arrangement, and to consent to it. In the case of children, though a seven-year-old could
be betrothed, one of such tender age could not validly marry because they “have not
sufficient understanding to give their consent.”347 If either should change his or her
mind, they were prohibited from marrying any member of the other party’s family. 348 In
order to back out of a betrothal, one had to offer a lawful and valid excuse. If the reason
offered for reneging on a betrothal was found by competent jurisdiction not to be lawful
and valid, the party could be forced “by the decree of the Holy Church” to go through
with the marriage.349
There were a number of reasons for opposing or preventing an engagement, and,
one would assume, for backing out. An engagement was invalid if either party entered a
religious order. There could be no engagement if either party disappeared without a
trace. An engagement would be voided if either party had incurred a serious physical
disability, especially one preventing sexual intercourse. Another impediment occurred if
one party had sex with a relative of the other party, or indeed if either party had sex with
someone other than their intended. Both parties might mutually decide to disagree,
dissolve the betrothal, and separate. An engagement would be invalid if either party had
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become betrothed to one individual by words of future marriage, and then to another by
words of present marriage (that is to say, marrying another while engaged to the first
party). If another man abducted a woman who was party to a betrothal, and had sex with
her, either forcibly or consensually, an engagement would be void. Finally, there could
be no engagement if neither party had attained legal age.350
Under the Partidas, a daughter could not be betrothed in absentia by her father or
anyone else when she had not given her consent. This provision outlawed forced
marriages. In Peru in 1618, Ysabel Allay Suyo complained that she had been forced to
marry Diego Andrés de Arenas by a priest, Fray Alonso Sarmiento, who was not of her
parish, and who was Diego’s employer. She filed suit, and while litigation was in
progress, she was placed in depósito in the home of a reputable Spanish woman.
Witnesses called on her behalf testified that she had refused to marry Diego. When
Diego’s attorney questioned the reliability of Ysabel’s witnesses, others were brought in
who also testified to her refusal to consent. One witness stated that he never saw or heard
of banns being published, as required by the canons of the Council of Trent. The court’s
ruling in the case nullified the marriage, as it had been improperly conducted. Fray
Sarmiento was found to have acted contrary to the will of the bride, forcing her into the
marriage, and to have been outside his jurisdiction.351 The ruling undergirds Patricia
Seed’s assertion on individual volition in marriage choice and opposition to forced
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marriages in civil and canon law. These two concepts “were cultural norms shared
broadly in Spanish colonial society” and were strongly supported by the Church.352
A valid marriage was made either by words relating to the present or by the
sexual act under the shade of the palabra de casamiento.353 “Consent alone, with the
desire to marry, constitutes matrimony between a man and a woman,” declared
Alfonso.354 Parties to the marriage had to form the intent to live together for the rest of
their lives, and to be faithful to each other.355 The Fourth Partida also prescribed who
could and who could not marry. To be eligible to marry, one had to be sound of mind
and capable of consent. A candidate for marriage had to have no physical impairment
that would prevent having sex, because marriage was for procreation. Prohibited from
marrying were people who were adjudged permanently insane or who were for some
other reason unable to have children.356 This law provides precedent for the idea of the
state stepping in to take control of deciding who could and could not marry, before the
matter entered into the realm of the Church. That idea was not a new one when the
pragmática was issued.
Alfonso’s law code reinforced the position taken by the Fourth Lateran Council in
1215 concerning the prohibited degrees of relationship. Godparents and godchildren
could not marry under the Fourth Partida, a prohibition that enacted in civil law one that
already applied in canon law. Neither could those who had served as godparents for a
particular child. One question for further study might be if the godparents involved in
baptisms in St. Augustine tended to be already married or related in some other way.
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This question arises in consideration of the small pool of eligible marriage partners in the
town. Also as mentioned previously, adoptive parents and their adopted children were
prohibited from marrying, and in addition, under the Fourth Partida, an adopted child and
his or her adoptive siblings could not marry. Though they may not have been related by
blood, they were considered spiritual siblings.357
Other impediments to marriage in the Fourth Partida included religious
incompatibility; that is to say, if one party were Catholic and the other of a different faith.
Christians (which meant Catholics; in Spain at that time, the words were synonymous)
were not permitted to marry Jews, Moors, or anyone suspected of being a heretic.
However, if the proscribed individual converted to the Catholic faith before the
consummation of the marriage, then it would be allowed. Force – which included
abduction, imprisonment or sequestration, and coercion – was prohibited. Likewise, fear
induced by a show of arms, intimidation, or threats (including the threat of rape) was also
prohibited.358 “A man of so cold a nature he cannot copulate with a woman” could not
marry, a veiled reference to homosexuality. A marriage seen to be in violation of any
provision of canon law could not be permitted, nor one in which the parties were related
within the fourth degree. Dispensations for such relationships were available, for a
price.359
Clandestine marriage, already proscribed by canon law, also was prohibited in
Alfonso’s code. With no banns, no announcement of the impending marriage, there was
no opportunity for anyone who knew of possible impediments to come forward and bring
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them to public and ecclesiastical notice.360 The reason given in the law code for
prohibiting clandestine marriage was to forestall one party leaving the other. As the
marriage had been done in secret, it could not be proven to have taken place at all, and
the Church therefore could not compel the party who had broken the marriage by leaving
to return to the marital home.361 This also explains why the parties to a clandestine
marriage, once discovered, would be forced to be united in a public wedding, so that the
existence of a marriage bond could be proven with documentation.362 Another concern
with clandestine marriage was bigamy. A clandestinely-married man might leave his
wife and marry another woman openly, living with her in sin, for who would know he
had been married to someone else?
Alfonso also reinforced the process of the expediente matrimonial, the priestly
counseling session at which the curate inquired into the parties’ eligibility for marriage,
including investigation into any possible impediments. The Fourth Partida covered many
aspects of marriage, but these are the ones most relevant to the examination of marriage
in St. Augustine under the real pragmática de casamientos.

The Laws of Toro
The Laws of Toro (Leyes de Toro) constituted a basic family law code, issued in
the early 1500s. They addressed inheritance, transfer of property, and guardianship.
There were four, however, which specifically applied to marriage. The first of these was
Law 49, which stated that those who contracted clandestine marriage, and those who
assisted in such marriage, “place in jeopardy all their goods.” These persons also were
360
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subject to being exiled, and if any who were exiled for this offense returned to Spain,
they would face the death penalty. The parents of the parties to a clandestine marriage
had the option of disinheriting them.363
In his commentary on this particular law, Maestro Antonio Gómez defined
clandestine marriage as one entered into without publication of banns, which provided no
opportunity for anyone knowing of impediments to the marriage to come forward and
present them. Maestro Gómez elaborated on the law prohibiting clandestine marriage,
stating that those subject to it could include the groom, the bride, witnesses, and others
who participated.364 This application of the law would have implicated doña Angela
Huet in the clandestine marriage of Lieutenant John O’Donovan and doña Dominga de
Zéspedes, for doña Angela provided the location and organized the subterfuge under
which the marriage was conducted. Such behavior by the lady brought the threat of
dishonor to her husband, don Mariano de la Rocque, eliciting his abject apology to
Governor Zéspedes. Fortunately for doña Angela, the punitive aspects of the law had
been moderated by the time she assisted the two young lovers.
Broadly, the Laws of Toro, according to Lavrín and Couturier, had effects that
defined the legal position of Spanish women, especially Spanish colonial women, into the
early nineteenth century. The code defined women’s status within the family, their rights
of inheritance, the administration of marital property, and the disposition of a deceased
woman’s goods. Thus these laws “reflected prevailing views on the proper position of
women in the family and provided a measure of protection for women’s rights.”365 As
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previously discussed, the Laws of Toro governed or influenced the conduct of business
by women in Spanish America.
Law 80 briefly stated that in cases of adultery, the offended spouse was required
to accuse both his (or her) spouse and the individual with whom he or she had committed
adultery, or else neither one could be accused. It was all or nothing. Law 82 stated that a
spouse was not permitted to accuse his or her spouse of adultery if the marriage was not
valid by reason of the accusing spouse having an impediment such as being married to
someone else, or having entered a vow of chastity, or some other listed impediment.366
Law 82, and Maestro Gómez’s commentaries on it, reveals much about the status
of women and the legal rights of husbands in the sixteenth century. A man finding his
wife in the act of having sexual intercourse with another man had the right to kill both of
them. Maestro Gómez added lengthy and numerous commentaries on law and precedent
concerning incest, adultery, rape, and other sexual and marital offenses.367 These laws
did indeed, as Lavrín and Couturier suggest, reveal much about the status of women and
marriage, about who was and was not considered an honorable woman, the treatment of
each being at times quite different under the law, as discussed in Chapter Six.

The Council of Trent
The Council of Trent, a high-level meeting of Catholic clergy aimed at
instituting reforms and revamping canon law, sat from 1545 to 1563. It constituted a
massive effort to clarify and codify canon law to “redefine the role of the parish and the
sacraments.” The parish was considered “the most effective unit for the imposition of
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doctrine and discipline on Catholics.368 Prior to Trent, Catholic Church practice was not
uniform; the Church exercised no central control. Throughout Europe, couples lived
together in consensual unions without the benefit of clergy.369 The Church abjured preand extra-marital sex. This concern was aimed more at women than at men,
demonstrating the gendered nature of the rules of marriage. Women who were town
residents and who violated the sexual rules could be chastised publicly and fined. A
woman who was not a resident would be exiled.370
Basic to the work of the Council was the concept of the battle between the flesh
and the spirit. It was up to the individual to control his or her body and desires to avoid
damnation. The Canons of Trent defined the rules; it was up to the individual to follow
them, or not. The “freedom to choose between good and bad was central to the definition
of sin.”371 Sin, then, was a voluntary matter, redeemable by confession and penitence.
The individual was reconciled to God through absolution. It was therefore important to
determine whether an individual’s actions were voluntary or involuntary, since sin was a
voluntary violation of moral rules.372
One of the last aspects of religious life and ceremony considered by the Council
was marriage. At its twenty-fourth session, on 11 November 1563, the Council
promulgated twelve canons on marriage. According to one scholar, the intent was to
condemn errors of faith and practice, and to anathematize those who committed these
errors.373 Among the errors were claims that marriage was not a sacrament instituted by
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Jesus Christ; that Christians can practice polygamy; and that the church cannot determine
diriments, impediments so serious as to render a marriage invalid. Among these diriment
impediments were being underage, being already married, and being within the fourth
degree of kinship by blood relationship.374
The issue of free will of the couple versus the wishes of their parents had been
debated since the Middle Ages, and the debate was far from over as Trent sat.375 Though
declaring that marriages conducted without parental permission were valid, the Council
reiterated the Church’s opposition to them: “the . . . Church has for most just reasons, and
at all times detested and prohibited such marriages.”376 Charles III later borrowed this
language for the real pragmática. This seeming contradiction can be explained by the
Church’s firm tendency to favor the marital couple over the objecting parents, in its belief
that the free will of the marital couple was paramount. In cases where parents raised
objections to their children’s marriages, the Church tended to intervene on behalf of
couples and to rule in their favor.377 The civil authorities in St. Augustine favored marital
couples overwhelmingly, as Chapter Nine will show.
Reforms instituted by the Council included an attempt to end to clandestine
marriages. The Council ruled that a valid marriage required a priest and two witnesses.
Medieval practice in the Church had been that a valid marriage was based on the promise
of marriage and upon its consummation with the act of sex.378 The promise of marriage,
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and gifts to seal the bargain, would be exchanged in front of witnesses.379 After Trent,
marriages conducted without a parish priest, or by a priest from another parish without
the bishop’s permission, and without the required two or three witnesses, were to be
considered null and void.380 This provision probably was considered by the court in the
case of Ysabel Allay Suyo’s suit over her forced marriage to Diego Andrés de Arenas,
discussed above. Any parish priest present without the required witnesses, and any other
priest not of the parish present in like manner, were subject to severe punishment at the
bishop’s discretion. The marital couple and other participants were also subject to the
bishop’s punishment.381
In the reforms promulgated by the Council of Trent, publication of the banns was
made mandatory, with the announcement to come from the pulpit on three successive
feast days. The banns were declared openly in the church before the marriage was
contracted. The parish priest was to proclaim the impending marriage in the parish where
the prospective bride and groom lived. He had to make public the names of the
prospective bride and groom, and to admonish the congregation that the marriage would
proceed if no lawful impediment were raised.382 Entries reflecting this practice appear in
the marriage records of the Diocese of St. Augustine. The marriage of Miguel Seguí and
María Ponz on 15 September 1794 was recorded thus in the marriage book by Father
Thomas Hassett: “Today . . . having read the three banns ordered by our Holy Mother
Church on three feast days . . . .”383
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However, the Council also allowed banns to be dispensed with in certain cases.384
A bishop could dispense with the banns if he deemed it prudent, for example, to protect
the couple from harsh action by their parents or other relatives.385 The Council provided
that if the banns were omitted before marriage, they were to be announced after the
ceremony but before consummation as fait accompli.386 Even criminal allegations or
charges based on a couple’s sexual misconduct before marriage could be nullified by
such a secret marriage conducted with the Church’s blessing. Such an action could not
be rescinded by civil authority, including an court of appeals or the viceroy. This ability
of the Church to defend couples even against the courts of appeals or the viceroy showed
the Church’s independence concerning marriage in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries.387 The reading of the banns could not be omitted if witnesses did
not support a couple’s allegations of parental interference, or if there were present some
condition that was sufficient to preclude marriage.388
The Council echoed the Fourth Partida of Alfonso X, prohibiting clandestine
marriage. “Grievous sins” arose from such marriages, wherein a man who married
clandestinely could leave that wife and openly marry another woman and live with that
woman “in perpetual adultery.”389 The Church wished to erase bigamy, and one way to
do that was to prohibit clandestine marriage.390 However, a clandestine marriage was
considered valid unless rendered invalid by the Church, as long as it was by mutual
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consent. The Council emphasized its ruling by declaring that anyone who said that
clandestine marriages were invalid was anathema.391
The Council wished to prohibit marriages between persons in spiritual
relationship to each other (godparentage or adoption, as discussed previously) and those
within a certain degree of affinity. The Council also proposed punishments for such
offenses as abduction, concubinage, and interference by civil officials in a couple’s right
to marry of their own free will.392 Thus the Council prohibited forced marriages, stating
that no one was to be compelled into an unwanted marriage. The marital couple had to
mutually consent to marriage.393
Another Tridentine reform involved the expedientes matrimoniales, the files
opened by the parish priest for a pre-marital investigation to ascertain if a marital couple
was free to marry.394 The Council prescribed specific procedures and formats. The
interviews conducted by the priest used preset questions for both parties to determine that
their mutual consent was genuine.395 The interviews also aimed to discover that both
members of the potential marital couple were indeed single; that they were not related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity; and that neither of them had taken a vow of
chastity or joined a religious order.396 The prospective couple was also examined on
Church doctrine, so that they would “understand completely the sanctity of the sacrament
of marriage.”397 Finally, the couple had to confess and take communion, to be in the
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“spiritual state best prepared to undertake the solemn sacrament of marriage.”398 The
Council of Trent thus played an important role in formalizing and institutionalizing
marriage. The Church redefined marriage, and tightened its control of regulating social
and sexual relations.399 That control would be challenged by the real pragmática de
casamientos.

The Decree of 24 October 1775: Prelude to the Pragmática
In a decree dated 24 October 1775 and signed by don Manuel Roda on behalf of
Charles III, there are clues to the impetus behind the 1776 pragmática. Saether argues
that these clues show that the concern of the king was with the disruption of the social
order and evidence of diminishing respect for superiors. These conditions were therefore
a threat to the monarchy. If filial piety were strengthened, the monarchy’s authority
would be preserved, for the king was seen in patriarchal theory as the father of all his
subjects.400
The 24 October decree concerned itself with the topic of unequal marriages,
framing the problem in three parts. First, it decried the deleterious effects such marriages
had on “the splendor and lustre of the most noble families.” Further, the decree described
the situation “that some subjects of illustrious birth . . . may cause their families and the
glorious memory of their forebears” distress by marrying unequally or by, for various
reasons, selecting concubinage “to the spiritual ruin of their souls.” 401 This concern for
the status of elites appears in three different paragraphs, indicating that this was a primary
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issue. This bolsters the argument that the intent of the pragmática was to preserve social
order and protect the interests of royalty and the elites.
Second, the decree both chastised and supported the church, saying that the
church had too often favored the “ill-intended liberty” of unregulated marriage without
comprehending the possible circumstances and, at times, contravened parental authority.
The decree sought to establish clear lines of responsibility for the civil state in the law of
contracts and for the church in prescribing the forms for the ecclesiastical celebration of
marriage as a sacrament. The civil power in regard to contracts was presented in the
decree as being concerned with the legitimacy of children and with inheritance. This is
another theme emphasized in the pragmática. The third aspect concerns filial obedience
to parental authority. The stated goal of the pragmática was the enforcement of this
concept of filial piety. However, the decree also aimed to preserve the social-status
hierarchy.
One concern in the 24 October decree not finding direct emphasis in the
pragmática was the phenomenon of “marriages of conscience.” This was a form of secret
marriage carried out by the church to protect a young couple from retribution by parents
or other relatives who had objected to the marriage. The couple would be examined in an
expediente matrimonial to determine their eligibility for marriage. The marriage was
recorded not in the general records of the parish but in a separate, classified record kept
by the bishop. Of concern in these marriages was the appearance of “living in sin” or
concubinage, since there was no public record of the marriage. For the same reason,
children of such marriages had difficulties, said the decree, in gaining civil employment
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or proving legitimacy.402 In the 1776 pragmática, the concern is with clandestine
marriage, which may or may not have been for reasons of conscience and personal
security for the marital couple. In St. Augustine, clandestine marriage included those
instances when the Anglo-American residents of East Florida would cross the border into
Georgia to be married in a Protestant ceremony. In two such cases, those of John
Forrester and an unnamed young woman, and William Tucker and “the widow Hull,” the
perpetrators were considered to have contracted an illegal marriage, and were subject to
the penalty of having their goods confiscated.403 The intention to limit and regulate such
marriages was a direct challenge to the authority of the church in such matters.
Charles III wanted, outwardly at least, to maintain good relations with the church,
and to this end, the decree “actively desired piety and justice in finding a remedy
appropriate” to the king’s sovereignty, “with the least interference in the Holy
Canons.”404 The decree sought a means of regulating marriage such that the perceived
ills resulting from unequal marriages would be avoided, without disturbing ecclesiastical
authority and the canons of the sacrament of marriage. The use of the phrase “sacrament
of marriage” in this paragraph makes clear that the church’s authority is over the
sacrament only, and not over any civil contract of marriage or designation of inheritance,
both of them being the province of the state. The next chapter will describe and analyze
the results – the 1776 pragmática and the 1778 decree and subsequent decrees intended to
enforce them.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
FROM THE REAL PRAGMÁTICA OF 1776
TO THE DECREE OF 10 APRIL 1803

In 1752, the cleric José Tenebra, of Tlaxcala, Mexico, wrote that “in order to
ensure the ‘public good,’ the state should discourage unequal marriages.” He defined
these as “unions between honorable men and women who were not of the right condition
because they lacked the three purities of social status, caste, and occupation.”405 The real
pragmática de casamientos of 23 March 1776 did precisely what Tenebra had urged.

The Provisions of the Real Pragmática
The stated intent of the pragmática was to prevent marriages of minors and
dependent children without paternal permission, and thereby prevent unequal marriages.
In the text of the pragmática, a minor was a child under twenty-five, and a dependent
child (hijo de familia) referred to any child, regardless of age, living under his or her
father’s roof and therefore subject to his rules.406 Charles III saw unequal marriages as
resulting in “grave offenses to God our Lord, discords in families, and scandals and other
most grave embarrassments, both moral and political.” That young people married
without parental counsel or consent (consejo o consentimiento) presented a threat to
405
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social order. Initially, the law applied only within Spain itself. 407 Marriages without
parental permission ran “counter to the intention and merciful spirit of the Church, which
. . . has always detested and prohibited them as opposed to the honor, respect, and
obedience which children owe to their fathers . . . .”408 Here we see the king’s opportune
and probably intentional use of the phrase he lifted from the Tridentine canon, in its
expression of opposition to such marriages. It was good politics to give homage to the
Church while working to reduce its power.
Charles III stated that the “disorder” caused by “unequal” marriages had
continued to exist because “specifically declared civil penalties to be assessed against
violators have not been available.”409 He called his council of ministers to consider the
question “with the reflection and maturity which its importance requires” (a phrase he
lifted from the 24 October 1775 decree) and to propose rules, while taking care not to
offend ecclesiastical and canonical sensibilities.410 The result was the pragmática, which
Charles III found to be “appropriate, just, and pleasing to my Royal authority.”411 He
issued the Pragmatic Sanction “with the force of law, and it is my will that it have the
same vigor as if it were promulgated in the Cortés.”412
The first article of the pragmática was the key, from which the succeeding articles
derived. It provided that dependent children under the age of twenty-five years of age
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must, before marrying, seek the “consent and counsel” of their fathers. If the father were
not available, the mother would be consulted. The mother being unavailable brought the
grandparents on either side forth as the ones to grant such permission. Lacking these, the
marital hopefuls would need the permission of any relative over the age of twenty-five
living nearby. If there were no available relatives, a guardian or caregiver would be the
grantor of consent. Such permission, when granted, had to be approved by the nearest
royal judge, who could not be an interested party. That is to say, he could not have a
stake in the marriage or in its prevention. If the judge were an interested party, the ruling
authority would pass to another judge or to the royal magistrate, whichever was nearest.
This last part of this article is not discussed in writings on the real pragmática, but
the points raised in it are important. The royal judge, rather than the ecclesiastical judge,
was made the court of original jurisdiction as to whether a couple was qualified to marry.
Here was the first interposition of civil authority over ecclesiastical provided in the
pragmática. Also, impartiality – or the semblance of it, at any rate – was strictly to be
maintained in having a royal judge recuse himself if he had any personal interest in the
proposed marriage. This related to instances where there might be undue pressure to
force a marriage, as seen in the case of Ysabel Allay Suyo. A judge, as much as a priest,
could be in a position to force such a marriage for his own reasons. The demand that a
judge be impartial, or that he recuse himself if he did have a personal stake, was designed
to prevent such marriages.
Article Two began with the admonition that the law applied to all classes of
society, from the highest to the most lowly. Everyone regardless of station owed to their
parents the “indispensable and natural obligation of respect for parents and elders who
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are in their place by natural and divine law.”413 Young people were not capable of
making such a momentous decision in their lives without “paternal deliberation and
consent,” so that the young could reflect on the consequences.414 Such filial piety at the
level of the family corresponded to the necessity, in the patriarchal model, of respect for
the king as the symbolic father of his subjects, regardless of one’s position in the social
hierarchy. The king, of course, occupied his position by “natural and divine law.”
The third article stated that, if the subject children should marry without parental
consent, they would lose all civil benefits, including dowries and inheritances. Charles
III felt that disinheritance of such disobedient heirs was just, based on their contravention
of law and their ingratitude. Children disinherited on the basis of having married without
permission were prevented from bringing suit to contest the provisions of a parent’s or
grandparent’s will. Parents and grandparents were obligated only to provide basic
subsistence to the disobedient children.415 The punishment for disobeying the pragmática
need not include starvation. In the Laws of Toro, Law 49, disinheritance of children
who married without parental permission was an option, as stated in Chapter Seven. In
the Pragmatic Sanction, disinheritance was mandatory.
Article Four provided that those who married without parental permission, and
who either had inherited or stood to inherit, should be deprived of such inheritance or
eligibility to inherit, and that their descendants also be barred from such inheritance. The
disobedient one’s share would pass to the individual next in line – so long as he, too, had
no legal obstacle to the inheritance. This disinheritance would hold “until the extinction
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of the lines of the descendants of the founder or the person who at the head of the family
instituted these rights or privileges.”416
Article Five expanded upon the provision of the preceding article in providing
that if the disobedient child were the last of his direct line of descent, his share of the
inheritance would pass to collateral lines (cousins, nephews and nieces, aunts, uncles).
This proscription would hold until the last collateral relative in line of descent from the
originator of the fortune in question died. Again, in no case was the disobedient one to
be denied basic subsistence.
Article Six probably would have been difficult to enforce unless a parent lodged a
specific complaint. This section provided that offspring over the age of twenty-five were
required to request the counsel and advice of their fathers before marrying. It did not
require parental permission, only advice. This requirement to seek such advice was not
to be taken to such an extent that it delayed the marriage. However, those young people
who failed altogether to seek parental counsel were subject to the same punishments as
prescribed for those under twenty-five who married without parental consent.
Article Seven put limits on paternal authority, while at the same time stating that
it was the king’s intent to “preserve to parents the due and ordered authority which by all
right belongs to them in intervening in and consenting to their children’s marriages.”417
“It is just,” said the king, “at the same time to prevent the abuse of this authority by
parents in interfering arbitrarily and with malice in their children’s freedom of choice in
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the estate to which their vocation calls them.”418 This provision served to prohibit forced
marriages, and also warned parents against forcing their children to marry when the
child’s own choice of vocation did not include matrimony, for example, if a young man
earnestly wished to enter the priesthood. Parents were also warned against imposing their
own social or economic agenda on their children by forcing them “violently to marry
someone repugnant to them, for base reasons rather than for those high ends for which
the sacrament of matrimony was instituted.”419
In Article Eight, the king ordered that parents and others in line to grant
permission to marry were required to give their consent when they had no “just and
rational” reason to withhold it. The acceptable rationale for parents to deny permission
was that such marriage would “gravely offend the family’s honor or the serenity of the
State.”420 The vagueness of this statement left the matter open to interpretation by
parents and the courts. Indeed, in the period between the issuance of the Pragmatic
Sanction in 1776 and the decree of 10 April 1803, there were numerous lawsuits, both in
Spain and, after 1778, in Spanish America, over the causes and the quality of parental
objections to their children’s marriages.421 These lawsuits spawned a number of decrees
and royal orders clarifying or attempting to clarify the issue.
If parents should interfere unjustly and maliciously in their children’s marital
decision, says Article Nine, whether of minor children or those over twenty-five years of
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age, the young people were to have “summary recourse to royal justice.”422 This article
provided precise deadlines within which suit was to be filed and a decision rendered. The
decision of the tribunal, court of appeals, or Council to which the case was referred was
final, so that a marriage might not be delayed by dragging the case out with appeals and
countersuits from the children’s parents or others qualified to provide consent.
Article Ten provided that only the final ruling in a lawsuit could be publicly
announced. All testimony or records of deliberations were to be sealed, in order to
protect the parties to the suit, and their families, from any possibility of defamation.
Hearings in these matters were to be conducted behind closed doors. Should a judge or a
notary reveal any details or provide copies of the full proceedings to those wishing to use
them in support of the dissenting parents, these officials stood to lose their jobs. The
record of the proceedings, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the matter was decided,
were to be kept in a secret, secure archive so that no one could access them. Historians
are eternally grateful that these records were not ordered destroyed.423
In Article Sixteen, the king again nodded to the Church in recognizing that civil
penalties alone were insufficient to deal with “offenses to God,” disorder, and youthful
passion.424 He indicated plainly that he expected the clergy to be zealous in their
observance of the canons. He urged bishops to enforce the encyclical of Benedict XIV,

422

Konetzke, Colección de Documentos, Vol. III, Book 1, 409.
Articles Eleven through Fourteen dealt with royalty, nobility, and grandees, of which there were none
in St. Augustine, and with the conduct of ministers, councilors, and magistrates. Article Fifteen instructed
military members to observe those procedures laid down in royal orders regarding marriage. Soldiers and
sailors were admonished that, should they not follow proper procedure and should they fail to receive
paternal permission, they would be subject to the same penalties as civilians, as provided in the Pragmatic
Sanction. There had been numerous royal orders pertaining to the rules of marriage for military members,
both officer and enlisted, for many years prior to the issuance of the pragmática. The volume of these
documents and the progression of changes in these rules could provide a separate study. These articles are
thus not included here.
424
Ibid., 411.
423

127

not indicating specifically which one, but presumably the one issued 17 November 1741
with the intent of reducing secret or clandestine marriages. “Far too many marriages
have been performed and are celebrated so secretly that official notice of them is erased
and lies buried eternally in darkness,” the pontiff declared. Benedict required that his
bishops see to it that marital couples were asked if they were “of that quality, rank, and
condition which they rightly claim,” and whether the father of either one had withheld
consent to the marriage.425 “Do not give them cause or reason,” said Charles III of
dependent children, “to fail in the obedience due to their parents,” as he urged his clergy
to be careful and vigilant in handling betrothals lest they be entered into contrary to
parental wishes.426 The king ordered that such betrothal contracts were to be in writing
and signed.
Article Seventeen briefly stated that the clergy were to observe the canons of
Trent on the subject of the announcement of the banns. The Council of Trent had
emphasized that public reading of the banns was essential to the prevention of clandestine
marriages. Charles ordered that clergy were to avoid omitting them without substantial
reason for doing so.
For “the order and tranquility of families upon which the state depends,” the king,
in the same article, ordered his archbishops, bishops and other prelates to ensure that all
clergy under their command familiarized themselves with the provisions of the Pragmatic
Sanction, so that they should both promote and concur in “its due observance and
compliance.”427 Charles III’s message to the Church was clear: though sharing
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jurisdiction in the matter of marriage, the share had become tilted in favor of the state,
and the king expected obedience and compliance.
Article Nineteen stated that the clergy had in the pragmática and in whatever
provisions bishops would make for its implementation a “competent recourse” to follow.
The king referred in this section to a decree of the same date as the pragmática, but such a
decree could not be found. The decree was directed to bishops and other Church
officials.428 The content of this document, if it still exists, could shed light on the
changing relationship between the Church and the Crown. As it was, Charles III had
strengthened the state over the Church, all the while appearing deferential.
In the closing paragraph, Charles III admonished his council, presidents and
judges of his courts of appeals and chancelleries, and all other judges and justices of
Spain to see to it that their rulings should conform to the pragmática, “without permitting
contravention in any way.”429 He also ordered that the Pragmatic Sanction be published
in Madrid and in all cities, towns, and other locations in customary form.430

Interpretations of the Pragmatic Sanction
Several scholars have offered interpretations of the pragmática. Diana Marre sees
its purpose as reserving to parents “their due and orderly authority that by all rights they
should have” in deciding who their children should marry. She calls the Pragmatic
Sanction “the chief expression of socio-political patriarchy of the Spanish crown.431 To
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María Elena Martínez, the pragmática was the key element in the Crown’s desire to
severely limit the autonomy of the Catholic Church in matters of marriage.432
Susan Socolow argues that Charles III wanted to control “disorder.” Unequal
marriages were the cause of that disorder, by disturbing the “proper ordering of society.”
This blurring of social lines produced “a dangerous confusion between social groups,” a
confusion that the state felt it must control in order to survive.433 Socolow also says that
“the state had always believed that, in order to protect a family’s honor, marriage should
be between social equals.”434 Yet there is no provision either in the Siete Partidas or in
the Laws of Toro addressing the question of marital inequality, whether social, economic,
or racial. The absence of such a provision tends to put the state in agreement with the
Catholic Church on the question of free will in the choice of marriage partners, at least as
far as the legal code was concerned, up to the issuance of the pragmática.
Ann Twinam sees the Bourbon reforms as exclusionary and preserving the
hierarchy, though social mobility was possible.435 Rodrigo Andreucci Aguilera argues
that in 1563, Philip II had prohibited clandestine marriages, calling for punishment for
the offending couple and for witnesses or accomplices. Their goods could be
confiscated, they could be exiled under penalty of death if they returned, and they could
be disinherited by their parents.436 What Philip did, actually, was to reinforce the
provisions of the Laws of Toro, Law 49.
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According to Steinar A. Saether, the Pragmatic Sanction was not so much about
curbing the Church’s power or preserving social hierarchy, but “more fundamentally, it
was as a political instrument by which the very glue that held the monarchy together was
consolidated.”437 As Saether sees it, the purpose of the Bourbon reforms in general was
to enhance the king’s authority, to unify and modernize Spain, to promote rational laws,
and to preserve society’s hierarchical order. That “glue” of the monarchy was the
patriarchy. Saether calls the strengthening of paternal authority, and the requirement of
obedience to that authority, the most important point of the pragmática. It existed
primarily to “enhance the power of the king, who, according to Bourbon absolutist
rhetoric, was the father of all fathers.”438 Saether also argues that the Bourbon reforms
did not have as their aim the reduction of the Church’s power vis-a-vis the Crown.
However, if the reforms, including the Pragmatic Sanction, existed to enhance royal
power and to solidify the king’s position as the “father of all fathers,” the Church in fact
stood to lose power. Power, indeed, does not exist in a vacuum. If the Crown increased
its power, another institution somewhere was seeing its power diminished. The most
powerful institution other than the Crown was the Church.
Saether refers to crown prince Luis de Bourbón’s proposed marriage, discussed at
length below. The idea of the crown prince marrying a woman of inferior status
threatened to disrupt the Bourbon succession and the royal family’s honor and status.
According to Saether, Prince Luis notoriously smuggled women into the palace for his
carnal amusement. María Luz Alonso says, below, that the result of Luis’s behavior was
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the Pragmatic Sanction.439 However, argues Saether, Luis’s case does not explain the
article in the pragmática applying its rules to all levels of society, nor does it explain the
extension of the 1776 pragmática to the Indies in 1778. The law was not, therefore, a
hasty reaction to a crisis within the royal family. It had a much broader purpose and
deeper history than that. On this point, the evidence tends to support Saether’s view.
María Luz Alonso’s argument is that Luis’s intended marriage was the only
impetus for the pragmática. It was not mundane abstractions such as the power struggle
between Church and State or between social classes or races, she says. Rather, it was
what Charles III saw as ill-advised love on the part of his own brother: “There cannot be
the least doubt that the cause which gave rise to the promulgation of this Pragmática was
that of meeting and regulating the civil effects of the possible marriage of the prince don
Luis de Borbón with an unequal person.”440
Alonso cites contemporary sources who maintained that the true origin and
motivating factor for issuance of the real pragmática de casamientos was Prince Luis’s
possible marriage to a woman considered to be his inferior. A history of the reign of
Charles III, written in 1856 by Ferrer del Río, stated that the pragmática was rooted in the
role don Luis was expected to play in the succession to the Crown of Spain.441
Victorian de Villava, a crown attorney in the court of appeals in Charcas, Mexico,
wrote a scathing critique of the pragmática, quoted by Alonso. It was not promulgated to
resolve a problem of general character such as a perceived increase in unequal marriages,
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said Villava, but to prevent Don Luis’s unequal marriage. The true purpose of the 1776
pragmática was not to exalt any abstract ideal, but merely “to exclude any possible
descendants of the Crown Prince Luis, who would be born of a marriage to an unequal
person, to succeed to the throne.”442 Scarcely one month after the issuance of the
pragmática, don Luis petitioned his brother the King for a royal license to marry the
woman of inferior status. The license was granted, but don Luis had to accede to the
penalties listed in the pragmática.443 On 4 August 1799, a month after the death of don
Luis, King Charles IV pardoned him posthumously, granting royal benefits to Luis’s
children and recognizing them as members of the royal family.444
From this point of view, the pragmática can be seen as an exercise in irony and
futility. However, evidence shows that it grew more out of Bourbon intent to strengthen
the position of the king and thereby curb the power of the Church, out of concern over
unequal marriages, and out of the general trend in Spanish society toward strengthening
the patria potestad as it did out of any fears Charles III may have had about the purity of
the line of succession. As evidenced by José Tenebra’s writings, Charles III was not the
only one in Spain or the colonies who thought something should be done about the
problem of unequal marriages. Based on what Tenebra wrote, and when he wrote it,
those concerns arose long before don Luis cast his eye on the “inferior” woman. Not
only that, but the fact that the Pragmatic Sanction echoed many provisions of the fourth
of the Siete Partidas, the Laws of Toro, and the Tridentine canon on marriage
demonstrated that concerns over uneqal marriage, the role of parental consent, and the
role of church and state in marriage long predated Prince Luis’s escapades.
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The Decree of 7 April 1778: Extending the Pragmática
Some two years after the issuance of the pragmática of 1776, Charles III extended
its provisions to the Indies. Having become aware “that the same or worse prejudicial
effects of this abuse” [unequal marriages] were found in the Indies as well as in Spain,
the king felt it was appropriate that the Pragmatic Sanction should cover the overseas
colonies as well as the mother country. Modifications were necessary to accommodate
the diversity of classes and castes of the inhabitants of the Indies and “for other various
circumstances which do not occur in Spain.”445 Charles referred to the Fourth Provincial
Council of Mexico, a Church convocation that sat in 1771, and contemplated these
difficulties attributed to unequal marriages. This Council’s deliberations resulted in
recommendations to Charles of “salutary and appropriate rules” to prevent “the most
grave disturbances which have resulted from the absolute and undisciplined liberty within
which impassioned and inexperienced youth have become betrothed.”446
In reference to the Mexican convocation, Charles indicated parenthetically that
the bishops recommended prohibiting unequal marriages contracted in opposition to
parental wishes, and the omission of the announcement of banns. The Council also
suggested that priests not remove potential brides from the parental household and place
them in depósito against parental wishes without first clearing such action with the
bishop. This advance notice was to allow the bishop to determine whether the father’s
opposition to the marriage was rational, as demanded by the 1776 pragmática.
Ecclesiastical judges were not to admit into their tribunals those betrothal contracts
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entered into by persons of “notorious inequality,” when such betrothals “would redound
to the discredit of the parents.”447
These recommendations from the convocation in Mexico were submitted to the
Council of the Indies. On 7 January 1778, the councilors forwarded their report to the
king. Charles, pleased with the results, mandated that the 1776 Pragmatic Sanction, with
the modifications specified in this decree of 7 April 1778, be published in customary
form in the Indies, to the end that it and the modifications should be made known and
complied with.448
Article One states that in light of difficulties encountered by certain classes of
people in obtaining parental permission for marriage, these groups were excluded from
compliance with the Pragmatic Sanction. The listed groups to be excluded were blacks,
mulattos, coyotes [offspring of mestizos and Indians] and other mixed-race persons.
Individuals of these classes who served in the militias were an exception to this rule.
Because of their service to the king, their reputation, and their “good operations and
services,” black and mixed-race militia members were included in coverage. “These
[persons] must be counseled and made to understand their natural obligation to honor and
venerate their parents and elders,” the king admonished.449,450
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Article Three, in one sentence, stated that the Indian equivalent of royalty, the
caciques, “for their nobility are considered to be in the class of distinguished Spaniards
for the purposes of the real pragmática de casamientos.”451 This did not necessarily mean
that the decree encouraged intermarriage, but instead protected the prerogatives of an
elite among Indians, just as its 1776 predecessor served to protect the elite among the
Spanish. There was no language prohibiting marriage between Spanish and Indians.
The fourth article formed the underpinning for the filing of every marriage license
petition in St. Augustine and elsewhere in Spanish America. It provided that European
Spaniards (peninsulares) and transients from other nations, as long as they were there
legally, had recourse to a justice or judge of the province in which they were living for
permission to marry, if no one qualified to give consent was available. Legal presence
was determined by the possession of a license to travel to the Indies. The judges or other
officials to whom petitions were submitted were prohibited from asking for compensation
“under the penalty of loss of employment.”452
The provisions of Article Four were extended in Article Five to those who were
born in Spanish America but whose parents lived at such a distance or in terrain so rough
and impassable as to prevent timely request and receipt of permission to marry. Both
conditions prevailed in St. Augustine, with many individuals stating in their petitions that
their parents were either dead, or lived in Spain, Minorca, or other overseas locations, or
so far away within East Florida, or in the United States, as to preclude timely permission.
In both the Pragmatic Sanction of 1776 and in this decree of 1778 we find reference to
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deadlines and to timely response, with the wish to avoid unnecessary delay of the
celebration of a marriage.
Article Six made the courts of appeals the court of final jurisdiction. For St.
Augustine, the court of such jurisdiction was the court of appeals in Cuba. In such cases
as described in Articles Four and Five, it was not necessary for an individual wishing to
marry to attempt to obtain permission from his parents. The courts of appeals were to
name the officials in each district who were to receive and rule on petitions for license to
marry. In St. Augustine, the tribunal that heard such cases was made up of the governor,
the notary, and the city/military auditor.
Article Seven referred to Article Nine of the 1776 pragmática in the assignment of
deadlines within which certain duties were to be performed. In the petitions filed in St.
Augustine, we find these deadlines imposed in cases of parental dissent. A recalcitrant
parent or other relative who did not grant permission would be told by the governor,
through the notary, that he or she had from one to three days, depending on
circumstances, in which to provide such permission or to submit a “just and rational”
reason for withholding it. Such instances will be examined in the next chapter. Also in
this article, once again there appeared an admonition for officials not to request or accept
any emolument for their services. It was proper to charge a petitioner for the cost of
paper and ink, but in no case was the imposition of such fees to prevent someone who
could not afford them access to the official services needed to process his or her petition.
Article Eight provided for accommodation of special circumstances. Courts of
Appeals could establish rules consonant with the 1776 and 1778 decrees which accounted
for such things as customs, distance, and other circumstances which seemed appropriate
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to the particular area or district. Such special rules were to be submitted to the Council of
the Indies, which would forward them to the king for his approval. In order to avoid
inconvenience, these local rules could be implemented on an interim basis until the ruling
of the king was received.
In Article Nine, Charles III ordered that all archbishops and bishops see to it that
their priests in the field not issue permission for young people to marry without the
consent of their parents or other qualified persons as required, or until a court of
competent jurisdiction issued a final ruling on parental resistance.
Charles picked his language in the last paragraph of the decree carefully: “In
consequence of my Royal determination, I order my Viceroys, Presidents, courts of
appeals, Governors and other judges and ministers of the Realm of the Indies to whom
pertaining, and I urge and charge the Very Reverend Archbishops and Reverend Bishops
. . . to observe, comply with, and execute . . .” the provisions of the decree.453 He was not
going to “order” the Church to comply, but “urged and charged” it to be in compliance.
Aside from the above modifications, the pragmática of 1776 was to be observed
and complied with in all of its other provisions, including the punishments for young
people who married without their fathers’ permission.

Interpretations of the 1778 Decree
What do scholars claim was the effect of this decree on marriage in the Indies?
Ilona Katzew sees the 1778 decree as a drastic curtailment of the freedom to marry. Her
interpretation holds that the 1778 decree applied “only to those who were white or of
pure Indian ancestry, enabling parents for the first time to have a legally sanctioned say in
453
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their children’s marriage choices.” The 1778 decree provided that “the only valid
reasons for opposing marriage were racial disparities when the other party was of black
ancestry.” The decree, says Katzew, was designed “to protect whiteness.”454
María Elena Martínez also sees the 1778 decree as including a specific prohibition
against Spanish and blacks marrying. “Marriages were ‘unequal,’” says Martínez, “when
they involved unions between blacks and non-blacks.”455 With respect to Section Three
of the 1778 decree regarding Indian nobility, Martínez states that marriage legislation
“consecrated” the idea of the purity of Indian lineages.456
Ann Twinam joins the chorus of those who maintain the 1778 decree had the aim
of preventing interracial marriage. It “gave both parents and royal officials the authority
to prevent marriages that crossed natal and racial boundaries.”457 In Spain in 1776, says
Twinam, the specter that prompted the 1776 law was social inequality. In 1778, the
specter was racial.
In a 1989 study, Susan Socolow commented on the effect of the 1778 decree on
unequal marriages. In her study of six parishes in Buenos Aires, she found that the
incidence of “unequal” marriages declined from 23.4% before the 1778 decree to 10.1%
after its issuance. Socolow defined “inequality” for purposes of her study as interracial
marriage or those between a legitimate child and an illegitimate one.458 The economic
factor, important in St. Augustine, does not appear included in this definition. In a later
publication, Socolow broadened her definition of “inequality” as being partly racial, but
also as social, economic, and moral. She argues that the exclusion of blacks, mulattos,
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and mixed-race individuals from coverage under the 1778 decree existed specifically to
protect the Spanish elite.459 The decree protected elite families from the possibility of
their daughters making “socially inopportune marriages.”460 But again, social
inappropriateness is not given a precise definition. It may be noteworthy that Socolow
says “daughters,” but not sons. Here again, gender is a factor. Certainly in St.
Augustine, officials were not worried about white men who married women with a family
history of African origin.
In her 1989 study of marriage in Mexico, Edith Couturier concluded that it was
not known if the state “upheld the rights of the parents to decide on their offspring’s
matrimonial choices, or how often the courts ruled in favor of the children.”461 In the
first part, she seems to be asking the wrong question. The courts were bound by law to
uphold the parents’ right to have a say in their children’s marriages. The courts were not
bound to uphold parental oppositions that were not “just and rational.” The question to
ask is the second one: how often did the courts support the young people and reject
parental reasons for opposing these marriages?
Steinar Saether determined from his studies that the 1778 decree and by extension
the real pragmática were not accepted with grace in Spanish America. Between 1778 and
1802, decrees and royal orders were issued to reaffirm and reinforce the provisions of the
pragmática, in response to resistance, dissent, and a host of lawsuits. The number and
frequency of these lawsuits suggests that the provisions of the 1776 and 1778 decrees
were too vague, not well understood, or that there was considerable resistance to them.
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Saether raises the question: Why was there such a difference in the reactions to
the changes wrought by these two documents? Between Spain and Spanish America, he
argues, there was a difference in the application of concepts of honor. He perceives
honor in Spanish America as linked to issues of race, lineage, social status, and personal
conduct in ways they were not in Spain. There was “a conflict of mentalities” in that
Spanish America did not pay the same homage to either royal or paternal authority as did
Spain. There was “a dominant prejudice” against Africans among the Spanish in the
New World. Blacks were often characterized as the offspring of concubines or as
conceived in illicit consensual unions. The 1778 decree, Saether maintains, made legal
marriage more difficult for blacks.462 Perhaps it did in areas Saether studied, but it does
not appear to have been the case in St. Augustine. Blacks there simply did not have to go
through the civil petition process unless they were members of the militia. The Church
encouraged marriage over consensual unions or concubinage. Marriage was encouraged
for all citizens, white and black.
Jane Landers tells us that marriage rates were low for blacks in St. Augustine,
attributing this statistic to the fact that most blacks, free and slave, were rural, and did not
have ready access to the services of the church in St. Augustine. She also states that
“concubinage and illegitimacy [resulting from consensual unions] did not carry the
disadvantages in this frontier society that they may have elsewhere . . .”463 St.
Augustine’s Catholic Church facilitated those black marriages that were celebrated in the
church by not requiring the marital couple to pay for the marriage ceremony if they could
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not afford it.464 Though blacks in St. Augustine did not have to comply with the
pragmática, the Church conducted the expedientes matrimoniales in the same way for
them as it did for white marital couples. Whatever other social benefits a Catholic
marriage had for blacks, one was of paramount importance. Slave families with parents
who had been married in the church could not be broken up by being sold by their
masters. Such a family had to be kept intact if sold.465
Blacks could and did get married in the Catholic parish of St. Augustine, without
having to go through the process of parental consent prescribed in the pragmática. Slaves
were required by other laws to obtain the consent of their masters. María de la Luz
Blanco’s master José de la Encarnación Espinosa gave permission for her to marry the
free mulato José de Arrivas (Rivas).466 There were thirty-one entries in the book of black
marriages between 1785 and 1803. No black marriages were recorded in 1784. Of this
thirty-one, only two grooms filed petitions for permission to marry, based on possible or
actual militia service, José de Arrivas and Juan García.

Decrees and Royal Orders, 1778-1802
Of the decrees, royal orders, and opinions of the Council of the Indies issued
during this period, this discussion will consider those most relevant to how the
pragmática was applied in St. Augustine. The first under consideration here was an
opinion of the Council of the Indies issued on 27 February 1783, prompted by three
lawsuits involving parental permission. The opinion was requested by the Bishop of
464
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Cuba, concerning rules he was formulating for his parishes for their conduct under the
pragmática. St. Augustine’s parish was under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cuba.
The proposed rule stated that minors requesting to marry must obtain parental
permission, or receive the decision of the duly constituted tribunal in their favor in case
of parental disapproval. The proposed rule also directed clergy to exercise caution in
approving betrothals or marriage requests presented without parental permission.467 The
Council of the Indies approved the proposed rule, saying that it was just and fitting to
observe the rule which prohibited requests not just for marriage, but also for engagement
without parental permission for those young people under twenty-five.468
According to Socolow, two decrees issued in May of 1783 strengthened parental
power and abrogated free choice of marriage partners.469 The first, issued 26 May 1783,
involved the intended marriage of don Juan António López and doña María Manuela de
Aranda y Laris in Mexico. Doña María’s father, don Ramón Luis de Aranda, objected to
the marriage, an objection upheld by the tribunal. Don Juan, the intended groom,
appealed to the pertinent court of appeals, which upheld the tribunal’s ruling. The couple
married anyway, and María was disinherited by her father. Her mother disagreed with
that decision and attempted to provide for María, beyond the required basic subsistence.
The matter went all the way to the king, who ruled that a mother may not provide for a
disobedient son or daughter as an heir, nor could she provide any support whatsoever.
The second decree, issued 31 May 1783, tightened the requirement for parental
permission for marriages of children twenty-five years of age or older.470 Those in that
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category who did not seek advice and consent for their marriage could be disinherited.
The pragmática originally required only that those over twenty-five seek the counsel of
their parents, if time permitted. The same punishments prescribed for those under
twenty-five years of age who failed to secure parental permission were applied also to
those over that age by this later decree. Such punishment had little effect on those
families with little substance to pass to their children. Many youngsters were not worried
by the prescribed punishment. Saether’s interpretation is that young people adopted the
attitude that if they were willing to accept disinheritance, nothing could be done in the
civil or ecclesiastical realms to prevent their marriage.471
Marriage license documents in St. Augustine do not reveal whether there were
cases of such disregard for the possibility of disinheritance in the town, but other
documents in the East Florida Papers indicate that the text of the pragmática and the 1778
decree had been publicly published, and citizens were expected to be aware of their
provisions.472 The assumption was that everyone in East Florida knew that parental
permission for marriage was necessary, and that there were penalties for failure to obtain
it or for marrying in the face of parental opposition.
On 10 July 1783, the king issued a clarification regarding the application of the
pragmática’s rules to military members. The king provided three rules. In the first,
military members with parents or other qualified relatives in the Americas (presumably
within a reasonable distance) were required to abide by the consent or dissent of their
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parents. Superior officers were required to determine whether a soldier wishing to marry
had parental permission. In the second rule, those officers in the Americas whose parents
or other qualified persons resided in Europe were to ask permission from their parents.
They were required to send all required documents to the Council of War via the Council
of the Indies. The delicate concern in the pragmática that a planned marriage not be
unnecessarily delayed certainly did not apply in these cases. The third rule applied to
enlisted men, whether Spanish or foreigners, who wanted to marry and establish
residence in the Americas. Enlisted personnel were not required to obtain royal
permission. Instead, they were to supply witnesses who had knowledge of the subject
soldier’s parents’ place of residence in Europe, or other difficulty in obtaining parental
permission. The commander of the corps, battalion, or regiment to which the soldier
belonged was empowered to give permission for the man to marry.473 Rules for the
military concerning clandestine marriage were not based in the pragmática, but in royal
orders issued in 1775 and 1781.474
Yet again, in a royal order dated 8 March 1787, the power of the father to prevent
his child’s marriage was strengthened. This decree stated that priests absolutely could
not celebrate a marriage without parental or court approval. This decree also
strengthened the role of the state in deciding who could and could not marry. If the state
hurdle were not cleared, the church had no power to perform such a marriage, even if the
parties to the marriage were willing to face disinheritance as a result.
On 18 September 1788, a decree was issued ordering that only the children
involved in petitioning for marriage could request permission for either betrothal or
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marriage. No other person would be allowed to file such petitions. The charge to
archbishops, bishops, and their subordinates not to accept petitions for betrothal or
marriage without parental permission was renewed in this decree.
Issues of race and legitimacy were treated in a consulta (advisory opinion to the
king) of the Council of the Indies dated 12 August 1791. At issue was the wish of Ana
Josefa Fernández, a white citizen of Puerto Principe, Santo Domingo (present-day Portau-Prince, Haiti) to marry Pedro de Estrada, a free mulatto. Ana was a sacrílega,
illegitimate daughter of a priest, and considered to be of the lowest status. Her sister,
doña Juana Fernández, objected based on Pedro’s race. Juana’s dissent was ruled rational
by the court. The case hinged on the fact that Ana, though the illegitimate issue of a
scandalous act, was white and Pedro was mulatto. The statement in the ruling was that
the color “of mulattos never fails to cause a notable disparity.” The court further said that
the stain of a mulatto relative “always infects a family.”475 Here is an instance where the
pragmática, though it lacks specific language prohibiting interracial marriage, had been
interpreted to support the dissent of a family member based solely on such color
disparity. It is also noteworthy to recognize a basic assumption: a white person, even one
who was born of an illicit liaison between her mother and a priest, was superior to a
person of color. The unfortunate result was that Ana’s chance of marrying a white man
was practically nonexistent.
On 27 February 1793, a decree was issued in response to a case in Lorca, Murcia,
Spain, in which don Pedro Exea had married doña María de los Dolores Molina, fifteen
years old, on 21 July 1780, without her father’s permission. Don Pedro had appeared
before Charles III, stating that his wife was not subject to the penalties under the real
475

Ibid., 695-697.

146

pragmática. The corregidor (magistrate) of their home city had said that María had lost
her right to inherit because of the marriage without parental permission. Her share had
passed to her sister. The ruling was affirmed by the king’s council, but Charles IV said
that the order was “without effect.” The pragmática and succeeding orders were not
retroactive, said the king. This seems an odd statement, considering that the pragmática
was issued in 1776 and the marriage took place in 1780. The document does not state
when the promise of marriage may have been given, and that could be a factor in the
seemingly odd dates. Also, the decree of 1793 mentions another, dated 26 August 1788.
That decree could not be found, but it may be the basis for the king’s statement about
retroactivity. In any case, the king overturned the ruling, and also made it very clear in
the 1793 decree that those who were to marry without proper consent or in the face of
parental opposition were to be deprived of civil benefits and that parents “shall”
disinherit them and their descendants.476 There is no way of knowing if don Pedro Exea
had influence with Charles IV, or what may have transpired between them when don
Pedro had his audience. This case demonstrates that even the king made exceptions to
the pragmática.
On 16 December 1792, the Department of Grace and Justice, in Madrid, sent
Governor Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada at St. Augustine a letter concerning clandestine
marriage. The letter was in response to a report by Quesada concerning the instance in
which John Forrester, an Anglo resident of East Florida, had eloped across the border into
Georgia with a young Anglo woman, who was not named in the letter. The instruction
forwarded with the letter was also in response to events in Florida and in Louisiana, and
was aimed at bishops, priests, and other clergy. The letter cited the Forrester case, and
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emphasized the principle that, in Spanish territories, “there cannot be any other public
religion than Catholic.” Moreover, the letter stated that “public concubinage cannot be
tolerated,” referring to the public image attached to clandestine marriage.477
The instruction, dated 30 November 1792, was addressed to all “who exercise the
care of souls in the provinces of Louisiana and East and West Florida.” Its subject was
“the celebration of marriages of English, Anglo-American, and Foreign Protestants
domiciled” in the Spanish provinces, and also was directed to the attention of governors
and judges, as applicable. Referring both to the Council of Trent and civil law, including
the pragmática, the instruction prohibited clandestine marriages. Specifically, it stated
that such foreign Protestant colonists were required to marry in the Spanish colony in
which they resided, in the Catholic church, whether their intended spouse was Catholic or
Protestant.478 Those Protestant couples who had gone to another Catholic territory to
marry were to have their marriage verified by their parish priest. The instruction also
required that marriage ceremonies be performed in the presence of three witnesses,
according to the canons of Trent. Marriages contracted clandestinely, whether within the
Spanish colonies or on foreign soil, were declared null and void. The punishment for
violation of the rule laid down in the instruction was confiscation of goods and permanent
expulsion from Spanish dominions.479
In February of 1798, the Council of the Indies issued a report covering several
cases which had arisen over several years challenging the 1778 decree. The Council, in
surveying the flood of questions, problems, and cases arising from the 1778 decree,
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referred to the “difficulties and doubts encountered in meeting one’s obligations under
the real pragmática.” The law needed reform, though the Council emphasized that they
were not suggesting repeal. To repeal the pragmática would have been a signal to
youngsters that they could do as they pleased regarding marriage. Some way had to be
found, said the Council, to strengthen the basic principles of the pragmática: prohibition
of unequal marriages and reinforcement of the concept of filial obedience. The Council
recommended leaving the matter of whether a couple should be permitted to marry in the
face of parental opposition to the ecclesiastical judges.480 Taking into consideration
Charles III’s wording of the pragmática of 1776 and the decree of 1778, he would
probably not have accepted this suggestion.
The Council reminded Charles IV that his father’s intention had been “directed
only at remedying disorder caused by unequal marriages,” and setting out the civil
penalties for those who disobediently entered into such marriages without parental
consent.481 The only concern of the pragmática was to prevent unequal marriages, said
the Council. Was the Council demonstrating a desire to renegotiate the balance of power
between church and state? The Council spoke of the continued litigation over the
interpretation of the Pragmatic Sanction, despite “repeated Royal declarations”
concerning its intent and enforcement. Yet the tribunals of the Americas continued to
“approach His Majesty, disturbing his sovereign attention” with more “inexcusable”
lawsuits.482
Citing a case from 1783, the Council of the Indies upheld a decision by the
Bishop of Cuba to allow a marriage of conscience, in spite of the civil tribunal’s decision
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that the opposition of the bride’s father was “just and rational.” The Council declared
that ecclesiastical authorities had exclusive jurisdiction over marriages of conscience.
The Council seems to be defending ecclesiastical authority against civil authority. The
possibility that the Council may have been maneuvering vis-a-vis the king is a topic for
further investigation. This interpretation may have been part of the reason for the
issuance in 1803 of the most restrictive rules on marriage, a distinct move by the crown
to solidify its position and strengthen the patriarchy. Such enforcement of patriarchal
power benefitted the king, as a further implicit statement of the need for his subjects to
respect his authority. If there was a struggle between king and council, this may have
been a stern message from the king. At the same time, the Council stated that
ecclesiastical courts were to deny requests for marriage when the betrothal of the marital
parties was entered into without parental consent and if the opposition of the parents had
been upheld by the civil court as just and rational.483

The Decree of 10 April 1803: the Final Stroke
The decree of 10 April 1803 announced significant changes to the provisions of
the pragmática. The major change was that a parent who opposed the marriage of his or
her child was no longer required to provide any reason at all. This represented further
strengthening of the patria potestad and a further restriction on a young person’s marriage
choice, up to the age of twenty-five. Such restriction did not apply to sons over twentyfive and daughters over the age of twenty-three. These individuals, being of the age of
maturity, were no longer required to ask for permission or for advice and counsel, but
could marry whom they pleased without limitation.
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The change in procedure for young people under age twenty-five was as
significant as it was complicated. The ages at which permission was required became a
function of who was available to provide it, on a sliding scale. Individuals over the stated
age in each category were free to marry as they wished. If the father was living, his
permission was required for the marriage of men up to age twenty-five, and women up to
age twenty-three. If the father was dead or absent, the mother was the person qualified to
provide or withhold permission. If the mother was the one consulted for permission, the
age limit changed to twenty-four for men and twenty-two for women. If neither the
father nor the mother was available, the paternal grandfather or, in his absence, the
maternal grandfather were the ones to grant consent. If a grandfather was the one
granting consent, the age requirement for males dropped to twenty-three years of age, and
for females, twenty-one.
If the grandfathers were absent or dead, the authority to grant consent fell to a
tutor and, if none, a local judge. Neither the grandfathers, the tutors, nor the judges were
obligated to provide a cause for withholding consent to a marriage. And, again, the age
limit dropped if a tutor or judge was the individual granting consent, to twenty-two for
males and twenty for females. Thus, while the rules further restricted free will in choice
of marriage partners by not requiring that a parent’s objection be supported by just and
rational reasons, there was some free will by age group. If nothing else, a couple could
wait until they attained the ages at which they were not required to obtain parental
permission to marry.
Provisions for those who were required to ask for royal permission to marry –
such as government officials and military officers – remained unchanged. Clergy who
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officiated at marriages contracted without parental permission or under the burden of
parental opposition risked expatriation and loss of worldly benefits. Parties to such a
marriage were also subject to confiscation of goods, loss of benefits, and expatriation.
Rules regarding betrothal were tightened. No secular or ecclesiastical tribunal
could allow an engagement that was entered into without parental permission. Such
engagements as were qualified to go forward had to be written and made public. Charges
based on failure to follow this rule concerning betrothal would be heard as civil, not
criminal, matters. This decree came to St. Augustine from the Marquis de Someruelos,
Captain-General in Cuba, on 23 June 1803.484
Steinar A. Saether argues that the 1803 decree was the final reinforcement of
“filial obedience as a guiding principle while it became unnecessary for officials and
clergy to pronounce on the justice of parental opposition.” After 1803, he says, only
written and notarized betrothals were legal.485 This 1803 decree supplanted the
pragmática as the law of marriage in the Spanish empire. No more were certain racial
groups excluded, and no more could a young person have recourse to civil or
ecclesiastical justice if his or her father opposed the marriage.486 According to Saether,
the aim of so drastic a change was to do away with the spate of lawsuits that had followed
issuance of the pragmática. “There would therefore be no more cases before the courts
on the justice of parental dissent.” Here is the explanation for the abrupt cessation of
petitions for marriage licenses in St. Augustine. They were no longer necessary.
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Robert McCaa maintains that the 10 April 1803 decree tipped the scales in favor
of men. He finds that judges had been unsympathetic to women’s charges of seduction
and rape. He attributes the issuance of the decree at least in part to a rise in illegitimacy
in the Spanish colonies. The aim of the decree was to strengthen parental control. It also
served to strengthen the male position in courtship. It removed the right of a woman to
sue for breach of promise.487 As McCaa sees the 1803 decree shifting the balance
toward men, Susan M. Socolow states that the changes wrought by that document
corrected a “bias against women” with its sliding scale of ages at which young people
were to seek permission to marry.488
Patricia Seed found that the Crown no longer maintained race “as the primary
definition of social inequality.” Parents had total power to prevent the marriage of a son
under twenty-five or a daughter under twenty-three.489 A basic assumption of the
pragmática had been that parents would be rational, responsible, dispassionate decisionmakers regarding their children’s marriages. Seed found this not to be the case in her
study of Mexico. Greed, personal grudges, and “the whims of difficult personalities”
were behind one-third of the total marriage objections lodged in the cases she
examined.490 Personal motives also figured in cases in St. Augustine, as will be
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE:

APPLICATION OF THE REAL PRAGMÁTICA
IN ST. AUGUSTINE

How was the real pragmática de casamientos applied in St. Augustine? Which
elements were complied with and which, if any, were ignored? These questions will be
considered in this chapter. Note that, for the rest of this paper, the terms pragmática, real
pragmática, and Pragmatic Sanction will be applied to the 1776 and 1778 documents
taken together as a unified whole, as this was the way the terms were used in the marriage
license petitions of St. Augustine.

Parental Consent
The first article of the pragmática prescribed that individuals below the age of
twenty-five should request and receive permission from their fathers, mothers, other
relatives, or their tutors or caregivers in order to marry. This basic premise was modified
for the Indies to exclude blacks and mixed-race residents, except those who served in the
various militias. Further modification provided that those in the New World who had no
relatives or other qualified persons within reasonable distance could apply to a judge or
tribunal for permission to marry. Of the 146 marriage license petitions filed in St.
Augustine, 122 of them were filed seeking the tribunal’s permission to marry due to the
petitioners lacking parents or other relatives in East Florida. In a few of these petitions,
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other reasons were also stated for filing, such as Louis Trunston’s request for validation
as a “stranger” (forastero), discussed in Chapter Four. When Pedro Fontanet filed to
challenge his brother’s opposition to his marriage to María Luisa Rodriguez, discussed
below, María filed jointly with him on the grounds that she had no one in St. Augustine
to ask for permission to marry.
Article One of the original 1776 order also specified that those who received
parental permission were required to have the grant of permission approved by the chief
judge in their locality. In St. Augustine, this approval came from the governor. Twelve
of the 146 petitions were filed in order to receive the governor’s approval of permission
granted by a parent or other relative. Other grounds for filing petitions were to document
the limpieza of the family of the petitioner, the status and behavior of the petitioner as a
forastero who had not yet achieved the status of a citizen (vecino), and a request for
approval of the marriage of a man and woman whose family relationship was within the
fourth degree.

Race
Article Two of the 1776 decree declared the universality of application of the
pragmática within Spain. In 1778, that universality was modified to exclude certain
racial groups. Several scholars – Katzew, Martínez, and Twinam – argue that the
pragmática prohibited marriage between white and black. The pragmática appears not to
have been interpreted in St. Augustine as proscribing such marriages. In St. Augustine,
interracial marriages were few, but those which did take place did not raise objections,
nor did they seem to have been handled by the authorities as special cases. The
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marriages in 1795 of two of the quadroon daughters of Francisco Xavier Sánchez have
been previously discussed. Another daughter, Catalina, married a peninsular Spaniard in
1803, as her sisters Ana and Beatriz had done before her. The petition of Francisco
Sánchez of Granada made no mention of his intended bride Catalina’s racial makeup or
her illegitimacy.491 Nor did witnesses Antonio Vallejo, Gabriel González, and Manuel
Alvarez, all of whom testified that Francisco Sánchez of Granada had no one in St.
Augustine qualified to give permission for his marriage, and that Catalina was honest,
honorable, and of good family. Governor White granted permission without any
mention of Catalina’s origins.492
In the marriage license petitions of St. Augustine are two cases in which mulatto
or black petitioners filed petitions which were accepted and acted on in due judicial
course. Some scholars maintain that the pragmática was totally exclusionary, that blacks
and mixed-race people fell outside of its purview. This idea has been put forward in spite
of the provision that those black, mulatto, and mixed-race individuals who served in the
militia of their locality were included under the pragmática due to their distinguished
service. However, in St. Augustine the Pragmatic Sanction was not considered
exclusionary. José de Arrivas, a free mulatto also known as Rivas, filed 10 June 1786
for permission to marry the black slave María de la Luz Blanco. He was a shoemaker,
with no documentation indicating he was a member of the militia, though it is possible
that he was. He may have merely known about the requirement to file a petition in the
absence of anyone he could ask for permission to marry, and decided that he should
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comply with it. His petition was accepted the same as any white person’s. The notary
followed through with the required notifications, and Governor Zéspedes issued the
permit with the same attention as he did to all such petitions. María had the required
permission of her master, who told notary Domingo Rodríguez de León he was “very
pleased” over the marriage.493
The other non-white petitioner was Juan Antonio García, who was probably a
mestizo, though he could also have been mulato. One witness called on his behalf said he
was mulato, but another said one of his parents may have been an Indian. These
witnesses did say that his family members were “people of color and of low esteem” in
their home town of Campeche, Mexico. María Caterina Brown was a mulata, as noted
earlier in this paper. Juan’s petition was in line with the requirements of the 1788 decree,
as one witness testified that Juan was “of the caste of mulattos, as he had served in the
militia of this class.”494 At the time he petitioned, he was among the crew of a royal
launch stationed at St. Augustine. It would appear that, at least for the family of a
member of the planter elite, the pragmática was not interpreted as preventing interracial
marriage. Nor was it considered totally exclusive of blacks and mulattos.

Punishments
Articles Three through Six go into detail concerning punishments for individuals
who married without parental permission. There was no indication of any such cases in
the marriage license petitions filed in St. Augustine. The government in St. Augustine
applied these articles of punishment in cases of clandestine marriage, especially when
493
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Anglo-Americans crossed the border into Georgia to be married in Protestant ceremones,
rather than in the Catholic Church.

Parental Dissent
Articles Seven and Eight covered parental dissent. Parents were required to give
approval unless they put forth “just and rational” reasons against a proposed marriage. In
St. Augustine there were twelve oppositions filed to proposed marriages. Of these
twelve, not a single parental objection was upheld. All the rulings in these cases were in
favor of the marital couple.
A few of these opposition cases have been discussed in previous chapters. One of
these is the objection of don Juan Leonardy to the marriage of his mother doña Agueda
Coll to Juan Bernardo Sánchez, who had previously been exiled to Florida for a crime he
committed in Cuba. Juan Leonardy objected, as described in Chapter Five, on the
grounds that Sánchez was not a man of honor. In addition, Leonardy maintained that the
marriage of his mother to Sánchez would be an unequal marriage, based on her elite
status (as doña) and his allegation that Sánchez, originally from Mexico, had Indian
blood. This was the one racially-based objection in the St. Augustine marriage petitions.
As was her right under the pragmática, doña Agueda petitioned that her son don
Juan produce his reasons for objecting or be required to withdraw his objection and allow
her to marry. Witnesses testified that Sánchez was indeed of Indian blood. In his ruling,
Governor Enrique White stated that “as to the quality of Indian which Juan Bernardo
Sánchez proved, it is not an impediment to the marriage . . . .”495 Apparently, Governor
White did not interpret the pragmática as prohibiting mixed marriages. White pointedly
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ruled in favor of doña Agueda, stating that she did not have parents “or other legitimate
persons who could give license” for her to marry. Children were not among those
enumerated in the pragmática as being qualified to grant permission to marry. Certainly
this makes sense, if we view the pragmática as having as its intent to strengthen parental
authority. Even in the face of the statement in Article One of the 1776 decree that
granted permission rights to any relative over the age of twenty-five living nearby,
children could not exercise the patria potestad over their parents.
Bartolomé Suárez filed for permission to marry Agueda Casalina, stating that her
parents had given verbal permission but refused to provide their permission in writing.
Saying that Agueda’s parents had no reason to oppose the marriage, he asked that
Governor Zéspedes require a response. Notary Domingo Rodríguez de León reported
having contacted the parents for their answer, and that they told him the only reason they
had for objecting was their son’s tender age and “infantile capacity.” They would not
grant the permission, though they realized the governor could do so. And he did, “the
reasons given by Juan Suárez [Bartolomé’s father] not being sufficient to deny his son the
permission he seeks.”496
In 1790, Gaspar Candelario petitioned for permission to marry Angela Rosi,
stating that her father refused, and requesting that Governor Quesada compel José Rosi to
provide reasons for his objection. Candelario’s cousin don Domingo Reyes, his only
relative present in St. Augustine, also had refused. Governor Quesada issued an order on
18 August that Rosi and Reyes both provide reasons for withholding permission for the
two to marry, setting a deadline of two days for their responses. The two men had not
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responded by 21 August, when Candelario renewed his petition and asked that the
governor enforce compliance with his order of the 18th. On that same day, Notary León
reported having contacted Reyes. Reyes had said he had no objection, and granted his
permission for his cousin to marry. Once again, on 23 August, Candelario petitioned the
governor to compel José Rosi to comply, requesting that the governor charge him with
rebeldía, refusal to comply with a judicial order.497 Rosi finally complied, granting his
permission, and Governor Quesada approved Candelario’s petition. Candelario’s original
petition contained a plea that Rosi be instructed that in the time between the petition and
the governor’s ruling he “not threaten or maltreat in any manner” his daughter. Rosi
possibly had a violent temper.498
Gaspar Candelario apparently died before 1797, because in that year Antonio
Coruña petitioned to marry Angela Rosi, widow. This time it was Coruña’s father who
withheld his permission, refusing to state his reasons. Angela’s father José Rosi may
have learned his lesson, as he raised no objection to the match. Governor Enrique White
gave José Coruña three days in which to either provide his reasons for opposing the
marriage or grant his permission. The prospective groom’s father complied with the
order to respond, stating that he “opposed and opposes the marriage” on the grounds that
neither Antonio nor Angela had any resources, “not even a bed to sleep in,” and that his
son’s salary was inadequate to support Angela and her two children from her prior
marriage. The elder Coruña’s refusal continued emphatically for several more lines. The
governor found the reasons for the objection inadequate, and granted the license.499 As
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discussed in Chapter Four, this case is unusual in that the parent withholding permission
objected to the qualities of his own child rather than to the qualities of his child’s choice
of marriage partner.
Also in Chapter Four appeared the case of doña Felicitas Almanza, whose mother
objected to her marriage to don Juan Blas Entralgo, on the basis of the prospective
groom’s poverty and inability to support a family. Governor White found that the
mother’s objections in this case failed the “just and rational” test, and ruled in favor of
doña Felicitas.500 The parents’ concern in these two cases was based on the perceived
inability of the prospective grooms to support their families.
María Wisten petitioned the governor to order Francisco Arnau, father of her
intended Santiago Arnau, to grant permission for the marriage. Governor White so
ordered, giving the elder Arnau two days in which to present his reasons for opposing the
marriage. The deadline passed without a response from Arnau, and María petitioned
again that Arnau be ordered to supply permission for his son to marry, or explain why he
refused to do so. She asked the governor to declare Arnau in rebeldía. Arnau never did
respond to the governor’s orders. White issued the permission, citing the provision in
Article Nine of the 1776 decree that a couple facing parental opposition had recourse to
the courts, and that the decision of the tribunal to endorse or overturn the parental
objection was final.501 White did not address the question of rebeldía in his ruling.
Guillermo Holzendorf had promised marriage to Antonia Leonardy, but his father
had not only refused permission, but had forbidden Guillermo to leave their plantation for
any reason. Guillermo stated his obligation to keep his promise to Antonia, asking the
500

Petition of doña Felicitas Almanza for permission to marry don Juan Blas de Entralgo.
María Wisten protests the refusal of Francisco Arnau to consent to his son’s marriage to her,
Matrimonial licenses, Reel 132, Bundle 298R9, No. 120, East Florida Papers.
501

161

governor to require the elder Holzendorf to grant permission or provide his reasons for
refusing, and to free him from being the victim of his father’s punishment. On 7 July
1801, Governor White gave Juan Holzendorf, the father, two days in which to respond.
Promptly on 9 July, Guillermo filed another petition seeking his father’s compliance with
the governor’s order. This time, Juan Holzendorf was given three days in which to
reply. Again, the father did not respond.
The son filed another petition on 16 July, in which he asked that the governor
grant the permission he needed in order to marry. The case was complicated by the
presentation of a letter Guillermo wrote on 12 July to his mother, who appeared to have
been living separately from her husband. A line in the letter, which was in English,
expressed Guillermo’s regret that “I ken it not in my power to drop this business for it is
gone too far.” Juan Holzendorf presented a petition with his interpretation of his son’s
remark as expressing regret over his promise to marry Antonia. However, in another line
in the letter, Guillermo offered to live with his mother after he married, which indicated
that he still held the intent to marry. Juan Holzendorf stated that the letter demonstrated
his son’s “imbecility and poor judgment, and that his intentions were the effect of his
youth.” He asked the governor to “absolve the said, my son, of the supposed contract
and restore the patria potestad.” Further, said Juan, “Neither now nor later will I give my
paternal consent, for reasons that I reserve in my breast.” Governor White found reasons
concealed in one’s breast inadequate to prevent the marriage. A parent’s reasons had to
be stated in order for civil officials to determine whether those reasons were indeed just
and rational. White ruled that the letter was immaterial, as Guillermo had stated to the
tribunal after the date of the letter that he did intend and desire to marry Antonia, and that
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he renewed his petition to have his father’s consent compelled. On 21 July, White
granted the permission.502
The intention of don Joaquín Sánchez Ceballos and doña María Rita Bravo y
Prados to marry was blocked by the objection of María’s aunt, doña Rosalia Prados.
Joaquín petitioned the governor for relief, and included also the fact that he had no one in
St. Augustine to grant him permission. Governor Zéspedes gave doña Rosalia two days
in which to respond. She replied through Notary León, stating that she refused to give
consent and refused to provide her reasons for doing so. She also asked that the governor
place her niece in depósito for her “provocative” behavior. Zéspedes found doña
Rosalia’s answer “neither sufficient nor legitimate.” He gave doña Rosalia one day in
which to either consent or provide reasons for her objection, or face a charge of rebeldía.
She refused, and Zéspedes did charge doña Rosalia with rebeldía. Though other
governors were urged by petitioners to do so, Zéspedes was the only one who followed
through on pressing such charges. Joaquín and María were granted permission to
marry.503 The cases of Guillermo Holzendorf and Joaquín Sánchez Ceballos show that
governors in St. Augustine interpreted the demand that parents have “just and rational”
reasons to include the presentation of those reasons to the tribunal. Simply having
reasons but not expressing them to the court was not acceptable.
Vicente Valencia petitioned Governor Zéspedes to order “the relatives most near
the said Francisca Galloso” to either provide permission for her to marry him or give
their reasons for withholding the permission. The first page of the document, Valencia’s

502

Petition of Guillermo Holzendorf to compel his father’s consent to his marriage to Antonia Leonardy,
Matrimonial licenses, Reel 132, Bundle 298R9, No. 137, East Florida Papers.
503
Petition of Joaquín Sánchez Ceballos to compel doña Rosalia Prados’s consent to his marriage to María
Rita Bravo y Prados, Matrimonial licenses, Reel 132, Bundle 298R9, No. 21, East Florida Papers.

163

petition, has faded into unreadability. The only writing discernible on the page is
Valencia’s signature. The rest of the document, however, is readable, and it is possible to
piece together Valencia’s petition from the governor’s order. Zéspedes gave the
unnamed relative or relatives two days in which to respond to his order. Notary León
reported that he contacted Francisca Galloso’s older sister, Getrudis Galloso y Chapus,
who stated she had no reason at all to object to the marriage, and gave her consent to it.
For the consent granted by Getrudis, and for the reason that there was no inequality
between Francisca and Vicente, Zéspedes granted permission for them to marry.504 The
comment on inequality stems from Vicente’s statement, later in the document, that he had
lost his certificate of baptism. He asked that witnesses be called to testify to his practice
as a Catholic. The idea of inequality in this case appears to have had a religious basis.
Doña María de la Concepción Perry petitioned for permission to marry don
Ramón de Fuentes. Her mother objected on the grounds of María’s age: she was thirteen
years old. Fuentes was around forty-two years of age at the time. Governor Zéspedes
ordered the mother, doña María Hassett, to respond with permission or with reasons to
withhold it, under threat of a charge of rebeldía. Notary León informed the mother that
she had one day in which to respond. She charged that her daughter had been induced to
consent to the union, accusing chief engineer don Mariano de la Rocque and his wife of
being complicit, as young doña María had been placed in depósito in their home. It
appears that the mother was not Catholic, for she charged that her daughter had also been
induced by others to convert to Catholicism.
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Young doña María replied that she had not been induced or persuaded, but had on
her own volition sent word to her mother by Father Miguel O’Reilly that she intended to
marry don Ramón. The mother had told Father O’Reilly that she would send a response
to her daughter in two or three days, but then on that same day sent her other daughter to
fetch María and force her to return to her mother’s house, against her will. María also
stated that her mother had said she’d rather see María dead than converted to
Catholicism. María’s conversion would be a necessary step for her to marry don Ramón.
When ordered again to provide consent or reasons for withholding it, the mother stated
that by no means would she give consent, having no impediment to offer other than
María’s tender age. The governor granted the license for the marriage.505 As María was
above the legal age of consent for marriage, which was twelve for females, her mother
could not use María’s age as grounds to object.
On 16 November 1786, Pedro Fontanet and María Luisa Rodrígues filed a joint
petition. María filed on grounds that she had no one in St. Augustine of whom to ask
permission to marry. Pedro filed to obtain an order from Governor Zéspedes that his
older brother provide permission or state his reasons for denying it. Zéspedes gave the
brother, José Fontanet, one day in which to respond. José’s petition begins with the
statement that he was “forzado de las Reales Obras de esta Plaza,” at forced labor on the
public works of the town. This document does not state what José’s offense may have
been. José’s occupation was as the chief cook at the royal hospital; Pedro was his
assistant, and at the time of filing this petition, Pedro was the interim chief cook. José’s
charges were that Pedro was “an undisciplined boy of juvenile behavior;” that María, the
intended bride, was “old enough to be his [Pedro’s] mother;” that María, an English
505
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woman, had been sent from Pensacola to Havana to St. Augustine, and that no one knew
whether she was married or not, nor whether she was indeed a widow, as she had two
children; and that she did not have documentation of baptism in the Catholic faith, nor of
her widowhood. José also charged that Pedro’s “miserable salary of three reales” was not
enough to support a family.506
Pedro replied on 18 November, within the one-day deadline Zéspedes had set for
his response. All the points his brother raised, said Pedro, were strange. Pedro stated that
his bosses at the hospital said he carried out his duties responsibly and maturely. As to
the age difference between Pedro and María, he was twenty-five, and she twenty-seven,
hardly old enough to be his mother. It becomes apparent that José was exaggerating, and
his subsequent claims appear less credible. Further reducing José’s credibility was his
claim regarding Pedro’s salary, which as assistant cook at the royal hospital was ten
pesos per month.507 Whether, as acting chief cook in his brother’s stead, Pedro was
earning his brother’s usual salary of eighteen pesos per month is not known. Ten pesos
may not have been a large salary, but it was certainly more than three reales.508
Reasons for María’s movements from Pensacola to Havana to St. Augustine did
not necessarily mean there was any diriment impediment to the marriage, Pedro said. As
for the children, they were legitimate, María’s husband having died. He was an
Englishman, therefore most likely Protestant. Pedro stated that María’s purpose in
leaving Pensacola “was caused by the great desire to leave Protestantism (luteranismo),
and take instruction in the solid foundation of the Catholic religion.” María had her
506

Petition of Pedro Fontanet and María Luisa Rodríguez, Matrimonial licenses, Rel 132, Bundle 298R9,
No. 17, East Florida Papers.
507
Joseph Byrne Lockey, East Florida, 1783-1785: A File of Documents Assembled and Many of Them
Translated, edited by John Walton Caughey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 199.
508
Eight reales made one peso.

166

baptismal certificate, a copy of which was appended to the file. She had been baptized in
Havana on 9 August 1784.
Zéspedes granted permission for the marriage, and passed to the ecclesiastical
judge, Father Hassett, the task of determining María’s status as a widow and if there were
any other diriment impediment to the marriage.509 Apparently there were no such serious
impediments, as Pedro and María married on 9 January 1787.510 José Fontanet may not
have been released from “forced labor on the public works of the town” as early as he
thought he might, for Governor Zéspedes entered against him a charge of rebeldía.511
Finally, there is the case of don Manuel de Almansa’s opposition to the marriage
of his nephew don Mariano to doña María Ramona de Miranda. Governor Zéspedes gave
don Manuel two days in which to respond to don Mariano’s charge that his uncle’s
refusal was not reasonable. The complication in this case is that not only was don
Manuel the nearest relative who was qualified to give permission, and thereby had the
power of the patria potestad to grant or withhold that permission, he also was don
Mariano’s boss. Don Manuel was the chief quartermaster of the castillo, and don
Mariano was his assistant. Don Mariano was required to receive the permission of his
superior in order to marry.
Don Manuel stated that his objection was not based on any inequality between the
two, but that their engagement had been hasty and, in his opinion, entered into solely for
the purpose of engaging in premarital sex (si solo abrazarse con la lizencia mia o del
tribunal). He also charged that the couple had evaded asking their parents’ permission.
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Don Mariano’s parents, living in Spain, had appealed to don Manuel that their son did not
have the means to support a family, and so don Manuel denied permission. This
statement was not enough for the governor, and he ordered don Manuel once more to
grant permission for the marriage. Don Manuel refused, stating that his initial statement
would not change. Zéspedes found don Manuel’s reasons insufficient to prevent the
marriage, and issued permission for the couple to proceed to the ecclesiastical judge for
the expediente matrimonial. He also charged don Manuel with rebeldía.512 In one order
in this file, Zéspedes mentions letters in his possession relevant to the case. It is possible
that he corresponded with don Mariano’s parents, and found that don Manuel was not
being completely truthful.
Governor Zéspedes, as the only governor between 1784 and 1803 to charge
objecting parents or other relatives with rebeldía, took the harshest stand against parental
objection to their children’s marriages. In light of his own disobedient daughter’s
clandestine marriage to Lieutenant John O’Donovan, and the threat that such an occasion
presented to Zéspedes’s personal and family honor, this became an interesting stand for
him. Yet the reasons for objections by parents or other relatives to these twelve
marriages did not meet the test of being based in a concern for “grave offenses” to the
honor of a family or of the state. Some of the reasons were frivolous, if not completely
imaginary, such as José Fontanet’s trumped-up reasons for denying permission to his
brother Pedro, or don Manuel de Almansa’s fear that his nephew may have had nothing
more in mind than engaging in premarital sex with his intended. In St. Augustine, that
would not have been of great concern, as it has been shown that many couples engaged in
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premarital sex under the umbra of the palabra de casamiento, and even had children out
of wedlock, some of whom were later legitimized by the parents’ marriages. In addition,
the notorious concubinage practiced by men such as Francisco Xavier Sánchez, George J.
F. Clarke, and others seemed not even to have raised an eyebrow.

Clandestine Marriage
Clandestine marriage has been shown to have been a problem in St. Augustine,
from the marriage of Lieutenant O’Donovan and Dominga de Zéspedes to AngloAmericans who developed the habit of sneaking across the border into Georgia to be
married in Protestant ceremonies. These prohibited marriages continued long after the
issuance of the pragmática, and even after the decree of 1803, which drastically changed
marriage law. In 1806, Judge Fernando de la Puente wrote to Governor Enrique White,
reporting that Isaac Carter had eloped across the border with Clarissa Silcox. De la
Puente felt it his duty to report the marriage to the governor, “as these clandestine
marriages are scandalous, and with repetition they propagate a bad example in the rural
areas of the province.”513

Effects of Changes to the Pragmática
A decree of 31 May 1783 tightened the requirements for parental consent. It
required that those over the age of twenty-five must seek and receive parental consent.
The original pragmática required only that those over twenty-five seek parental counsel
and advice before marrying. Thus it is that the marriage license petitions of St.
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Augustine contain requests for permission to marry from people in their forties and
fifties, including the absurd phenomenon of a twice-widowed woman of age 56, Mary
Evans, petitioning for permission on the basis of having no parents or other relatives
authorized to provide permission. Such absurdity would end with the decree of 10 April
1803, allowing men over twenty-five and women over twenty-three to marry without
having to ask for parental permission.
There was apparently a widespread practice in Spanish America of people other
than the two parties to a proposed marriage filing petitions on behalf of the marital
couple. There were at least two such cases in St. Augustine, both occurring in 1786.
Rafael Ximenez, uncle of Juana Ximenez, filed a petition on her behalf, providing
permission for her to marry Juan Triay and requesting the governor to approve that
permission and issue the license for the couple to proceed to the ecclesiastical judge.514
Antonio Pons’s older brother petitioned on Antonio’s behalf, for permission for Antonio
to marry Benita Alcina.515 This practice was outlawed in a decree issued 18 September
1788, which stated that only the prospective groom or the prospective bride, or both
jointly, could enter a petition requesting permission to marry.516
However in 1791 in St. Augustine, F. P. Fatio filed a petition on behalf of his
ward, orphan Juana Cross, that she be granted permission to marry Fatio’s son Felipe.
The petition was received by the governor and permission was granted. Here was
another case of an exception being made for an elite individual.
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CHAPTER TEN:
CONCLUSIONS

The Pragmática in the Spanish World
Saether’s contention, mentioned in Chapter Two, that the Bourbon reforms were
not intended to curb the Church may describe his interpretation of intent. However, the
effect was to interpose a civil layer over the Church’s management of the sacrament of
marriage. As seen in Chapter Seven in the discussion of the Siete Partidas, the idea of
the state interposing its power to decide, among other aspects of marriage, the question of
who was eligible to marry did not originate in the pragmática. The idea that unequal
marriages were a problem was also not new with the pragmática. To judge by the
comments of José Tenebra, twenty-four years before the Pragmatic Sanction, there had
been concern over such marriages for some time.
The issuance of the pragmática resulted not from one cause but from many, and
certainly not just from the problem of don Luis de Borbón’s marriage choice. A general
social movement in favor of patriarchy and the rights and authority of fathers, concern
over unequal marriages, the aristocracy’s need to assert itself and maintain the class
structure, and the tension always existing between church and state all contributed to the
conditions which brought about the Pragmatic Sanction on marriage. Don Luis’s
indiscretions and an unequal marriage choice that hit a bit too close to home for the

171

king’s comfort may have been the last straw, but the foundation for the decree had been
laid long before the crown prince was of dating age.
Unfortunately, neither the original pragmática nor its 1778 extension to the
colonies defined “unequal” marriage. There is no statement in the decree that race was
the only valid reason for a parental dissent, as Katzew, Martínez and Twinam claim, or
that it was one at all. The 1776 pragmática vaguely stated that a valid reason was one
which involved the possible dishonor of a family or disturbance of the good order of the
state. That did leave room for interpretation, as some Spaniards might have seen an
interracial marriage as threatening the “honor” of a family. Vague language, then, can
lead to a variety of interpretations, influenced by local practice and individual prejudice.
Such an interpretation may have been applied to or inferred from the king’s opening
statement that in the Indies there were “other various circumstances which do not occur
in Spain,” a possible reference to the occurrence of mixed marriages in Spanish
America.517
Was there racism in Spanish America? Certainly there was. Boyer quotes
Spanish jurist José Solórzano Pereira as saying “few Spaniards of honor . . . would marry
an Indian or Negro woman.”518 Daniel Schafer points out that racial prejudice existed in
East Florida, but that it was of a different, less harsh character than that in the
neighboring United States. The 1778 decree specifically states that mixed-race people
and negroes were excluded because of difficulties in obtaining parental permission. That
might have been an ostensible reason, a smoke-screen for another motive, possibly racist.
However, members of black militias were included in the application of these marriage
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rules due to their distinguished service; therefore, the provisions of the decree did not act
to exclude all blacks. This may have been an exception that proved the rule; that is to
say, blacks had to be extraordinary in some way in order to be included.
It is true that in supporting so strongly a father’s right to pass judgment on a
child’s marriage choice, the documents of 1776 and 1778 provided the means for
protesting an interracial marriage. It is possible that the documents these scholars studied
in Mexico and other parts of Latin America revealed an application of the 1778 decree
that was determinedly and specifically prohibitive of interracial marriage based on local
attitudes. It is possible that the parents who expressed disapproval of their children’s
marriages, if race were involved, argued against interracial marriage, basing their
arguments on what they saw, or wanted to see, in the decree. The language simply is not
there to support the argument that the 1778 decree specifically prohibited interracial
marriage. The assertions by Katzew, Martínez, and Twinam that the intent of the decree
was overtly racist can be challenged. To maintain that the 1778 decree specifically
prohibited interracial marriages is simply not correct.
In its incorporation of the provisions of the 1776 Pragmatic Sanction, and in its
own language throughout, the 1778 decree was most concerned with the obligation on the
part of children to honor the wishes of their parents and ask them for permission to
marry. In this, these decrees overthrew centuries of support on the part of church and
state for free will in marriage choice. What both of these decrees did more than anything
else was to lend legal support to the patriarchy.
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The Pragmática in St. Augustine
What conclusions may we draw from the application of the real pragmática de
casamientos in St. Augustine? For one thing, if one studied only St. Augustine for clues
concerning the intent and effect of the pragmática, one would not draw the conclusion
that it was overtly racist, as did scholars who studied Mexico. The interracial marriages
cited in the previous chapters occurred without objection by relatives or the authorities,
and the couples were wed in the Church. Certainly such marriages were rare in St.
Augustine, with five out of 146 being such mixed marriages. However, no one suggested
that the racial disparity was a serious impediment to the marriages. The marriage license
petitions of these parties were treated as any other, and only one of them mentioned the
mixed race of the bride at all. That there were not more mixed marriages suggests, of
course, that prejudice did exist, that whites and blacks in St. Augutine more often chose
marriage partners of their own racial classification. But such separation may have been
due much more to individual preference, even prejudice, in combination with social
pressure than to the stated requirements of the real pragmática de casamientos.
Don Juan Leonardy raised several issues in his objection to the marriage of his
mother doña Agueda Coll to Juan Bernardo Sánchez. Don Juan offered the only raciallybased objection found in these records, and it turned on the prospective groom having
Indian, not black, blood. Was there a gendered standard operating here? The five cases
of white men marrying quadroon or mulata women brought no objection from family
members. Perhaps it was all right for men to marry interracially, but at least to one famly
member it was unacceptable for a white woman to marry a racially-mixed man.
Officialdom in St. Augustine, in the person of Governor White, did not seem to agree, as

174

he dismissed the issue of Juan Bernardo Sánchez’s origins. Not only social and racial
equality but also honor was a concern for don Juan in objecting to his mother’s planned
marriage. Don Juan’s protest indicated he did not think of Sánchez as a man of honor.
Also at play in this case was the concept of who could and could not wield the
patria potestad. According to Governor White, children could not exercise such power
over their parents, and therefore don Juan Leonardy was not qualified either to grant
permission or to object to his mother’s planned marriage. The issue for Governor White
was whether or not doña Agueda complied with the pragmática in showing that she had
no qualified persons from whom to ask permission to marry. It was on that basis that he
granted permission.
Honor played a large part in the clandestine marriage of Lieutenant John
O’Donovan and Dominga Zéspedes, affecting not only the family of the governor but
also the household of don Mariano de la Rocque. Honor was also uppermost in the
request from don Sebastián Berazaluce that don José Genaro Chaple be arrested for
failure to keep his promise of marriage to Manuela Berazaluce. As well, the many
petitions which included witness testimony that the petitioner and his or her family were
honorable indicates strong concern with honor.
The Spanish concept of limpieza de sangre had both racial and religious
implications in St. Augustine. Race was referred to in regard to that phrase, as in “clean
of all vile race of Negro, mulatto, Jew, or Moor.” More often it was religion, and in St.
Augustine there was only one church allowed, the Catholic Church. Thus there was a
requirement that Protestants who wanted to marry Catholics had to convert to
Catholicism. This requirement was part of the case of María de la Concepción Perry,
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whose mother objected partly on the grounds of María’s desire for such conversion in
order to marry don Ramón de Fuentes. Doña María del Carmen Hill likewise converted
to the Catholic faith in order to marry don Francisco Xavier Sánchez.519

Success or Failure?
Did the real pragmática de casamientos succeed in its goals? If the goal was to
enforce the patria potestad, it succeeded only partially. It took passage of the decree of
1803, absolving parents of the need to provide any reasons for their disapproval of a
child’s marriage, to solidify paternal authority regarding marriage. Such unconditional
authority, however, could be circumvented simply by waiting until the age of consent
specified in the 1803 decree. If the goal was to prevent interracial marriages, as Katzew,
Martínez, and Twinam claim, it was a failure in St. Augustine, as there were at least five
interracial marriages approved by governors Zéspedes and White, without the least
suggestion of opposition by parents or other family members, and one approved by
Governor White over a family member’s objection. It also failed to prevent interracial
concubinage, for there were several men in East Florida who kept black or mulatto
consorts: Francisco Xavier Sánchez, George J. F. Clarke, Charles Clarke, Zephaniah
Kingsley, John Leslie, Miguel Ysnardy, Thomas Tunno, and others.520 And if the
pragmática had the intent of preventing clandestine marriages, it was a dismal failure in
St. Augustine, for clandestine marriages persisted long after the pragmática, and long
after the decree of 10 April 1803. The spate of lawsuits and the frequent modification of
the pragmática by subsequent decrees and royal orders, and the passage of the 1803
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decree, also support the argument that, at least in St. Augustine, the pragmática was a
failure.
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